Battered Women and Identity Work: Negotiating Agency, Responsibility, and Justice with the State by Leisenring, Amy
University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
University Libraries Digitized Theses 189x-20xx University Libraries
Spring 4-13-2004
Battered Women and Identity Work: Negotiating
Agency, Responsibility, and Justice with the State
Amy Leisenring
University of Colorado Boulder
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/print_theses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by University Libraries at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in University
Libraries Digitized Theses 189x-20xx by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact
cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leisenring, Amy, "Battered Women and Identity Work: Negotiating Agency, Responsibility, and Justice with the State" (2004).
University Libraries Digitized Theses 189x-20xx. 177.
http://scholar.colorado.edu/print_theses/177
BATTERED WOMEN AND IDENTITY WORK: NEGOTIATING AGENCY, 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND JUSTICE WITH THE STATE
by
AMY LEISENRING 
BA., Miami University of Ohio, 1994 
M.A., New Mexico State University, 1997
A thesis submitted to the 
Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment 
of the requirement for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Sociology 
2004
This thesis entitled:
BATTERED WOMEN AND IDENTITY WORK: NEGOTIATING AGENCY, 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND JUSTICE WITH THE STATE 
written by Amy Leisenring 
has been approved for the Department of Sociology
The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find both 
the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in
the above mentioned discipline.
HRC protocol #: 0101.32
Abstract
Leisenring, Amy (Ph.D., Sociology)
Battered Women and Identity Work: Negotiating Agency, Responsibility, and Justice 
with the State
Thesis directed by Assistant Professor AnnJanette Rosga
Sine the 1970s when the battered women’s movement brought increased 
public attention to the issue of woman battering, a set of domestic violence discourses 
have emerged. These discourses have been influenced by a variety of social 
institutions. Through such discourses, the “battered woman” has been represented in 
specific ways. In this dissertation, I draw from discourse analysis, symbolic 
interactionism, poststructuralism, and feminist theory in order to explore the 
relationship between discourse, subjectivity, and the criminalization ot domestic 
violence. Through an examination of current criminal justice domestic violence 
policy, interviews with prosecutors who work with domestic violence cases and 
interviews with women who have experienced violence in the context of an intimate 
relationship, I examine how domestic violence discourses: (1) re(present) victims of 
woman battering; (2) influence the interpretive processes of both criminal justice 
system professionals and battered women in their interactions with one another; and 
(3) situate and mediate the experiences of both criminal justice system professionals 
and battered women. I demonstrate that mainstream representations of abused 
women both enable and limit the self-constructions and presentations of battered 
women and ultimately impact the women’s experiences, particularly in the context of 
the criminal justice system. However, as I illustrate, despite being constrained by the 
institutional power o f the criminal justice system, battered women are never 
completely powerless and are able to engage in acts of agency and resistance.
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Joanne Belknap for hiring me as a research assistant and introducing me to the 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
Much attention has been given to woman battering in the United States since 
the 1970s when feminists first declared it a “legitimate” social problem (Schechter,
1982). In the past several decades, a domestic violence discourse has emerged, 
produced in a wide variety of social arenas. Domestic violence, as Ferraro (1996) 
states, “is both a term with specific legal and social definitions and a discourse which 
reflects and perpetuates cultural assumptions” (p. 78). While certainly not a unified 
discourse, arguably there are many dominant themes and trends in the ways in which 
domestic violence is conceptualized and portrayed.1
At the heart of domestic violence discourses rests the image of the “battered 
woman.” Domestic violence discourses have constructed and represented the 
“battered woman” in very specific, yet often complex, ways. This identity of 
“battered woman” is strongly tied to larger discourses surrounding female victims of 
abuse in general. As many theorists have argued, there exists an assumption of 
uniformity in battered women’s experiences (Ferraro, 1996; Loseke 1992). Domestic 
violence criminal justice policy and practice are not only based on dominant cultural 
representations of battered women, but simultaneously reproduce them. This is 
potentially problematic, as assuming that battered women are a homogenous 
population prohibits the criminal justice system from fully addressing the myriad of 
problems domestic violence raises.
The purpose of this work is to consider ways in which domestic violence 
discourses have constructed and (re)presented victims of woman battering and to
explore the “real-world” implications of these representations. Numerous sources 
have participated in the creation and reproduction of domestic violence discourses: 
victims’ advocates and shelter workers; the media; law enforcement officials and 
criminal justice agents; therapists and psychologists; victims of abuse; and 
researchers from a number of different fields such as biology, psychology, social 
work, criminology, women’s studies, and sociology (Ferraro, 1996; Lamb, 1999). An 
examination of all of these sources would be quite an ambitious project. Thus, while 
I consider each source theoretically and examine the “bigger picture” produced by the 
merged conversations from all of the sources, I elaborate on only several of them. I 
focus particularly on the roles of the criminal justice system and the battered 
women’s movement in the creation of domestic violence discourses. My exploration 
of the way in which these discourses manifest themselves interactively and how they 
are deployed in the “real world” is centered both on members of the criminal justice 
system and battered women, themselves.
Through an examination of current domestic violence criminal justice policy, 
interviews with prosecutors who work with domestic violence cases, and interviews 
with forty women who have experienced violence in the context of an intimate 
relationship, I explore, broadly, the relationship between subjectivity and discourse. I 
am interested in understanding how domestic violence discourses—including 
criminal justice policy—situate and mediate the experiences of both agents of the 
criminal justice system and victims of domestic violence whose cases go through the 
criminal justice system. Additionally, I explore how the discursive construction of 
the identities of “battered woman” and “victim,” particularly in the criminal justice
system, directly impacts the lives of women who experience domestic violence. I 
examine how women make meaning of these constructions and the contexts in which 
they accept or reject them in order to make sense of their experiences and have their 
needs met while they are involved in the criminal justice system.
The bulk of this chapter consists of a discussion of the four bodies of 
literature that inform or “frame” this project: (1) discourse analysis; (2) poststructural 
feminism; (3) symbolic interactionist approaches to victimization; and (4) feminist 
criminological approaches to domestic violence. After presenting these bodies of 
literature, I then discuss the methods I used to conduct my research and the 
methodological and epistemological background of this study.
In Chapter Two, I provide historical background on the roots of modem 
domestic violence discourses, focusing particularly on the way these discourses have 
been influenced by the battered women’s movement, the criminal justice system, and 
the complex relationship between the two. Chapter Three follows with an 
examination of the ways in which battered women have been represented by 
mainstream domestic violence discourses; this involves a consideration of both 
dominant cultural constructions and the ways in which battered women are 
represented in criminal justice domestic violence policy.
In Chapter Four, I examine interviews with twenty-one prosecutors in order to 
illuminate how dominant domestic violence discourses influence the meaning-making 
processes of prosecutors who work with battered women view; specifically, I 
examine how the prosecutors draw from these discourses in their interactions with the 
domestic violence victims with whom they work. Chapters Five through Seven are
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based on my interviews with forty women who were abused by an intimate partner 
and were somehow involved with the criminal justice system because of this abuse. 
All three of these chapters examine the way in which domestic violence discourses 
shape both the self-construction of battered woman and their lived experiences. In 
Chapter Five, I examine the ways in which the “victim” has been discursively 
constructed and explore how these constructions are central to the ways in which 
women make sense of themselves and their experiences. Chapter Six is structured 
very similarly to Chapter Five, yet involves an examination of women’s identity work 
with discursive constructions of the “battered woman.” Given that Chapters Five and 
Six are interrelated, I present conclusions relevant to both at the end of Chapter Six. 
Finally, Chapter Seven examines how dominant cultural constructions of the “victim” 
and the “battered woman” are central to the interactional processes of the criminal 
justice system; I focus specifically on communications between battered women and 
criminal justice system professionals, including police officers, attorneys, and judges. 
My concluding chapter highlights some of my most important findings surrounding 
the relationship between discourse and subjectivity, issues of agency and resistance, 
and implications of the criminalization of domestic violence.
As I will demonstrate, social scientists have extensively written about and 
researched the topic of domestic violence, particularly as a legal issue. We know 
about women’s experiences with police officers and in the courts (Erez and Belknap, 
1998; Ferraro and Pope, 1993; Ford and Regoli, 1993). Researchers have also 
examined the effects of criminal justice policy on the reoccurrence of domestic 
violence (Ford and Regoli, 1993; Hirschel, Hutchinson, and Dean, 1992). Literature
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exists that analyzes the history of the battered woman’s movement in relation to the 
criminal justice system (Schechter, 1982), the creation of domestic violence 
discourses (Ferarro, 1996; O’Neill, 1998), and the ramifications of the criminalization 
of domestic violence (Schneider, 2000). Several researchers have also examined the 
processes surrounding how a woman becomes labeled a “victim” or “battered 
woman” and the ramifications of this (Dunn, 2001; Lamb, 1999; Loseke, 1992, 
Mahoney, 1994). The bulk of this work, however, has commonly been confined to 
the particular theoretical subfield of the researcher or theorist. What is missing is a 
multidisciplinary investigation that combines these approaches. For example, with 
several exceptions (see, for example, Dunn, 2001), we know little about how battered 
women draw from particular discourses in their negotiations with the criminal justice 
system. Moore (1994) argues that the concept of violence in the social sciences is 
“remarkably undertheorized,” and states: “.. .there is an obvious need to integrate the 
sociological and psychological theories of interpersonal violence with theories about 
meaning, representation and symbolism” (p. 139). My work is an attempt to 
undertake such a project and by doing so, fills an important gap in the literature.
In this dissertation, I bring together feminist theory, symbolic interactionism, 
and discourse analysis to form a multifaceted lens through which to examine the way 
battered women are situated through the criminalization of domestic violence. I 
consider the criminal justice system to be a central site where meanings about 
domestic violence and battered women are produced and reproduced, both through 
the creation of criminal justice policy and through interactions between battered 
women and criminal justice system professionals. (However, my examination of
domestic violence discourse is not just limited to the criminal justice system, given
that a variety of other social institutions have participated in the creation of this
discourse). Tamar Pitch (1995) writes:
Various theoretical schools see social control as productive of consciousness, 
personality, identity, organization and as implying complex processes of 
interaction. Social control involves therefore not only the macro processes of social 
organization and social integration, but also the micro processes which.. .produce 
consensus or shared meanings as an end result.” (pp. 13-14)
I hope to illuminate the relationship between these macro and micro processes that
are involved in the state’s attempts at controlling domestic violence. I explore how
institutional discourses created through the criminalization of domestic violence
shape identity and patterns of interaction—or, more specifically—the understandings
that both battered women and agents of the criminal justice system have of
themselves and each other. I argue that is these discursive practices that allow for the
creation of “institutional selves” necessary to “conduct institutional business”
(Spencer, 2001, p. 158).
This work also addresses important questions about when and how feminists 
should engage with the state over the issue of violence against women. In particular, 
my research highlights tensions in feminist lawmaking over what Schneider (2000) 
terms “particularity” and “generality.” As she argues, it is important for the law to 
accurately capture the complexity of women’s experiences, while simultaneously 
exploring the “general dimensions” of woman battering, recognizing: “first, that it is a 
facet of women’s subordination in society; and second, that it is linked to larger 
problems of societal violence” (p. 59). However, as I will demonstrate, both the 
structure of the criminal justice system and the ways in which domestic violence has
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been constructed have, in many ways, prevented this, and battered women have 
suffered the consequences.
Review of the literature
This work draws from four bodies of diverse—yet often interconnected and 
overlapping—literatures. They include: (1) discourse analysis; (2) poststructural 
feminism; (3) symbolic interactionism; and (4) feminist sociological and 
criminological approaches to domestic violence. In the next several sections, I will 
discuss each of these literatures and the ways in which they inform my work. 
Discourse Theory/Analysis
In recent decades, many theorists have demonstrated the benefits of discourse 
analysis in examining various aspects of social life. While such an approach is 
generally attributed to Foucault, it serves as the basis for the work of theorists and 
researchers in a number of different disciplines. Discourse analysis considers 
discourse to be much broader than just language or communication between people; 
instead, it is conceived as “the structured ways of knowing which are both produced 
in, and the shapers of, culture” (Ransom, 1993, p. 123). Thus, discourse provides a 
framework for viewing particular aspects of the social (Little, 1999).
Discourse is institutionalized in the practices of everyday life and as such, 
discourse analysis employs a somewhat unique view of power. According to 
Foucault, power is “coextensive with knowledge; where there is one, there is the 
other” (Ransom, 1993, p. 129). Little’s (1999) interpretation of Foucault’s 
conception of power reads as follows:
Power is not possessed, but exercised. It does not emanate from a dominant
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social group, but comes from everywhere. Because power is everywhere, Foucault 
can also assert that resistance is everywhere (1980a, 96). The goal of resistance is 
not to wrest some finite amount of power from another group; it is to produce an 
alternative power-laden discourse, (p. 164)
Thus, discourses, as are power sites, are plural and contested. According to Ransom
(1993), Foucault rejects “the idea of history as a process with a purpose” and instead
looks at social reality as fragmented and inextricably connected to power relations (p.
124). Because this perspective challenges and recasts traditional historical
understandings, it is interconnected with postmodernist traditions of thought.
Discourse also constructs subjectivity (Little, 1999). Examinations of social
discourse help to illuminate “the narrative conventions available for constructing the
individual and collective stories that are constitutive of people’s social identities”
(Fraser, 1989, p. 165). Instead of viewing a particular identity as grounded in nature
or some other essential condition, this perspective views identity as historically,
culturally, and politically constructed (Hall, 1996; Davis and Fisher, 1993; Butler and
Scott, 1992). Theorists such as Hall (1996), Butler (1992), and Scott (1992) argue
that people are not just situated by various discourses but also are constituted by, and
constitute themselves in the language of, such discourses (Butler, 1992). As such, the
subject is not only represented by discourse, but discourse produces and gives
meaning to the subject. Hall (1996) writes:
.. .how things are represented and the ‘machineries’ and regimes of representation 
in a culture do play a constitutive, and not merely a reflexive, after-the-event, role. 
This gives questions of culture and ideology, and the scenarios of representation— 
subjectivity, identity, politics—a formative, not merely an expressive, place in the 
constitution of social and political life. (p. 443)
Dominant cultural discourses then, in many ways, shape and even limit the actions 
available to those who occupy particular identities. For example, Deborah Little 
(1999), building on work by Fraser and Gordon, illustrates how dependency discourse 
in U.S. welfare policy “constructs a limited field of possibilities for participants” and 
results in the stigmatization of welfare recipients (p. 164). Many theorists refer to this 
as the process of hegemony, a term used by Antonio Gramsci to describe the 
discursive construction of power (Fraser, 1997). As Fraser (1997) states, hegemony 
“is the power to establish the ‘common sense’...o f a society, the fund of self-evident 
descriptions of social reality that normally go without saying” which includes “the 
power to establish authoritative definitions of social situations and social needs, the 
power to define the universe of legitimate disagreement, and the power to shape the 
political agenda” (p. 153).
Viewing identity as discursively constructed does not mean, however, that 
identities are unified, determined, or fixed; in fact, quite the contrary is true. As Scott
(1992) argues:
Treating the emergence of a new identity as a discursive event is not to introduce a
new form of linguistic determinism.......It is to refuse a separation between
‘experience’ and language and to insist instead on the productive quality of 
discourse. Subjects are constituted discursively, but there are conflicts among 
discursive systems, contradictions within any of them, multiple meanings possible 
for the concepts they deploy, (p. 34)
Fraser (1989) argues that there are rival interpretations of people’s needs in capitalist
welfare states, among which are: needs discourses from “experts” such as social
workers and policy makers; needs discourses originating from various oppositional
movements (e.g. welfare clients or people of color); and “reprivatization” discourses
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of constituencies who wish to send needs that have been newly problematized in the 
public sphere back to the private realm (p. 157). Thus, as Fraser demonstrates, 
because discourses are multiple, fluid, and often contradictory, so are the identities 
constituted by them.
However, while identities are not fixed and given, we cannot ignore the 
impact and effects of the way in which identity is discursively constructed; often, 
particular discourses construct identity as if it is inflexible and determined. Fraser 
(1989) reminds us that the identities constituted by various discourses are actually 
“highly political interpretations”; yet, because they are often not recognized as such 
they are assumed to be “real” (pp. 153-154).2 As both Fraser and Gordon (1994) and 
Little (1999) illustrate in their examinations of dependency discourse in U.S. welfare 
policy, an analysis of the way in which identities are discursively constituted can 
serve to challenge essentialized notions of identity, and allow for recognition that 
social identities are constructed in specific historical, social and cultural contexts.
We should also not assume that discursively constructed identities are never
challenged or resisted. As we have seen, Foucault argues that “discourses create the
capacity for resistance within themselves because they are multiple and
contradictory” (Little, 1999, p. 164). Fraser (1989) shows through her “needs talk”
analysis, that competing discourses have varied degrees of cultural legitimacy:
Some ways of talking about needs are institutionalized in the central arena of late 
capitalist societies: parliaments, academies, courts, and the mass circulation media. 
Other ways of talking about needs are enclaved as subcultural sociolects and 
normally excluded from the central discursive arenas, (p. 165)
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Thus, while some discourses are hegemonic, disproportionately influenced by the 
interests of the social and political elite, other discourses may be counterhegemonic 
(or “counterdiscourses”) and serve to resist or challenge mainstream interpretations. 
As Hall (1988) argues, hegemony always implies “the struggle to contest and dis­
organize an existing political formation” (p. 7). Individuals may draw, then, from 
competing discourses in an attempt to construct, solidify, alter, or resist their 
identities (Fraser, 1997).
A central method employed through discourse analysis is “genealogy.” As 
Bacchi (1999) states, “genealogy is recommended as a technique to historicize claims 
to knowledge, indicating shifts in thinking and acting around particular issues” (pp. 
40-41). Foucault used this approach to examine broad discourses of sexuality, 
medicine and criminology, but it may also be used to focus upon more narrow 
categories of analysis, in an attempt to examine the historical, cultural and political 
conditions that led to their emergence (see, for example, Bacchi, 2001).
Several theorists have debated whether Foucault’s genealogy allows for an 
explicit normative political analysis, arguing that any failure to do so would reflect a 
shortcoming of his work (Fraser, 1989; Ransom, 1993). Fraser (1989) has maintained 
that normative evaluation is an important, even necessary, part of the genealogical 
method. Demonstrating a commitment to a distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate forms of power, she illustrates the value of discourse analysis. In an 
attempt to examine and understand the complexities surrounding “needs talk” in late 
capitalist welfare state societies, she makes her focus of inquiry not needs themselves, 
but discourses about needs. Fraser maintains that this approach provides, among
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other things, better access to understanding how various discourses position people
“as specific sorts of subjects endowed with specific sorts of capacities for action; for
example as ‘normal’ or ‘deviant,’ as causally conditioned or freely self-determining,
as victims or as potential activists, as unique activists, as unique individuals or as
members of social groups” (p. 165). Fraser and Gordon (1994) build on this approach
to provide a critical genealogy of dependency discourse in the U.S. welfare reform
debate. They state:
By historicizing “dependency,” we aim to defamiliarize it, to render explicit 
assumptions and connotations that usually go without saying (e.g. assumptions 
about human nature, gender roles, the causes of poverty, the sources of entitlement, 
and what counts as work and as a contribution to society), (p. 5).
Fraser and Gordon use this method to contribute to a more thorough understanding of
contemporary debates surrounding U.S. welfare policy.
Many theorists have also argued that it is important to look at social policy as 
a form of discourse (see, for example, Bacchi, 1999 and Pitch, 1995). Such a 
perspective focuses on the production of meaning in the policy making process. 
Attention is given to the ways in which “arguments are structured, and objects and 
subjects are constituted in language” (Bacchi, 1999, p. 41). A discursive analysis of 
public policy looks not just at what can be said and thought, but also at who can 
speak, when, where and with what authority (Ball, 1990, p. 17). According to Bacchi 
(1999), when policy is viewed as discourse, there are three categories of effects that 
must be examined: (1) the ways in which subjects and subjectivities are constituted in 
discourse; (2) the effects following from the limits imposed on what can be said; and 
(3) the ‘lived effects’—or the material, real-world implications.
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Discourse analysis is central to my work. I examine how mainstream 
discourses surrounding women’s victimization, broadly, and domestic violence, more 
specifically, have constituted and represented battered women. In Chapter Three, I 
perform a genealogy of the concept of “battered woman,” examining the cultural and 
social forces that have created and shaped this social identity, paying particular 
attention to shifts over time. Central to this process, is Bacchi’s (1999) view that 
policy is a form of discourse. Criminal justice policy has been a major site for the 
production of dominant cultural meanings surrounding domestic violence. A 
thorough examination of domestic violence discourses in the criminal justice system 
reveals the ways that such discourses situate the social “players” in domestic violence 
cases and shape or limit the words and actions of these players (for my purposes, 
prosecutors and victims of abuse). Finally, drawing on the discursive conception of 
subjectivity in which identities are never unified, fixed, or unchallenged, I examine 
how battered women may utilize both hegemonic and counter discourses to construct 
their identity.
Poststructuralist Feminist Theory
Grounded in discursive approaches to subjectivity and identity, a somewhat 
recent strain of feminist theorizing has also questioned traditional conceptions of the 
subject. Often referred to as postmodern or poststructuralist feminist theory,3 this 
perspective critiques earlier strands of feminist theory’s practice of taking gender as a 
given and fixed category of analysis (Davis and Fisher, 1993). Postructuralist 
feminists maintain that the use of “woman” as an unproblematic identity is based on 
an assumed essential “femaleness” that does not exist. Further, such a practice not
only erases differences between different groups of women but also fails to take into
account the fragmented nature of women’s identities (Davis and Fisher, 1993;
Charles, 1996). As Charles (1996) reminds us, “women are lovers as well as mothers,
lesbians as well as workers, black as well as feminist and many of these identities
conflict” (p. 9). Poststructuralist feminism deconstructs and interrogates not only the
category of “woman” but all foundational concepts and identities on the basis that
they are normative, and thus, exclusionary, hierarchical, and silencing (Butler and
Scott, 1992; Hekman, 1995). For poststructuralist feminists, “woman” is not an
essential identity, but:
“ .. .is a Active device—a device that is socially, historically, and discursively 
constructed in relationship to other categories (i.e., women/men, white 
women/black women). Despite their apparent link to the natural, these categories 
and their positions in relationship to one another are both constructed and given 
meaning through repeated discursive practices.” (Davis and Fisher, 1993, p. 7)
Poststructuralist feminism also conceives of power in a different way than do 
traditional feminist theories. Davis and Fisher (1993) argue that while theories that 
developed during the “second-wave” of feminism (i.e. radical feminism, Marxism 
feminism, and socialist feminism) have been useful in their depiction of gender in 
terms of power, the fact that these theories attempt to root the source of that power in 
either capitalism, patriarchy, or both, renders them limiting in that they focus only on 
the way that power oppresses. There is little space allowed for the examination of 
ways women may negotiate at the “margins” of power, however subtle and indirect 
this negotiation may be. As a result, such theories “run the risk of victimizing women 
by representing them as the passive objects of monolithic systems of oppression” (p. 
6). Davis and Fisher position these second-wave theories against a poststructuralist
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feminist perspective, which rejects the possibility that one narrative can explain 
women’s subordinate position in society, on the basis that such a perspective is 
essentialist and assumes an objective and knowable Reality or Truth. Additionally, 
the assumption that one story or narrative explains women’s position also fails to 
acknowledge the differences between women and the diverse ways they may 
experience the social world.
A poststructuralist feminist position conceptualizes power in a more 
Foucauldian manner. Here, power cannot be viewed as inherently repressive or as 
only imposed in a one-way direction, but instead is productive and operates 
continuously in—more or less—subtle, but penetrating manners. Power is viewed as 
discursively constructed and thus, possibilities exist for resistance through the 
creation of counterdiscourses. As Davis and Fisher argue, under a poststructuralist 
perspective, multiple sites of resistance are allowed and what counts as political is 
redefined—routine daily micropractices are described as political and become sites 
for the investigation of power and resistance.
Feminism and poststructuralism have had a tenuous and often contested 
relationship. Many feminists have argued that a decentering of the subject risks 
undercutting the political foundations upon which feminist theory is based (Hartsock, 
1990; Ransom, 1993). If the category of “woman” is deconstructed, than how might 
women’s oppression be theorized? How can a feminist politics exist without a 
subject or privileged “knower”? In a related vein, other feminists are concerned 
about poststructuralism leading to the erasure of the body (Bordo, 1990) or to a 
dangerous relativism (Benhabib, 1990). Further, despite the argument by some that
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poststructuralist feminism allows for a more complex examination of power and the 
ways in which women resist power, others have argued that under a poststructural 
feminist analysis, resistance and the possibility for agency actually disappears into 
fragmented discourses (Hartsock, 1990).
Without dismissing these criticisms, I align myself with poststructuralist
feminism. Arguably, feminism’s relationship to poststructuralism is a difficult one.
Yet, in my work, I privilege the perspective that argues the importance of avoiding
essential and unified conceptions of subjectivity, while simultaneously maintaining
that agency and resistance are possible under poststructuralist theorizing. Nancy
Fraser (1996) words are important here. She maintains that a discursive perspective
in no way precludes agency; for her, it is discourse that allows for the possibility of
human actions. In defending the method she and Gordon (1994) use, she writes:
To analyze cultural complexes of meaning...is not to deny that individuals act 
consciously, deliberately, and strategically, nor that they sometimes deploy such 
terms instrumentally to promote their own interests and goals. It is, rather, to make 
available for political critique the network of meanings, assumptions, and images 
that constitute the background and the stuff of intentional action. Far from 
representing a threat to agency, then, an analysis such as ours helps explain how it 
is possible while extending the reach of critique, (p. 531)
Similarly, Hekman (1995) maintains that feminism does not need an essential 
subject in order for the possibility of agency or resistance to exist. Hekman argues 
that feminist theories centered on an essential subject are actually more likely to deny 
women agency than those approaches utilizing a “discursive subject” because the 
former often conceptualize women as passive and dependent. According to her, a 
discursive approach allows for a more complex depiction of how power and 
resistance works, as it allows feminists “to describe how the feminine subject is
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constructed through the multiple discursive formations of a given culture while at the 
same time asserting that some, although not all, of these discursive formations 
provide the possibility of agency” (p. 203). It is the very existence of multiple 
discourses that, for Hekman, allows for resistance.
Some theorists have attempted to reconcile both the approaches and 
epistemological critiques of feminist politics by arguing that we should position 
ourselves somewhere in between these two camps (Davis and Fisher, 1993; Fraser, 
1989; Hartsock, 1990). According to this view, we should learn to live with and even 
embrace the tensions and contradictions between these approaches, as they can be 
seen as something to “explore” (Davis and Fisher, 1993, p. 12). Davis and Fisher 
maintain that the way to address problems posed by the gaps between these theories is 
to: (1) maintain a commitment to the examination of structural constraint while 
focusing on ways women resist (even if not always successfully); and, (2) maintain a 
commitment to the power of discursive production, while also paying close attention 
to the relationship between discourses and women’s material reality. This is what I 
aim to do in this work.
Little’s (1999) project examining women welfare clients’ interaction with and
manipulation of welfare dependency discourse serves as an excellent model for what I
am trying to accomplish. She describes her goals in the following way:
.. .1 try to tease apart these questions of the sources and processes of resistance to a 
hegemonic discourse. How does the institutional framework enable and constrain 
resistance? How does the hegemonic discourse enable and constrain resistance? 
What is the place of other discourses in the resistance of these women? How does 
their material experience of poverty and low-wage work inform their resistance? 
(pp. 166)
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In a similar vein, I wish to examine how battered women’s actions are shaped by 
domestic violence discourses and explore the possibility of counterhegemonic 
discourses they may draw from in acts of resistance. I will address, in greater detail, 
the explicit feminist nature of my work later in this chapter.
Symbolic Interactionism
Yet another set of literature central to my work is rooted in symbolic 
interactionism. A symbolic interactionist approach to social life places human 
interaction at the forefront of importance. According to this perspective, human 
beings don’t simply react to one another’s actions, but they interpret or define these 
actions (Blumer, 1969). Thus, person A’s response to person B’s actions is rooted in 
the meanings person A attributes to person B’s actions. Central to this meaning- 
making process, is the use of symbols or signs that may have particular cultural or 
social meaning.
In the 1990s, Holstein and Miller argued the importance of conceiving 
victimization as an “interactional phenomenon.” Traditional approaches to 
victimization assume victim status is inherent to particular persons in particular 
situations. However, under an interactionist framework, the social processes through 
which a person is categorized a “victim” become central. People are not inherently 
“victims,” but rather victim status is “conferred upon them as they are interpreted, 
organized, and represented through social interaction” (Holstein and Miller, 1997, p. 
26). Victimization provides “interpretive instructions” that dictate how a victim 
should be perceived and involves both discursive constructions of victims and 
interactional processes. For Holstein and Miller, victim descriptions have several
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characteristics. They are reflexive in that “they both instruct observers in how to 
appreciate the situationally specific meanings of persons as ‘victims’ and 
simultaneously invoke and create those meanings” (p. 27). They are indexical, 
“taking their sense and meaning from the occasions of their production” (p. 27). And, 
lastly, they are rhetorical: “partisan activity intended to persuade others to adopt and 
act on preferred understandings of persons and circumstances” (p. 27).
Thus, the process of the assignment of a victim identity is based both on 
existing public constructions of victims and the ways in which individuals derive 
meaning from these constructions and act on them. This process is often complex, 
particularly given that it involves establishing issues of blame and responsibility, 
injury, and possible responses and solutions. Holstein and Miller (1997) argue that 
naming a person a victim “encourages others to see how the labeled person has been 
harmed by forces beyond his or her control, simultaneously establishing the ‘fact’ of 
injury and locating responsibility for the damage outside the ‘victim’” (p. 29).
Further, it often entitles a person to compensation, retribution, and/or assistance. 
However, as Holstein and Miller remind us, because victim assignments are always 
open-ended, they may be sites of contestation and negotiation: “Disagreements about 
assignments of victim status may become conflicts in which the assignments are 
openly disputed. Both injury and responsibility may be at stake in such disputes” (p. 
37). As Dunn (2001) argues, the identity of “victim” is always contingent and 
involves “assessments and evaluations of moral worth” (p. 289). Thus, this process 
can, at times, be highly, charged.
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Loseke (2001) uses the term “identity work” to describe the process of people 
categorizing themselves and their lived experiences in the terms of a particular 
identity. According to Gubrium and Holstein (2001), social institutions offer “a 
striking panorama of discursive environments for identity work,” particularly 
surrounding troubled identities such as “victim” or “battered woman.” (p. 13).
Dunn’s (2000) work serves as an example of the identity work of a particular type of 
victim in a particular institutional context. She demonstrates that “stalking victim” is 
often a very difficult identity to achieve and maintain: “Stalking victims’ struggles to 
claim victimization take place within a historical, cultural, and organization context 
shaped by multiple perspectives on what it means to be a ‘true’ victim” (p. 287). 
However, as she argues, “victim” is a problematic identity in the criminal justice 
system and thus, women claiming to be stalking victims have to present themselves in 
a particular—and believable—-manner, less they lose credibility. Achieving 
believability often means meeting particular normative expectations, particularly 
those surrounding gender.
Examining the complexity of the interactional processes surrounding 
victimization is central to my work, as I examine the identity work of a specific group 
of victims: battered women. From an interactionist perspective, the consequences of 
victimization for abused women extend beyond the women’s actual experiences with 
violence—they also involve the impact of becoming a “battered woman,” or, more 
broadly, a “victim.” My work is an attempt to comprehend how abused women make 
sense of this process, particularly in the context of the criminal justice system. 
Following Holstein and Miller (1997), I view the process of assigning “victim status”
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as an interactional and descriptive practice. Such a perspective provides broader 
possibilities for understanding the meaning-making processes battered women and 
criminal justice system professionals employ. Battered women may draw meaning 
about themselves through a variety of social phenomona. Arguably, of most 
importance here are both dominant cultural constructions of battered women and 
victims and the women’s communication with others: interactions with their abusers, 
including instances of violence and abuse; interactions with friends and family; and 
interactions with criminal justice system members and social service workers. All of 
these may influence an abused women’s decision to claim or reject the identity of 
“battered woman” and/or “victim.” An examination of mainstream discursive 
constructions of battered women as victims, particularly in the criminal justice 
system, comprises the first part of this dissertation. The second part of the dissertation 
involves an examination of the interactional processes surrounding the effects of these 
constructions for women who have experienced violence from an intimate partner. In 
other words, I explore how women who are abused by an intimate partner draw from 
cultural representations of battered women in their social relationships, in their 
decisions to claim or reject a victim identity, and in their experiences with the 
criminal justice system.
Feminist Sociological and Criminological Approaches to Domestic Violence 
The fourth and final set of literature I use in my work involves feminist 
criminological approaches to domestic violence. I will provide only a brief 
introduction to this work here, as I will discuss it in more detail in Chapter Two. 
Feminist approaches to victimization have gained currency only in the last few
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decades; historically, women were often not included in crime victimization studies 
(Belknap, 2001).
Caulfield and Wonders (1994) argue that there are five contributions of 
feminist scholarship to research and practice within criminology. The first is a focus 
on gender as a central organizing principle for contemporary life. As Caulfield and 
Wonders discuss, this does not involve merely adding women to analysis and/or 
exploring women’s experiences in contrast to men, but understanding how social life 
is gendered and how this relates both to women’s victimization and women’s 
offending. The second contribution of feminism to criminology is an understanding 
of the importance of power in shaping social relations. Caulfield and Wonders 
maintain that mainstream criminology “has always had difficulty incorporating power 
into its analysis” (p. 218). A feminist perspective provides tools for grasping how 
power shapes people’s lives, and in the field of criminology, this may involve 
examining who has the power to define the meaning of crime and related harm, and 
understanding the role of the state in creating and perpetuating gendered laws and 
criminal justice practices.
For Caulfield and Wonders, a third feminist contribution to criminology is 
sensitivity to the way that social context shapes human relations. They state, “to talk 
about the context of human lives means to recognize that people are never just one 
characteristic at a time” (p. 222). Thus, feminist criminological research takes into 
account the various structural and institutional forces that shape people’s lives, 
particularly in the realm of the criminal justice system. A fourth feminist contribution 
to criminology involves the creation of research methods that recognize that all of
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social reality is a developing process. Feminist research methods often differ from
traditional, positivist methods:
.. .while dominant science views things as static, dualistically ahistorical, 
mechanical, and additive, feminist science, which has not lost sight of its political 
goal, strives for a new view of the whole societal constellation in which things 
appear as historical, contradictory, linked to each other, and capable of being 
changed.” (Mies, as cited in Caulfield and Wonders, p. 223)
Caulfield and Wonders make clear that while there is no one method that is more
feminist than another, feminist methods are inherently more reflexive than traditional
methods of inquiry. As such, feminist researchers are critically reflective of the
research process and their roles in it.
The fifth and final feminist contribution to criminology, according to 
Caulfield and Wonders, is a commitment to social change. An important part of 
feminist scholarship is linking theory to action. As Caulfield and Wonders point out, 
many feminists study the world in order to change it. Feminist criminological 
research efforts to bring about social change have been centered on things such as 
changing law and public policy and education. Of particular note, are several 
feminist research projects that “have been explicitly linked to efforts to change 
criminal justice in light of new information on the ways that gender, power, social 
context, and process issues shape criminal justice outcomes” (p. 226).
The five principles outlined above have been highly instrumental to the 
process in which domestic violence came to be viewed as a social problem. Domestic 
violence, like virtually all other types of women’s victimization, was not recognized 
as a considerable social and legal problem until the 1970s (Belknap, 2001). It was at 
this time that the battered women’s movement, rooted in the second wave of the
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feminist movement, took shape in the United States and drew increased attention to
the issue of domestic violence (Schechter, 1982). According to Schechter (1982 ):
The emerging feminist movement painstakingly detailed the conditions of daily life 
that would allow women to call themselves battered. A fundamental assertion of 
the movement, women’s right to control their bodies and lives, and one of its 
practical applications, women’s hotlines and crisis centers, provided a context for 
battered women to speak out and ask for help. (p. 29)
The battered women’s movement, at its original inception, was explicitly political; it
rejected both biological and individualistic explanations of domestic violence and
instead argued that we must be aware of the ways in which domestic violence is tied
to asymmetrical power relations—particularly gender relations—both in the home
and in society at large. However, as Schechter acknowledges, while ideology played
a major role in the movement’s origins, it was not always a primary or spoken one.
Further, she maintains that women in the battered women’s movement did not always
agree on the meaning or implications of feminism. While some women in the
battered women’s movement focused on women’s rights, others focused on women’s
oppression and a critique of patriarchy. As Schechter states, “For women of all races
and classes, for feminists and nonfeminists, for professionals and activists, reasons for
joining the battered women’s movement were and are complex” (p. 51).
Out of the battered women’s movement arose many social and legal reforms 
surrounding domestic violence (which I will discuss more specifically in Chapter 
Two). The terms used to describe domestic violence have changed over the years, 
often in response to various feminist groups’ attempts to shift the language used to 
“frame” the problem in recognition that each tenn expresses a specific social/political 
meaning (Bacchi, 1999). As Schneider (2000) states, “Feminists have long struggled
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over the characterization of the problem as ‘domestic violence,’ ‘family violence,’ 
‘spouse abuse,’ and ‘woman abuse,’ and recognized that each of these terms is 
limited, problematic, and provides only a partial description” (p. 45). Further, 
Belknap (2001) argues that the term “domestic violence” is very broad and risks 
lumping intimate partner violence together with issues such as child abuse and elder 
abuse. The use of terms such as “spouse abuse” and “family” “hides the fact that 
women are the victims and men are the perpetrators approximately 95 percent of the 
time” (Belknap, 2001, p. 267).4 Finally, the term “wife abuse” restricts the definition 
to include only those couples who are married. For these reasons, in this work, I will 
primarily use the term “woman battering.”5
Along with debate surrounding definitions of intimate partner violence, comes 
debate surrounding both the frequency and gendered nature of battering. Although, 
as previously stated, most research finds that men are the aggressors in approximately 
95 percent of battering relationships (Belknap, 2001), some researchers argue that 
women are often as violent as men (see, for example, Straus and Gelles, 2001). 
Belknap (2001) provides a detailed discussion of this controversy. She maintains that 
much of the discrepancy in findings is based upon differences in sampling and the 
survey questions. At the center of this debate, is a measurement instrument called the 
Conflict Tactic Scale, which many feminist researchers have argued is a problematic 
means of measuring battering: “Specifically, the CTS oversimplifies the complexities 
of battering, focusing solely on behaviors and ignoring consequences of the social 
contexts in which the behaviors occur and their meaning to the victims and the 
offender” (p. 273). As Belknap demonstrates, because of the problems with this
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measurement instrument, the majority of researchers in this field are critical of 
research that reveals gender parity in intimate partner violence and agree that 
battering is a strongly gendered phenomenon.6
Feminist criminological research has contributed much to our understanding 
of the prevalence of domestic violence. While estimates of the number of women 
who are assaulted at some point in their lives by husband or boyfriend vary, most 
studies find fairly high prevalence rates—from around 25% of women to as many half 
(Belknap, 2001; Eigenberg, 2001 a). Again, one of the difficulties in measuring the 
frequency of woman battering stems from differences in definition. Feminist 
researchers have developed four categories of battering (Belknap, 2001). They are: 
physical battering, or all forms of nonsexual physical violence; sexual battering, 
including all forms of sexual assault; psychological battering, where the offender 
“threatens, demeans, or otherwise discredits the victim”; and finally, the destruction 
of pets and property (p. 269). While some disagreement exists over which of these 
forms of violence must take place for a woman to be battered, the development of 
these categories was an important achievement for feminist researchers. It illustrates 
that, contrary to popular belief, battering is not just physical abuse but involves other 
aspects of power, domination, and control.
Along with feminist criminological approaches to woman battering within 
heterosexual couples, I share several assumptions: that woman battering is a fairly 
common phenomenon which must be understood within a specific historical and 
social context; that men are most likely to be the batterers; that issues of power are 
central to fully understanding all aspects of woman battering; that issues of “framing”
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or defining are very relevant to how we understand and/or study woman battering; 
and that woman battering is not merely characterized by physical abuse, but involves 
a wide range of actions and behaviors, including emotional and verbal abuse. These 
assumptions form the basis of this work.
Summary
The four bodies of literature I have just reviewed that are central to my project 
are often, on a theoretical level, discussed separately, despite occasional overlap 
between them. Certainly, it is difficult (if not impossible) to talk about battered 
women as any type of cohesive group (as feminist criminologists often do) while 
simultaneously heeding poststructuralism’s warning to avoid the dangers of 
foundationalist categories. The moment one invokes the term “battered woman,” she 
traipses into essentialist territory. However, the very goal of my work is to challenge 
unified constructions of battered women and to this end, poststructuralism serves a 
useful and important function. I believe that weaving together discourse analysis, 
poststructuralism, symbolic interactionism, and feminism only serves to provide my 
work with theoretical and methodological richness. By providing an examination of 
the ways in which discursive constructions enable and constrain battered women’s 
real world experiences and actions, I hope to demonstrate that, “negotiating at the 
margins” (to borrow Fisher and Davis’s (1993) phrase) of discourse and materiality, 
of power and resistance, is not only possible, but is necessary to provide a more 
complete picture of the way power, resistance, and control operate at the place where 
the lives of battered women intersect with the criminal justice system.
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Research Methods, Methodology, and Epistemology
Harding (1987) makes an important distinction between method and 
methodology. She defines ‘method’ as a specific technique for gathering evidence, 
and ‘methodology’ as “a theory and analysis of the special ways in which the general 
structure of theory finds its application in particular scientific disciplines” (p. 24). 
There has been much discussion surrounding what actually constitutes feminist 
research (see, for example, Jayaratne and Stewart, 1991). Debate at one point 
centered on whether some methods were inherently more “feminist” than others. 
Several researchers have argued that qualitative methods are in some ways more 
useful to feminist research in that they “do not break living connections in the way 
that quantitative methods do” (Mies, 1991, p. 67). However, most researchers have 
acknowledged that both quantitative and qualitative methods have proven useful for 
feminist research (Cook and Fonow, 1990; Harding, 1987; Jayaratne and Stewart, 
1991). Indeed, both methods have contributed positively to research surrounding 
woman battering. Quantitative methods have provided us with startling statistics and 
prevalence rates that have given us a better idea of the scope of domestic violence, 
while qualitative methods have illuminated battered women’s experiences and have 
given women more of an opportunity to speak for themselves (although this speech is 
still subject to researcher intervention).
Thus, as Harding (1987) concludes, it is more useful to look to methodology 
(as opposed to method) in order to unearth what is distinctive about feminist research. 
Most researchers now speak of feminist principles of research or feminist 
epistemological issues, instead of looking at a specific feminist method (Acker,
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Barry, and Esseveld, 1991; Cook and Fonow, 1990; Harding, 1997; Jayaratne and 
Stewart, 1991; Kirseh, 1999). As Kirseh (1999) states, “it is a feminist perspective, 
including a commitment to improve women’s lives and to eliminate inequalities 
between researchers and participants that characterizes feminist research” (p.5). In 
the next two sections I will first present the methods I utilized in my research and will 
then discuss the methodological and epistemological underpinnings of my work. 
Methods
Despite the usefulness of both quantitative and qualitative methods in a 
feminist examination of woman battering, qualitative methods were best suited for the 
purposes of my specific project. According to Mason (1996), researchers may use 
qualitative interviewing for several reasons: (1) for an ontological position which 
“suggests that people’s knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, 
experiences, and interactions are meaningful properties” of social reality; and (2) for 
an epistemological position which “suggests that a legitimate way to generate data on 
these ontological positions is to interact with people, to talk to them, to listen to them, 
and to gain access to their accounts and articulations” (pp. 39-40). My use of 
qualitative interviewing is rooted in both of these positions. In order to more fully 
understand how battered women make sense of their own experiences and the 
violence in their lives, and to explore the meanings given to concepts such as 
“battered woman” and “victim” by both workers in the criminal justice system and 
battered women themselves, open-ended interview questions were necessary.
The data in this study are drawn from several sources: (1) structured 
interviews with prosecutors of domestic violence cases; and (2) in-depth, semi-
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structured interviews with women who experienced violence in the context of a 
heterosexual intimate partner relationship. The research took place in three 
jurisdictions: the prosecutor interviews were conducted in all three jurisdictions, 
while the interviews with battered women were conducted in two of the jurisdictions. 
The first jurisdiction is centered in a Midwestern county, “Easton Count,” that 
includes a medium-sized industrial city. Easton County has approximately 279,320 
residents. Around 79.5% of the residents are White non-Hispanic, 10.9% are 
Black/African American, 5.8 % are Hispanic/Latino, 3.7% are Asian, and less than 
1 % are American Indian. The median household income in Easton County is about 
$40,774 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). The second jurisdiction is located in Western 
“Rockford County,” that includes an affluent college town. The population of this 
county is around 291,000 residents. Approximately 83.6% of the residents are White 
non-Hispanic, 10.5% are of Hispanic/Latino origin, 3.1% are Asian, and less than 1% 
each are Black/African American and American Indian. The median household 
income in Rockford County is around $55,500 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000); however, 
this figure disguises significant extremes of affluence and poverty. The third 
jurisdiction is a large metropolitan city in the West, “Lanville.” The population in the 
city of Lanville is around 550,000 people. Around 65% of the residents are White 
non-Hispanic, 31.7 % are Hispanic/Latino 11.1% are Black/African American, 2.8% 
are Asian, and 1.3% are American Indian. The median household income in Lanville 
is about $39,500 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).
The interviews with the prosecutors were conducted as part of a larger project, 
funded by the National Institute of Justice, for which I served as a research assistant.
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Six prosecutors were interviewed from the prosecutor’s office in Easton County, three
prosecutors were interviewed from the district attorney’s office in Rockford County,
four from the district attorney’s office in Lanville, and eight from the city attorney’s
office in Lanville.7 Interviews with the prosecutors were, for the most part,
conducted by me or by two other research assistants working on the project.
Interviews were based on a structured schedule, developed by the project’s principal
investigator (see Appendix A). They were not taped, but interviewers took detailed
notes and transcribed them immediately after completing each interview. The major
objective of the prosecutor interviews (for the original project) was to determine the
prosecutors’ perceptions of the criminal justice system’s response to battering and
victims’ needs. The goals of the project were:
.. .to have the prosecutors identify what they look for in cases, what makes a “good 
case,” the process they use in prosecuting cases, how many prosecutors work with 
each victim/witness, how they decide whether to prosecute a case (i.e., what 
variables they use to make a decision), how they handle victim/witness reluctance, 
what they do to encourage victim/witness cooperation, and how they make 
decisions about what evidence to use in the court case.. (Belknap, Sulivan and 
Fleury, 1998, pp. 20-21)
While I did not have control over what questions were asked during these 
interviews, I believe the resulting data serve my purpose of examining how 
prosecutors who work with domestic violence view and relate to battered women. As 
I have previously discussed, from an interactionist perspective, people are not 
inherently “victims,” but rather victim status is given to them as they are interpreted 
and represented through social interaction (Holstein and Miller, 1997). Prosecutors, 
as agents of the state, are highly influential in determining which women are 
considered legitimate “victims” and they may draw on, shape, and/or challenge
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mainstream domestic violence discourses in this process. Thus, obtaining their 
perspective is important when examining how the criminal justice system participates 
in the discursive construction of the “battered woman.”
The bulk of my data comes from interviews conducted with 40 women, all of 
whom reported experiencing violence in the context of a heterosexual intimate 
relationship (one woman also reported experiencing violence in a same-sex intimate 
relationship). Because I was interested in exploring women’s experiences with the
criminal justice system, requirement for participation in the study was prior
8 rtinvolvement with the court system as a result of domestic violence. The interviews 
with these women were conducted primarily in the spring of 2002. All of the 
interviews took place in either Rockford County or Lanville.9 Five of the 
interviewees were recruited from the original National Institute of Justice project on 
which I worked. I recruited the remaining 35 interviewees via several methods in 
both Rockford County and Lanville: in Lanville, flyers were sent to women shortly 
after the first phase of their court case concluded (see Appendix B); flyers were 
posted at five different shelters for battered women in both Rockford County and 
Lanville; and I attended several support group meetings for battered women held in 
Rockford County to briefly discuss my research. If a woman was interested in 
participation, she called me to discuss the study and possibly schedule a time to meet.
Each interviewee was paid $30.00 for her participation. While paying 
respondents has been used as a means of increasing participation in survey research 
(Heberlein and Baumgartner, 1978), it is less common in qualitative research. 
However, feminist researchers and others have argued the importance of recognizing
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that economically disadvantaged populations may be less likely to participate in 
social research if doing so takes valuable time away from other important activities 
(Thompson, 1996; Cannon, Higginbotham, and Leung, 1991). Thus, as Thompson 
(1996) argues, payments may help avoid bias in social research “which might have 
resulted from the omission of those who declined to participate because they put a 
greater value on their time, energy and views” (p. 5). I viewed payment as a means of 
compensating the women I interviewed for possible costs involved in participation 
such as child care, time away from work, parking, and/or bus fare. Clearly, a 
potential disadvantage to this was that some women may have been less interested in 
being interviewed than they were in obtaining $30 (certainly understandable given 
some of their dire economic situations). However, I believe that I obtained a more 
diverse respondent pool—in terms of both racial and economic backgrounds—due to 
the fact that respondents were compensated for their time.
The interviewees ranged in age from twenty-one to fifty-eight, with a mean 
age of thirty-two. The sample is racially and ethnically diverse: 57 percent of the 
women were Caucasian and 43 percent of the women were African-American (11), 
Hispanic (2), Native-American (1) or interracial (3). The women were not directly 
asked about their sexual orientation; however, as previously stated, all of the women 
had been in abusive relationships with men and one also reported being in an abusive 
relationship with a woman.10
The annual household incomes of the women ranged from zero (several of the 
women were homeless, and staying at a shelter or living with friends or family) to 
over $55,000; the median annual household income was $10,800. This falls far
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below $47,203.00, the median annual household income for all households in the 
state where the research was conducted (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).
Interviews took place in settings chosen by the participants. The majority of 
women were interviewed in their homes, but many interviews also took place in 
public settings (some of which offered more privacy than others), including: public 
library study rooms, meeting rooms of social service organizations, parks, and 
restaurants or coffee shops. I used both narrative (Riessman, 1993) and 
semistructured interviewing (Mason, 1996) approaches. The former allowed me to 
understand the role of violence in each woman’s lives and grasp how they made sense 
of it and the latter helped to achieve consistency and allow for comparison of the 
interviewee’s answers on specific topics. All interviews were face-to-face and were 
tape-recorded, with the interviewees’ permission. Each interview began with a series 
of questions to obtain demographic information (e.g. race, age, income). I then asked 
each woman to tell me her “story” and discuss the history of her relationship and her 
experiences with violence. After this, I asked each woman specific questions from an 
interview guide about her experiences and involvement with the criminal justice 
system (see Appendix C). While, for the most part, each woman was asked all of the 
questions from the interview guide, the interviews often went in different directions 
depending on the women’s individual circumstances, and frequently, additional 
questions were asked. I collected data on a wide range of topics, including specifics 
of the participants’ contact with the police and the courts, the details and outcome of 
their cases, their thoughts on the criminal justice system process, and the impact their 
experiences had on their actions and their view of themselves. I also asked the
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women what the terms “battered woman” and “victim” meant to them and to discuss 
if, and how, they related to these terms. The interviews ranged from thirty minutes to 
over two hours.
The sensitive nature of this topic, coupled with the fact that many of the 
interviews were conducted in public, posed several problems. At times, the lack of 
privacy clearly impacted the research. Many of the interviews took place in areas 
where some of the women seemed less than comfortable using certain language or 
providing specific details of their experiences. I interviewed one woman at her 
parents’ house, and although they were upstairs, she whispered during the entire 
interview since they were not aware of her experiences with her abusive fiance; as a 
result of her whispering, my tape recorder did not pick up any of her words, and my 
notes after the interview suffered from the usual limitations of memory-based note 
taking. Other times, when interviews were conducted at bars or restaurants, it was 
difficult to hear the respondents’ voices on my tapes due to loud background noise. 
Finally, due to lack of childcare, sometimes the women’s children were present 
during the interviews and this occasionally posed problems such as children crying 
loudly on the tapes, and/or women not feeling comfortable being candid in front of 
their children.
Charmaz (2000) argues that qualitative researchers should gather “extensive 
amounts of rich data” (p. 514). Many ethnographic researchers advocate for on-going 
relationships between the researcher and their interviewees, and/or multiple 
interviews in an attempt to gather such data (see, for example, Heyl, 2001). 
Conducting multiple interviews with battered women is difficult as they are known to
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be a highly mobile population. Indeed, many of the women in my study did not have 
permanent addresses and moved around quite frequently. One of the women I 
interviewed was in the process of “going underground” and changing her legal 
identity in an attempt to escape from her abuser. This, combined with financial and 
time constraints, made it difficult, if  not impossible, to conduct multiple interviews. 
However, I tried to obtain as much detail as possible in the interviews I did conduct in 
an attempt to gather a large amount of data.
I analyzed my data using a combined grounded theory (see Charmaz, 2000) 
and narrative analysis (Cortazzi, 2001; Riessman, 1993) approach. According to a 
grounded theory perspective, theory development occurs throughout the research 
process: “the researcher’s interpretations of data shape his or her emergent codes in 
grounded theory” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 514). For my initial research project, I was 
interested in exploring women’s experiences with the criminal justice system. As I 
began the interviews, I noticed that while discussing their experiences and feelings, at 
various times, many of the women seemed to claim or reject the identities of “victim” 
and/or “battered women.” Some did both; one of the first women I interviewed, 
repeatedly referred to herself as a “victim” throughout the interview, yet emphatically 
explained why she was not a victim when directly asked. I was interested in this 
contradiction and, using a grounded theory approach, began incorporating questions 
into the interview process in an attempt to explore the identity claims of the women in 
more depth.
Narrative analysis involves conceiving of the interviewees’ stories, and the 
retelling of those stories by the researcher, as narratives or “structures of knowledge
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and storied ways of knowing” (Cortazzi, 2001, p. 384). According to Cortazzi, most
narratives go beyond the mere reporting of events but also provide the meaning,
relevance, and significance of the events from the teller’s point of view. As Riessman
(1993) points out, “narrators indicate the terms on which they request to be
interpreted by the styles of telling they choose. Something said in a whisper, after a
long pause, has a different import than the same words said loudly, without a pause
(pp. 19-20). Cortazzi maintains that narratives may be divided into at least three
major structural categories:
.. ..an event structure, which reports happenings; a description structure, which 
gives background information on time, place, people and context necessary to 
understand the narrative; and an evaluation structure, which shows the point of 
telling the narrative by presenting the speaker’s perspective or judgment on the 
events, marking off the most important part. (pp. 384-385)
Through careful examination of these categories, the researcher is given better access
to the way in which the interviewee interprets and makes sense of their experiences.
Drawing from these two approaches, after each interview was transcribed, I 
hand-coded the data and conceptual codes and categories began to emerge.
Following Charmaz’s (2000) discussion, these codes were kept “active” during the 
coding process; while I made extensive comparisons within and between interviews, 
the categories often shifted and changed. After lengthy analysis, concrete categories 
emerged and I developed a theoretical framework. According to narrative analysis, 
the researcher uses both the narratives of the interviewees and other data to construct 
an overall meaning or interpretation: “the analyst selects, categorizes, analyzes (and) 
interprets the data with much re-reading, and therefore, re-interpreting” (Cortazzi, 
2001, p. 389). Because the researcher shapes the narratives of the interviewees using
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her own interpretation in the final analysis stage, narrative research is a complex 
process and is “multi-layered in interpretation” (p. 389). Thus, a problem I faced was 
making sure my final analysis (or narrative) stayed true to the narratives of the 
women I interviewed.
Methodology and Epistemology
As previously stated, my research is rooted in feminist methodology. One of 
the most important aspects of feminist research—and this holds true for my own work- 
-is obtaining and validating women’s voices, perspectives, and experiences (Harding, 
1987; Kirseh, 1999). Much of the existing domestic violence research has only 
examined the perspectives of those who work with battered women. For example, 
the bulk of research examining battered women’s “cooperation” with the system has 
historically focused on the perceptions and attitudes of court officials and utilized 
data such as police and court reports, as opposed to gathering data from the women 
themselves (for more discussion, see Erez and Belknap, 1998). While court officials 
and police officers have assumed that battered women fail to cooperate out of a 
loyalty to their batterer, battered women themselves report they often refuse to 
cooperate with the prosecution of their batterer out of fear (Erez and Belknap, 1998; 
Hart, 1996; McLeod, 1983). A failure to obtain battered women’s perspective not 
only renders them invisible, but also results in a distorted, one-sided, and inaccurate 
picture of issues surrounding domestic violence.
However, research that does attempt to capture women’s voices is not 
problem-free. A possible issue with any social research concerns how the researcher 
represents her/his subjects. There are potential problems in speaking for others,
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including the dangers of appropriating, misinterpreting, or distorting another person’s 
speech or experiences (Alcoff, 1991-2; Rosga, 2001). As Acker, Barry, and Esseveld 
(1991) ask, “How do we explain the lives of others without violating their reality?”
(p. 142). This poses a difficult problem for researchers—on one hand it is important 
to present women’s lives as seen and made sense of by them, but on the other hand it 
is important to provide analysis. Lai (1996) argues that we should “listen to” and not 
just “talk with” our subjects, for, “otherwise we risk getting into the trap of just 
giving voice to subjugated positions, which, as we well know, are never innocent” (p. 
205). Instead, she maintains that we need to reflectively listen to interviewees by 
paying attention to their self-presentations, contradictions, silences and resistances.
The issue of representation has particular relevance to research on battered 
women. While recognizing and examining the ways in which social structures are 
constraining and limiting is vital, it is also important to avoid portraying battered 
women as total victims or as completely lacking comprehension or awareness of the 
circumstances of their lives. As Lisa Sanchez (1999) points out, “the voices of 
women who are considered victims have all too often been silenced and devalued, the 
contradictions in their narratives dismissed as ‘justification,’ ‘rationalization,’ or 
‘false consciousness’” (p. 53). What if a woman whom the criminal justice system 
has deemed a “victim” denies victim status (as more than a few women I interviewed 
did)? Is she in denial? Perhaps, but such an easy reading does little more than 
reproduce mainstream domestic violence discourses—certainly not my intent—and 
does little to explore or even challenge these discourses and their resulting 
constructions. Lai (1996) argues that by communicating to researchers how they
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want to be represented, respondents actively engage in self-presentation during the 
research process and this must be viewed as an act of agency. She states, “if we are 
to be truly open to what our research subjects tell us, we must be willing to read 
against the grain and yet within the larger contexts that situates their responses” (p. 
204). Thus, my goal was to pay careful attention to what the women I interviewed 
said (and what they didn’t say), all along keeping in mind what I’ve learned about the 
overall social context and available discourses situating both their lives and words.
An interesting debate in feminist methodology literature has centered on the
usefulness of feminist standpoint theory (see, for example, Wolf, 1996). Primarily
developed by Nancy Hartsock, this approach posits that women, as inhabiters of a
subjugated social location, share an “epistemologically privileged position” (Crosby,
1992, p. 132). In other words, women are better knowers, due to the very fact that
they are women and as such, have a particular set of experiences—achieved through
political struggle—from which to construct knowledge. However, critics of a feminist
standpoint perspective are skeptical of a theory “in which knowledge follows from
and leads to identity” (Crosby, 1992, p. 133). Lai (1996) does not deny that
epistemic privilege plays “an important political role in accounting for the
implications of categorical aspects of identities.. .in the production of knowledge” (p.
198). However, she also cautions that assuming such representations to be the true,
innocent, and natural outcomes of this identity is problematic:
Positing privileged epistemic standpoints from the specific ontological location of 
the oppressed.. .downplays the very real possibility that such representations can be 
colonialist, while simultaneously obscuring the possibility of noncolonizing 
representations emerging from nonsubjugated positions.” (p. 133)
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I share Lai’s concerns. From a feminist standpoint perspective, the battered
women I interviewed, due to their marginalized position(s), would be viewed as
having special claims to knowledge. While certainly I would argue that each woman
I interviewed is more of an authority on her experiences than I am, I do not believe
that my interviewees’ words were always “innocent” or representative of some grand
“truth.” Indeed, just as Lai points out the possibility that the knowledge of the
oppressed may parallel colonialist representations, more than a few of the women I
interviewed reflected racist viewpoints. While I will discuss the specific words of all
of the interviewees in later chapters, my goal here is to illustrate the dangers in
assuming that “the perspectives of those on the margin are less distorted rather than
simply different from those not on the margin” (Wolf, 1996, pp. 13-14). Further, to
assume battered women are better knowers because of their status as battered women,
serves only to further entrench the identity of “battered woman,” which is counter to
my goal in this project. However, while 1 reject the idea that an epistemologically
privileged position should be afforded solely on the basis of a person’s identity, I do
think we must recognize that those on the social margins may be more likely to have
“multiple perspectives” or “multiple visions” than those not on the margins (Wolf,
1996). As Wolf (1996) discusses, a potential alternative to feminist standpoint theory
is Haraway’s concept of “situated knowledges.” She states that situated knowledges:
reflect our locationality (historical, national, generational,) and positionality (race, 
gender, class, nationality, sexuality), acknowledging how the dynamics of where 
we are always affects our viewpoint and the production of knowledge without 
privileging one particular position over another, as in standpoint theory, (p. 14)
Under this view, knowledge is never fixed, but is always contingent, relational and 
contextualized. I approach my research from this perspective.
Just as the social position of the researched is important, so is the social 
position of the researcher. As Harding (1987) cautions, the social location of the 
researcher—including race, class, culture, beliefs and values—must be placed in the 
research frame. She states, “The researcher appears in these analyses not as an 
invisible, anonymous, disembodied voice of authority, but as a real, historical
individual with concrete, specific desires and interests........ ” (p. 32). Recognizing
the impact that the researcher’s social location has on the research process is 
important. Lai (1996) urges us to engage in self-reflexivity and to deconstruct our 
own research experiences, “thereby rendering them nontransparent” (p. 205). 
Feminist researchers have tried to avoid objectification as much as possible and be 
aware of issues of power, authority, and control. Many researchers argue that 
rejecting the subject/object separation is important in order to examine ways in which 
the research process may obscure and reinforce the subordination of women subjects 
(Acker, Barry, Esseveld, 1991; Cook and Fonow, 1990). Despite the perspective of 
traditional, mainstream scientific methodology, for feminist researchers it is desirable 
to show emotion and to treat research participants as human beings. However, 
completely erasing the power differential between the researcher and the subjects 
may be impossible and thus, the risk of objectification, manipulation and betrayal 
always exist (Acker et al, 1991; Stacey, 1988). Wolf (1996) writes, “although 
feminist researchers may attempt to equalize relationships while in the field through 
empathic and friendly methods, these methods do not transform the researchers’
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positionality or locationality” (p. 35). In the end, as Stacey (1988) reminds us, the 
research project ultimately belongs to the researcher.
As a white, upper middle-class, graduate student who has never experienced 
physical violence of any sort, in many ways I was an “outsider” to the majority of the 
women in my study. I will always remember the homeless woman I interviewed 
whom I met at a local restaurant. When I offered to buy her a cheeseburger, her eyes 
lit up and she told me she hadn’t eaten “real food” like that in almost a year. The 
ability to buy a sandwich for myself is certainly something I take for granted and this 
experience demonstrated to me the difference between my social location and that of 
many of the women whom I interviewed. For sure, I cannot know how they viewed 
me or how who I was, in their eyes, impacted what they told me or how they 
presented their experiences and thoughts to me. It was clear however, that many of 
the women I interviewed seemed to view me as a person who had the authority and 
capability to help them; several women sought legal information or guidance from 
me. Some of them seemed to assume that I would be able to do something to help 
them navigate the criminal justice system and/or right some of the wrongs they had 
suffered. It was painful for me, and seemingly disappointing to them, when I had to 
tell them that I did not work for the courts and had no pull there. Many feminist 
researchers have stressed the importance of reciprocity during interviewing in order 
to address the unequal power dynamics inherent to the research process (see, for 
example, Acker, Barry and Esseveld, 1991). Given this, I offered support and 
information when I could, but also made clear to the women that I did not have legal 
training. When necessary, I provided women with contact information for
organizations that could better assist them. However, I left more than a few 
interviews with women wishing that I could have done something more to help them 
and regretting that I had, in some ways, not lived up to what I perceived to be their 
expectations of me.
While some of the women behaved as though they saw me as an authority 
figure of sorts, this did not preclude the majority of them from sharing their stories, 
often in great detail. Many of the women shared emotional, painful, and intimate 
elements of their lives; on many occasions, women wept as their stories unfolded. A 
number of the women I interviewed commented on the “therapeutic” nature of telling 
their stories—for many of these women, it seemed that having an interested listener 
was a new and most welcome experience. While certainly I was glad to be a 
“listener” for them as well as a researcher, the emotional and sensitive nature of the 
research was an issue I took seriously throughout the research process. Battered 
women are often in a vulnerable position. Women may feel victimized by their 
abuser, and possibly by the criminal justice system as well. For researchers like me, 
taking care not to revictimize these women even further is crucial. Battered women 
may have had their trust of other people violated more than a few times in their lives 
and as a result, trust may be an issue for them. Researchers working with battered 
women need to keep in mind that they are able to get up and leave at the end of the 
interview. As Kirseh (1999) argues, despite the fact that some feminist researchers 
have advocated developing a friendship with participants, relations between the 
researcher and the researched often abruptly end once the researcher has left. Further, 
discussing past experiences and abuse may be difficult for some battered women.
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Kirsch reminds us of the importance of recognizing that, as researchers, we are not 
trained therapists. If a woman I interviewed seemed particularly troubled or in need 
of help, I provided her with additional resources instead of attempting to address her 
issues on my own.
Finally, feminist research should place an emphasis on consciousness-raising, 
liberation, empowerment and/or transformation (Acker, Barry, and Esseveld, 1991; 
Cook and Fonow, 1990; Jayaratne and Stewart, 1991; Lai, 1996). Thus, research 
examining domestic violence should in some way be beneficial to battered women. I 
hope to accomplish this through my own project via several methods: through the 
suggestion of policy changes; through an analysis of how the personal is political (i.e. 
showing that battered women’s experiences are not just reflective of individual 
problems but are connected to larger social structures); and through an illustration 
that battered women’s experiences are varied and complex—a challenge to 
mainstream representations. As I have previously discussed, much of domestic 
violence research addressing issues with the criminal justice system, has not 
specifically examined battered women’s experiences. Many of the women I 
interviewed expressed that no one had ever really listened to them and to their side of 
the story. Opie (1992) argues, “when qualitative research incorporates the voices of 
marginal and hence previously silenced groups into the text it can become subversive 
along a number of fronts” (p. 64). Not only does such research give voice to the 
marginalized, which in itself may be empowering, but it may also counter dominant 
images (often misleading) about the group being researched. Thus, I hope that as a
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feminist researcher, my work is not just about women but is also for women (Cook 
andFonow, 1990; Mies, 1991).
NOTES
1 To highlight the fact that domestic violence discourse is not uniform, I will use the term “domestic 
violence discourses” from this point forward.
2 Fraser refers to this process as the “reification effect” (p. 154).
3 While the terms postmodernism and poststructuralism are often conflated and/or used 
interchangeably, much has been written about the (possible) differences between the two. As Agger 
(1991) aptly notes, the lack of clear boundaries between the two illustrates the “purposeful 
elusiveness” of postmodem/poststructural work. Agger classifies poststructuralism as a theory of 
knowledge and language, and postmodernism as a theory of society, culture, and history. While much 
of my work utilizes discourse analysis, which is traditionally associated with Foucault, I will be using 
the term poststructuralism in my writing, as a major goal of this project involves an examination of 
how language helps constitute and shape social reality. Let it be noted, however, that other feminists 
making similar arguments to my own, may refer to their position as postmodernist or as postmodern 
feminism.
4 Recently, same-sex domestic violence has also come to be recognized as a social problem. However, 
studies examining both the prevalence of violence in homosexual relationships and the context in 
which this violence occurs have been limited and are often of poor quality. Prevalence rates vary 
greatly and Renzetti (1998) points out that is because no study has been able to use a random sample 
due to the stigma attached to homosexual relationships, obtaining a “true prevalence” rate may not be 
possible (p. 123). Further, several theorists have pointed out that there are key differences between 
heterosexual and homosexual domestic violence; for example, homophobia is inextricably connected 
to violence in same-sex intimate partners (Balsam, 2001; Renzetti, 1998). I acknowledge the existence 
of battering in same-sex intimate relationships, but wish to make clear that my analysis is limited to 
women battered by men.
51 will also at times use the term “domestic violence” as it is commonly found in most literatures. 
Further, despite the fact that the terms “battered woman” and “victim” are freighted with various 
meanings (which at times I problematize), I use them both for convenience.
6 Susan Okin (1991) defines gender as “the social institutionalization of sexual difference; it is a 
concept used by those who understand not only sexual inequality but also much of sexual 
differentiation to be socially constructed” (p. 67). However, the use of the term “gendered” can be a 
bit misleading, for, as Okin points out, gender is connected to but not determined by sex difference (p. 
78). By referring to the “gendered” nature of domestic violence, Belknap and others are likely 
flagging the process of social constructionism and suggesting that battering is sex-specific in 
heterosexual relationships. This is an important distinction, for as Renzetti (1998) maintains,
“ .. .research with victims of same-sex domestic violence shows that the abuser is not necessarily more 
‘masculine’ than the victim in terms of physical size, appearance, or mannerisms” (p. 124). Renzetti is 
quick to point out, however, that we should not throw out social and cultural explanations of domestic 
violence simply because same-sex partner abuse does not clearly fit into our existing model of who is 
the batterer and who the victim. For example, she maintains that perceived power or powerlessness is 
strongly associated with abuse in both heterosexual and homosexual relationships.
7 Specifics about these offices will be discussed in Chapter Four.
46
8 The majority of women in the sample (40) were involved with the court system through a criminal 
case (most of which involved the arrest of the woman’s male partner; however, fourteen of the women 
reported that they, themselves, were arrested at some point). Three of the women’s involvement with 
the court system came through filing for a restraining order. One woman had no court involvement but 
did have police contact.
9 Even though the interviews took place in different towns, I am making no claim to regional 
specificity in the analyzing and reporting of my data. Themes that emerge could possibly be found 
anywhere, nationally, or even globally.
10 Given the nature of my sample, I do not attempt to make generalizations about the nature of 
domestic violence in gay and lesbian relationships. While Renzetti (1998) does acknowledge some 
similarities in heterosexual and homosexual domestic violence (see above), she also makes clear that 
there are important differences between them.
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Battered Women’s Movement and the State: The Foundations of 
Contemporary Domestic Violence Discourses
Contemporary domestic violence discourses originated in the early 1970s 
when feminists and advocates for battered women insisted upon the recognition of 
domestic violence as a social problem (Ferraro, 1996); these discourses have since 
been shaped by a number of different influences and disciplines. In Chapter Three, I 
will explore the implications of the ways in which the “battered woman” has been 
constructed. However, in this chapter, I trace the historical roots of modem domestic 
violence discourses by considering two of their most important sources—the battered 
women’s movement and the criminal justice system. I will examine the histories of 
both the battered women’s movement and the criminal justice system in relation to 
domestic violence, and explore the ways in which these two forces have interacted 
with and influenced each other over the past three decades.1
Ferraro (1996) calls domestic violence discourse “a place of struggle” (p. 79). 
As we will see, the battered women’s movement and the criminal justice system have 
certainly clashed over numerous issues pertaining to domestic violence. Before 
turning to a discussion of the specifics of this struggle, however, contextualizing the 
relationship between feminists and the state more broadly is important. Feminists 
have “engaged with” or “negotiated” the state on a number of levels for a variety of 
reasons, and they have faced some major problems in doing so. In Marshall’s (1997) 
theoretical exploration of feminists’ relationship with the state, she argues that “the 
state” as a concept “is clearly too broad to allow a simple definition” (p. 95). While
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she notes that an easy definition “casts the state as comprised of elected and
administrative governmental institutions, both at the local and national levels” (p. 95)
she also argues that this conception is overly simple as it fails to recognize the role of
power. Marshall argues, instead, for a “gendered state” model which helps to
elucidate the complex nature of the state. This model rejects the traditional
assumption of state neutrality, but assumes state accessibility. Marshall writes:
The need of the state to at least appear democratic provides an opening for reform 
efforts. In addition, the rise of the liberal state provides the opportunity for 
demands for equality; the state must balance its use of power with a search for 
legitimation. Feminism can thus place demands upon the state which are difficult 
to evade without risking legitimacy, (p. 104)
For Marshall, despite the state’s accessibility, it is a major participant in
gender politics and serves to entrench gendered structures and assumptions into law
and policy. These assumptions include “the primacy of heterosexuality as the norm,
the economic dependence of women upon men, and the desirability of maintaining
the traditional nuclear family” (pp. 104-405). However, Marshall makes clear that
under this model, neither the state nor gender is coherent or unified: the state’s power
is not always stable or direct, and women’s experiences are influenced by other
coordinates of their social location, such as race and class. Wendy Brown’s (1995)
words are useful here:
Despite the almost unavoidable tendency to speak of the state as an “it,” the 
domain we call the state is not a thing, system, or subject, but a significantly 
unbounded terrain of powers and techniques, an ensemble of discourses, rules, and 
practices, cohabiting in limited, tension-ridden, often contradictory relation with 
one another, (p. 174)
Rosga (1999) argues that it is this fractured nature of state power that allows activists 
to challenge the function of law enforcement officers and hold the state accountable
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for redressing violence. As Marshall (1997) argues, the state is an incongruous 
resource for women: “the state.. .can be considered a necessary, but not sufficient, 
arena within which feminists must struggle for social change” (pp. 106-107).
Indeed, feminist activists historically have mobilized the state to address 
discrimination against and oppression of women, including violence against women. 
However, this has been somewhat of a double-edged sword, as Marshall’s (1997) 
analysis of the state suggests. As we will see, traditionally the state has not only 
failed to take woman battering seriously, but in some circumstances it has even 
legitimized domestic violence. Yet, as evidenced by numerous reforms in the 
criminal justice system regarding domestic violence in the past several decades— 
some of them quite substantial—feminists and victim’s advocates have clearly had 
significant influence in state policy and practice. I now turn to a discussion of this 
process.
The Rise of the Battered Women’s Movement
As I briefly discussed in Chapter One, domestic violence was not widely 
recognized as a serious social problem until the early 1970’s. Prior to the 1970’s, the 
criminal justice system referred to domestic violence as “domestic disturbance” and 
social service organizations termed it “family maladjustment” (Pleck, 1987, p. 182). 
An article published in the 1964 edition of the Archives o f General Psychiatry 
entitled “The Wifebeater’s Wife: A Study of Family Interaction,” (Schechter, 1982, p. 
21) illustrates the absence of terms such as “battered woman” and “victim” that are 
now central to domestic violence discourses. At this time, domestic violence was 
commonly viewed as a personal or private issue—a “family problem”—and the
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criminal justice system rarely became involved (Buzawa and Buzawa, 1996; 
Schechter, 1982).
Under this framing, women were viewed to be partially, if not completely, 
accountable for any violence they experienced at the hands of their spouse. As 
Schechter (1982) demonstrates, “victim provocation” theories, advocated by a variety 
of social institutions-academia, the criminal justice system, and medical and social 
service organizations—argued that abused women needed and caused violence in their 
relationships for their own psychological well-being. She states: “The police, courts, 
hospitals, and social service agencies cooperated, although not conspiratorially, in 
defining the abuser’s behavior as legitimate or insignificant and the victim’s behavior 
as crazy, provocative, or reformable” (p. 27). Because the dominant cultural 
perspective prior to the 1970s presented women as responsible for any violence they 
experienced in the context of an intimate relationship and did not recognize them as 
victims, abused women were often unable to receive needed legal and social 
assistance (Pleck, 1982; Schechter, 1982).
Rooted in the second-wave of the feminist movement, the battered women’s 
movement originated in the early 1970s. Susan Schechter (1982) provides a detailed 
history of the formation of the movement. According to Schechter, by the late 1960s 
and early 1970s the second-wave of the feminist movement was comprised of two 
main branches—the liberal or “women’s rights” branch, and a more radical branch 
focused on freeing women from oppression. While both of these branches focused on 
bringing attention to the ways in which women were discriminated against in U.S. 
society, the radical branch also began to raise consciousness about “previously
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undiscussed ‘personal’ problems” that women experienced, including physical and 
sexual violence (p. 31). Out of this arose anti-rape work that resulted in the creation 
of rape crisis centers around the country. Schechter maintains that it was the anti­
rape movement that provided the basis for the battered women’s movement:
The feminist anti-rape movement has not only laid the foundations to change 
public consciousness, but also has built organizations and networks of politically 
sophisticated and active women. The anti-rape movement has unmasked the 
domination that violence maintains, has tom away a veil of shame, and shown that 
women can aid one another, transforming individual silence and pain into a social 
movement. Such work handed ideological tools, collective work structures, and 
political resources to the battered women’s movement, (p. 43)
Thus, in the 1970s many different women, including feminists, community 
activists, professionals, and women who had been battered “increasingly responded in 
a new way [to woman battering], providing emotional support, refuge and a new 
definition of ‘the problem’” (Schechter, 1982, p. 56). This new definition 
characterized woman battering as a serious social concern. Schechter, however, 
maintains that “a respectful caution must be exercised in untangling the ideological 
threads within the movement” (p. 44). She argues that while ideology was important 
to the movement, there was no one unified ideology upon which the movement was 
based. As she points out, due to the enormous amount of work the movement 
undertook, there was often little time to develop philosophy. Further, not all women 
in the battered women’s movement identified as feminists and not all feminists in the 
movement were in agreement about what “feminism” meant. As Schechter states, 
“Women who started battered women’s programs were motivated by diverse 
ideological and personal experiences. The meaning of this diversity, often invisible at 
first, became evident only later and partially accounts for tensions within the battered
women’s movement today” (pp. 44-45). Despite the lack of a clear ideology, the 
battered women’s movement directly challenged the dominant thinking of the time by 
arguing that domestic violence was not merely a private issue but a public, social, and 
political problem rooted in sexism and women’s oppression (Schechter, 1982).
Reform efforts of the battered women’s movement were multiple; the 
movement brought increased media attention to women battering, established safe 
houses and shelters for victims of domestic violence, formed state and national task 
forces and coalitions that produced a proliferation of research and information, and 
demanded that the criminal justice system improve domestic violence policies and 
practices (Schechter, 1982; Schneider, 2000; Tierney, 1982). As a result of such 
pressure, changes in the criminal justice system included: the removal of procedural 
barriers to official action (such as the elimination of a federal law in the 1970s 
mandating that battered women must initiate divorce proceedings before requesting a 
temporary restraining order); new substantive state and federal domestic violence 
legislation (such as the legislation of “domestic violence statues” by many states that 
create a separate domestic violence criminal offense); increased use of arrests and 
prior restraints on offenders; and court-sponsored mediation and counseling programs 
(Buzawa and Buzawa, 1996; Chauddhuri and Daly, 1992).
It is important to note that the battered women’s movement was not the only 
social force to push for the criminalization of domestic violence (although it was 
arguably the most influential one). Ford, Reichard, Goldsmith, and Regoli (1996) 
maintain that the adaptation of a control perspective towards domestic violence by the 
criminal justice system in the past two decades stems not just from reform efforts of
women’s groups. In addition to the battered women’s movement call for harsher 
punishment of woman battering to assert the seriousness of it as a crime, there has 
been a “law and order” movement, which has advocated for harsher punishment 
towards crime in general. For Ford et al., the labor of both of these movements has 
resulted in the increased criminalization of woman battering. A final important force 
that contributed to the criminalization of domestic violence was the modem victims’ 
rights movement. In the late 1980s and 90s, victims’ rights advocates argued that 
criminal law needed to take the rights of victims more seriously (Dubber, 2002). The 
movement emphasized the importance of recognizing the suffering of victims— 
particularly those of interpersonal violence—and also influenced the “tough-on- 
crime” approach to lawmaking that gained prominence in the 1980s (Dubber, 2002). 
Legislative Reform
Battered women’s advocates have written, lobbied for, and assisted in 
implementing legislation in many states that has helped abused women receive better 
assistance. Many of the shifts in police and court practice—which I will shortly 
discuss—stem from these legislative changes. According to a report by the Urban 
Institute (Burt, Dyer, Newmark, Norris, and Harrell, 1996), in the 1970s and 1980s, 
legislative reforms in many states:
(1) Codified domestic violence as criminal conduct; (2) authorized or 
mandated arrest of the offender in domestic violence incidents, given 
probable cause; (3) created new offense categories to cover domestic 
violence incidents and increased penalties under existing statutes; (4) 
expanded coverage of domestic violence statutes to include couples living
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together or having a child in common, and, in some jurisdictions, couples 
of the same sex; (5) created civil protection orders specifically for 
domestic violence, expanded the allowable remedies, and, in some 
jurisdictions, criminalized behavior violating these orders; and, (6) 
mandated training about domestic violence for police and highway patrol 
officers and sheriffs.
Further, on a federal level, in 1984 the Attorney General’s Task Force on 
Family Violence, found the need both for coordinated community responses to 
domestic violence and for specific reforms in laws and practices of the criminal 
justice system (Burt et al., 1996). The Violence Against Women Act was passed in 
1994 as a result of the work of women’s and civil rights groups. According to 
Schneider (2000), VAWA “is a comprehensive legislative effort to address the 
problem of violence against women through a variety of mechanisms, including 
funding for women’s shelters, a national domestic abuse hotline, rape education and 
prevention programs, and training for federal and state judges” (p. 188). This 
legislation was groundbreaking in that it defined violence against women as violating 
a federally protected civil right. One of the major accomplishments of VAWA was 
the establishment of the “STOP Violence Against Women” grants program. This 
program provided funding (known as STOP grants) to states, Indian tribal 
governments, and local governments to assist them in developing and strengthening 
law enforcement and prosecution strategies to combat violent crimes against women. 
The grants also helped,to develop and strengthen victim services in cases involving 
violence against women.
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The Urban Institute also reports that by 1996, most states had some type of 
legislation allowing a police officer to arrest for a misdemeanor in domestic violence 
cases without first obtaining a search warrant. Thirty-nine states had some type of 
statewide policy pertaining to law enforcement response or training. Further, twenty- 
seven states had implemented one or more special units for domestic violence 
response within law enforcement, while twenty-two had implemented one or more 
special units within prosecution (Burt et al., 1996).
Policing Reform
Prior to the creation of the battered women’s movement, police officers 
received little to no training in handling domestic violence cases and most 
departments did not have concrete domestic violence policies in place. During the 
1960s, policies were implemented that encouraged police officers to treat domestic 
violence as a “breach of the public peace” and to respond to domestic violence calls 
with the use of mediation and referrals to social service agencies (Belknap, 2001; 
Eigenberg, 2001b). Schechter (1982) provides an example of this response policy 
from the Michigan Police Training Academy:
a. Avoid arrest if possible. Appeal to their vanity.
b. Explain the procedure of obtaining a warrant.
1. Complainant must sign complaint.
2. Must appear in court.
3. Consider loss of time.
4. Cost of court.
c. State that your only interest is to prevent a breach of the peace.
d. Explain that attitudes usually change by court time.
e. Recommend a postponement.
1. Court not in session.
2. No. judge available.
f. Don’t be too harsh or critical, (p. 157)
Thus, commonly when women called the police after being beaten by their partner, 
the calls were screened out or the police refused to arrest the batterer (Jaffe, Hastings, 
Reitzel and Austin, 1993; Schecter, 1982). A national review of basic training in the 
late 1970s showed that police training on domestic violence was limited to a brief 
mention during a short lecture on mentally “disturbed” individuals (Eigenberg, 
2001b). Training guides “often portrayed battered women as nagging or 
domineering, and instructed police that removal of an intoxicated and abusive 
husband in those circumstances would be unreasonable” (Jaffe et al., 1993). Clearly, 
police policy and practice at this time reflected the dominant ideology that battered 
women suffered from some type of mental pathology and should be viewed as 
responsible for any abuse they suffered.
From its origins, the battered women’s movement criticized the reluctance of 
police departments and the criminal justice system to provide protection to battered 
women, while simultaneously demanding reforms (Buzawa and Buzawa, 1996; 
Hilton, 1993). In the 1970s, class-action lawsuits filed in several cities took issue 
with the lack of police response to domestic violence. For example, as Schechter 
(1982) describes, in 1976 battered wives filed a suit, Bruno v. Codd, against the New 
York City Police Department, the New York City Department of Probation, and the 
clerks of the Family Court. The lawsuit charged the police and courts with “gross 
failure to comply with the law” (p. 160). The police settled out of court and agreed 
on a number of policy stipulations, including that they respond to all calls from 
battered women, arrest men who commit assault, and assist battered women in 
obtaining medical care. As Schneider (2000) observes, “This litigation raised the
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dramatic notion that domestic violence was criminal, sanctionable activity that was a 
harm against the ‘public,’ the state, not just an individual woman, and should be 
treated the same as an assault against a stranger” (p. 44).
In the 1980s, police response to woman battering continued to increase in the 
U.S. Several forces contributed to this. Not only did the battered women’s 
movement persist in its efforts to bring increased attention to the problem of domestic 
violence, but battered women also continued to file class-action lawsuits against 
police departments who failed to arrest batterers. As Belknap (2001) discusses, a 
well-known example of this was the 1984 case Thurman v. City ofTorrington in 
which police failed to respond to calls by Tracey Thurman, whose ex-husband 
repeatedly threatened, stalked, and harassed her despite the fact that she had obtained 
a restraining order against him. During an instance where her ex-husband beat her so 
severely that she was left with permanent physical damage, the police not only 
delayed their response but watched the beating without intervening. Thurman won 
the lawsuit, but perhaps more importantly, the governor of Connecticut also formed a 
state task force whose sole purpose was to examine responses to domestic violence.
Another factor that contributed to changes in police policy was the very 
influential Minneapolis experiment—a pioneer study conduced by Sherman and Berk 
in the 1980s, that found that arresting batterers helped to prevent future violence 
(Gelles, 1996). Belknap (2001) describes the study: “...offenders were randomly 
assigned to three options: (1) arrest, (2) mediation, or (3) an order that the offender 
leave the premises” (p. 294). Sherman and Berk found that those offenders who were 
arrested were the least likely to commit future violence. As Belknap (2001)
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maintains, these findings were another important factor that resulted in many cities 
around the U.S. adopting policies that encouraged or even mandated arrest in 
domestic violence cases.
Mandatory and pro-arrest (or presumptive) policies are common today. A 
mandatory arrest law “requires police to arrest a suspect if there is probable cause to 
believe that domestic violence has occurred, removes the decision to press charges 
from the victim, and generally limits or eliminates police discretion” (Schneider, 
2001, p. 184), while pro-arrest policies or presumptive policies encourage arrest but 
allow officers a bit more discretion. As of 2001,28 states had implemented 
mandatory arrest statues of some type, while 12 additional states had implemented 
statues that encouraged or preferred arrest (White, 2003). However, as I will discuss 
at a later point in this chapter, mandatory arrest policies have been the subject of 
much controversy and debate.
Court Reform
In the late 60s and early 70s, the courts’ response to domestic violence was 
not much different than the police response and often reflected blame toward abused 
women and leniency towards batterers. During this time, the courts’ interests in 
“keeping the family together” commonly superseded concerns with protecting women 
from violence. Schechter (1982) demonstrates that judges rarely removed abusive 
men from the home but instead recommended counseling as a means of 
reconciliation. Underlying this practice was the reigning cultural and legal ideology 
that framed battering as a “private” matter, outside the realm of the law. Liberal 
theory has traditionally separated social life into two separate spheres: the private (or
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women’s) sphere that is associated with family and domestic life; and the public (or 
men’s) sphere that describes the marketplace. Under liberalism, the state may 
legitimately intervene in public matters, yet has no authority to do so in private 
matters (Jaggar, 1983). Therefore, historically the state has believed it should not 
intercede into “private” matters. As Marshall (1997) notes, “because the United 
States is a liberal political system, the conception of separate public and private 
realms is imbedded in the law and doctrines concerning the state’s relationship to the 
family” (p. 99). Thus, many feminists have argued that this public/private3 separation 
has served to legitimize and even perpetuate violence against women (Schneider, 
2000). Schneider (2000) states: “The rhetoric of privacy that has isolated the female 
world from the legal order sends a message to the rest of society. It devalues women 
and their functions and says that women are not important enough to merit legal 
regulation” (p. 89). As Schneider observes, by allowing a man to physically harm his 
wife, the law constitutes woman as man’s property and considers any act he uses to 
control her as legitimate and reasonable.
Although prior to the battered women’s movement there did exist laws against 
domestic violence in every state, because agents of the criminal justice system were 
afforded a great deal of discretion in screening cases, arrest and prosecution were 
uncommon (Schechter, 1982). Many times, men who were arrested for partner 
assault never were tried in a court. Schechter (1982) describes how in 1972 in 
Detroit, of 4900 domestic assault cases brought to the criminal justice system’s 
attention, fewer than 300 were actually tried (p. 158). Research conducted in the 
1970s found that domestic violence cases were much more likely to be dismissed than
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other cases (Davis and Smith, 1995). Ford and Regoli (1993) state that prosecutors 
have reflected both a lack of response to domestic violence allegations and have made 
women “feel responsible for their own victimization through screening questions:
‘Are you still living with this man?’ ‘Are you married to him?’ ‘Have you filed for 
divorce?’ ‘Why do you stay with him?”’ (p. 130). Further, in the early 1970s, 
protective orders were difficult to obtain and in most states were only available under 
the context of divorce. Even when judges did grant orders of protection, rarely did 
they actually order an abusive man to leave the home (Schechter, 1982).
In the 1980s and 90s, just as police departments experienced pressures for 
reform, so did the court system (Davis and Smith, 1995). The 1984 U.S. Attorney 
General’s Task Force on Family Violence detailed specific recommendations for 
prosecutors, all of which served to organize “prosecutorial activities to insure an 
effective response to complaints” (Ford and Regoli, 1993, p. 149). However, as 
Eigenberg (2000b) argues, change has been slower in the courts than in police 
departments partially because the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not allow 
lawsuits against judges and prosecutors; thus, they have not had as much of an 
impetus to implement reforms. Despite this, there have been some steps taken to 
improve the courts response to domestic violence, such as the development of 
specialized domestic violence prosecution units, the use of batterer treatment 
programs, and the creation of model sentencing guidelines to promote increased 
uniformity and accountability (Davis and Smith, 1995; Eigenberg, 2000b).
A specific issue targeted for legal reform by battered women’s advocates has 
been the way the courts handle battered women who kill their batterers. Historically,
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women who were abused by their intimate partners and faced criminal charges for 
homicide or assault of their batterer were often denied “equal rights to present the 
circumstances of their acts within the framework of the criminal law” (Schneider, 
2001, p. 113). As a result of this, in the late 1970s and early 1980s both the use of 
expert testimony and the defense of “battered women syndrome” (or BWS) were 
introduced (Belknap, 2001; Schneider, 2001). Expert testimony involves using 
witnesses to explain the context in which battering occurs and “has been a primary 
vehicle for addressing the lack of credibility accorded battered women” (Schneider, 
2001, p. 108).
BWS is a diagnosis “typically brought in as a defense for women who killed 
their batterers and usually requires an expert witness to verify that this particular 
woman suffers from BWS” (Belknap, 2001, p. 298). As Belknap (2001) explains, 
BWS is understood as having three components. The first is psychologist Lenore’s 
Walker “cycle of violence” theory that argues woman battering is a pattern occurring 
over time that involves three phases: a tension-building phase; the actual battering 
incident; and a phase where tension is absent, as the batterer appears apologetic and 
remorseful (Walker, 1993). The second component of BWS, also attributed to 
Walker, is referred to as the “learned helplessness” of the battered woman and is used 
to explain why many battered women don’t attempt to leave their abusive 
relationships. The underlying argument is that experiencing recurring violence makes 
women passive and unable to act in their own best interests (Walker, 1979). The final 
component of BWS is based on post traumatic stress disorder (or PTSD). PTSD is a 
diagnosis claiming that “certain psychological symptoms result from experiencing
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severe and unexpected trauma or being unexpectedly and repeatedly exposed to 
abuse” (Belknap, 2001, p. 301). Today, the majority of states allow the expert 
testimony of those who can verify that a woman has BWS (Walker, 1993). Further, 
some have argued that using the BWS defense is necessary in order to provide a more 
accurate portrayal of the context in which domestic violence occurs. However, as I 
will discuss more in-depth in Chapter Three, BWS has also been criticized by some 
who believe it robs battered women of the chance to explain their own experiences 
and also portrays them as mentally ill, helpless, and irrational (Belknap, 2001).
Yet another recent development in the ways the courts address domestic 
violence involves the implementation of policies that encourage or mandate 
prosecution, regardless of the desires of the victim. According to Schneider (2001), a 
“no-drop” prosecution policy “denies the victim of domestic violence the option of 
withdrawing a complaint at her discretion once formal charges have been filed, and 
limits prosecutors’ discretion to drop a case based only on the fact that the victim is 
unwilling to cooperate or participate” (p. 184). These policies are believed to have 
been implemented primarily for two reasons (Davis and Smith, 1995). Some research 
showed that court officials were frequently dismissing domestic violence cases, 
despite the fact that more batterers were entering the criminal justice system as a 
result of mandatory arrest policies. However, other research indicated that domestic 
violence cases were not dismissed solely due to court officials’ biases, but because of 
victims’ desires. In either case, policies encouraging or mandating prosecution 
remove the discretion from both court officials and battered women, making the 
chances of prosecution more likely.
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While pro-prosecution policies clearly became more common in the 1990s, 
determining the number of states with no-drop prosecution policies is difficult 
because specialized courts and no-drop policies commonly are created according to 
local jurisdictions (Smith, 2001). Further, as Cheryl Hanna (1996) points out, the term 
“no-drop” is somewhat tricky in that there exists a difference between “hard” and 
“soft” no-drop policies. Under “hard” no-drop prosecution policies, cases progress 
with or without a victim’s consent, as long as there is enough evidence. Victims are 
often subpoenaed and may even be held in contempt of court for failing to cooperate 
and/or testify. Under “soft” no-drop prosecution policies, while victims are often 
encouraged to cooperate, they are not forced to participate in the process. Finally, as 
Hanna acknowledges, even in jurisdictions with strict or “hard” prosecution policies, 
prosecutors often retain a great deal of decision-making power over whether or not to 
proceed with a case. Not unlike mandatory arrest policies, no-drop prosecution 
policies are highly controversial, as I will now discuss.
Mandatory Policies: The Debate 
As I have noted, numerous states and/or local jurisdictions have enacted 
“mandatory arrest” and “no-drop” policies because when left to their discretion, many 
police officers and prosecutors historically have had a tendency not to take domestic 
violence very seriously and therefore have treated batterers leniently (Hilton, 1993). 
Further, in some jurisdictions, even when arrests in domestic violence cases do occur, 
problems with victim reluctance have resulted in dropped charges and case dismissals 
(Belknap, 1995; Davis and Smith, 1995). Mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution 
policies have been highly controversial however, both in and outside of feminist
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circles. Schneider (2000) discusses four arguments that exist in favor of such policies. 
The first argument is that these policies “ .. .best effectuate the state and prosecutors’ 
roles regarding domestic violence...” (p. 185). Many battered women’s advocates 
have argued that the decision to prosecute should rest with the state and not the 
victim. As Sparks (1997) argues, battered women advocates want to hold agents of 
the states, such as police and court officials, responsible for “carrying out the 
government’s mandate to protect citizens” (pp. 35-36).
The second argument Schneider discusses in favor of mandatory arrest and 
no-drop prosecution policies is that such policies relieve victims of making the 
decision whether or not to arrest or prosecute their batterer and thus removes pressure 
often applied by batterers to drop the case. Indeed, research suggests that high 
percentages of women who file charges often drop them prior to adjudication (see 
Ford, 1991). Other research, however, suggests that women’s reasons for wishing to 
withdraw cooperation in their batterers’ prosecution are not usually based on their 
desires to reunite with their batterers. Women may want to drop charges because of 
fear and/or because they encounter resistance in the system (Erez and Belknap, 1998; 
Hart, 1996; McLeod, 1983). Thus, some advocates believe that mandating arrest and 
prosecution will help address these issues. According to Schneider (2000), a third 
argument used to support mandatory arrest and no-drop policies is similar to the 
second argument, and centers on the impact these policies have on the batterer: they 
“tell the batterer that violent conduct and abuse are criminal and unacceptable, and 
that incarceration is an appropriate sanction” (pp. 185-186). Again, the argument
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here is that under such policies, batterers will be less able to manipulate and pressure 
victims into dropping charges.
The fourth and final argument in favor of mandatory arrest and no-drop 
prosecution policies discussed by Schneider is that they help to portray the notion that 
domestic violence is a public matter. Proponents of this argument maintain that, “by 
refusing to intervene under a rationale that domestic violence is a private matter, the 
state not only condones battering but in fact promotes it” (p. 186). Uniform response 
policies send the message that the state will treat domestic violence as no less a 
serious crime than assault by a stranger.4
There has been much criticism of these uniform policies, as well. A major 
area of concern is whether or not mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies 
really serve as a deterrent to domestic violence. While there have not been many 
studies evaluating no-drop prosecution policies, research examining the effectiveness 
of mandatory arrest policies in deterring future violence has produced contradictory 
results (Gelles, 1996; Schmidt and Sherman, 1996). As I previously discussed, in the 
1980s Sherman and Berk’s Minneapolis experiment showed that arresting batterers 
helped to serve as a deterrent to future violence and resulted in the implementation of 
mandatory arrest policies all around the U.S. (Schmidt and Sherman, 1996).
However, in the 1990s, replication studies of the Minneapolis experiment in six other 
cities reflected both deterrent and backfiring effects of arrest (Schmidt and Sherman, 
1996). From these replication studies, researchers have drawn several conclusions, 
including that: (1) arrest reduces domestic violence in some cities but increases it in 
others; (2) arrest reduces domestic violence among employed people but increases it
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among unemployed people; (3) arrest reduces domestic violence in the short term but 
may increase it in the long run (Sherman, 1992). These replication studies paint a 
very muddy and confusing picture regarding the effectiveness of arrest in deterring 
domestic violence. Sherman himself has retracted the importance of the results of his 
original Minneapolis experiment and argues that mandatory arrest laws should be 
repealed.5 As Hirschel et al. (1992) maintain, there is considerable controversy over 
what constitutes the most effective or appropriate law enforcement response to 
domestic violence. Because of this, many are critical of mandatory arrest policies.
Evidence also suggests that mandatory arrest policies have led to an increase 
in the number of arrests of battered women—studies have shown that in some 
jurisdictions, after mandatory arrest policies were implemented the number of women 
arrested for domestic violence increased (Hirschel and Buzawa, 2002; Miller, 2001). 
Additionally, some feminists have expressed concerns that using arrest as the main 
means of addressing woman battering will present problems in minority and/or poor 
communities where historically, police have demonstrated inappropriate behavior, 
including racism and brutality (Sparks, 1997). As Sparks (1997) reminds us, poor 
women and women of color who lack trust of police officers will likely not call them 
for assistance and may not want their batterer to be placed in the hands of the criminal 
justice system.
Another concern with both mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies 
is that they effectively serve to remove victims from a major-decision making role. 
Some researchers have argued that doing so is not always in the best interest of the 
women who experience domestic violence (Ford, 1991; Mills, 1998; Hilton, 1993;
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Hoyle, 1998). Not only have judges in some jurisdictions punished women who 
refuse to testify against their batterers by charging them with contempt of court 
(Hilton, 1993), but many researchers and battered women advocates argue that no­
drop and mandatory arrest policies disempower women because they limit women’s 
agency, ignore their opinions, and re-victimize them through forced submittal to state 
power (Ferraro and Pope, 1993; Ford, 1991; MacLeod, 1987; Schneider, 2000).
There are many reasons a woman may not want her batterer to be jailed: she may 
depend on him for income and/or housing, she may be afraid he will be even angrier 
when he gets out of jail and his violence against her will escalate, she may not trust 
the system, and/or she may not want to end her relationship with him.
Finally, other arguments against mandatory arrest and no-drop policies stem 
from the recognition that battered women’s experiences are diverse and 
multifaceted—there is no one universal “battered woman’s experience.” Uniform 
responses to domestic violence fail to take into account the diversity of women’s 
situations based on structural factors such as race, culture, and class and individual 
factors such as different women’s desires and needs (for further discussion of these 
issues see Crenshaw, 1995; Mills, 1996, National Latino Alliance for the Elimination 
of Domestic Violence, 1997). Critics of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution 
policies argue that these policies/responses assume that a cookie-cutter approach will 
be applicable to all battered women’s situations.
Disagreement over mandatory policies is a central issue for those working in 
the domestic violence field. As Schneider (2001) states, “Feminist advocates are 
deeply divided as to whether mandatory arrest, mandatory prosecution, and no-drop
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prosecution are a better policy choice than the courts’ current practice of dismissing 
cases when the battered woman refuses to participate” (p. 184). This question has not 
just brought about debate within the battered women’s movement, but has also caused 
friction between the battered women’s movement and the criminal justice system on a 
broader level. The debate surrounding mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution 
policies highlights many of the issues that arise when feminists attempt to use the 
state to remedy social issues predominately impacting women, such as domestic 
violence.
Tensions between Feminists and the Criminal Justice System
Eigenberg (2001b) states: “An examination of the criminal justice system 
response indicates that there has been progress in terms of changing the cultural 
hegemony, and battering is more apt to be viewed as a crime than in the past” (p.
291). Clearly, the battered women’s movement has played a major role in the 
reforms to criminal justice response to domestic violence. However, feminists’ 
engagement with the criminal justice system on the issue of domestic violence has 
brought up some major issues. Questions exist surrounding both the success of the 
criminal justice reforms and the nature of these reforms (that is, the direction they 
have taken and whether or not they can effectively address all of the needs of battered 
women).
Current research demonstrates that gender bias in the criminal justice system 
still exists and that many battered women continue to have negative experiences with 
the police and/or the courts. For example, Stephens and Sinden (2000) found that the 
majority of battered women in their study who had more than one encounter with law
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enforcement officials for domestic violence reported police officers commonly 
minimized the seriousness of their situation, doubted their story, conveyed attitudes 
of nonchalance and indifference, and/or were rude and condescending. Similarly, a 
study by Belknap and Hartman (2000) of victim advocates’ reports found that 
“although the advocates reported a wide range of police behaviors and 
responses.. .from supportive to hostile, most of the reported responses implied that a 
significant proportion of cases involved police who fail to take woman battering 
seriously” (p. 171). Further, Byrne et al. (1999) found that female victims of violent 
assault by a current or former intimate male partner were significantly less likely to 
report satisfaction with the district attorneys and judges than women who were the 
victims of nonpartner violence. The victims of partner violence were also less likely 
to believe that prosecutors took their opinions into account and to believe that the 
sentence was appropriate. In still another study, half of the battered women 
interviewed by Erez and Belknap (1998) felt they were discouraged to follow through 
with prosecution by the prosecutor. Half also reported that the prosecutor asked them 
questions about whether they had provoked their abuser.
Still other research has shown that the very process of using the court system 
is confusing and frustrating to battered women and this may contribute to their 
reluctance to going to court or using the system at all (Bennet et al, 1999). This has 
been shown to be especially true for battered women who are members of minority 
groups. Current criminal justice policy surrounding domestic violence has been 
criticized for overlooking or ignoring issues that are specific to immigrant women 
and/or women of color, such as language barriers, threat of deportation, and lack of
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power and economic resources (Crenshaw, 1995; National Latino Alliance for the 
Elimination of Domestic Violence, 1997).
Many feminists believe that weaknesses in the criminal justice response to
domestic violence continue to exist and thus, legal reform is still necessary.
However, an even broader issue for some feminists surrounds the question of whether
or not the criminal justice system is the best suited institution to address domestic
violence. While the criminalization of domestic violence has resulted in law
enforcement and justice system officials taking woman battering more seriously and
has lead to increased rates of arrest and prosecution of batterers, some feminist
advocates have expressed concerns about possible negative ramifications of
criminalization. As Schneider (2000) states:
Critics maintain that additional state interference into a battered woman’s life can 
hardly be described as liberating. If arrests lead to automatic prosecution, women 
will be less likely to call police for help. Indeed, these policies may reinforce 
battered women’s distrust of police and the justice system. In addition, the effect 
of forcing prosecution may well be that the battered woman becomes aligned with 
her batterer in order to protect him, thereby further entrenching her in the abusive 
relationship, (pp. 186-187)
Additionally, as we have already seen, for some, uniform and mandatory policies fail 
to account for the complex nature of domestic violence and thus, are not the best 
solution to ending woman battering.
From the battered women’s movement’s original origins, feminists have 
disagreed over the level of their engagement with the state and over the amount of 
control the criminal justice system should have in dealing with domestic violence. 
Schechter, writing in 1982 about some of the issues the battered women’s movement 
was confronting at the time, demonstrates the nature of this debate:
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In working to reform the criminal justice—or other—systems, women in the 
movement are faced with difficult political questions about the nature of social 
change and the relationship between institutional reform and a social movement. 
Taken to its extreme, one position suggests that reforms are the solution to battered 
women’s problems. The other extreme declares that police, courts, and welfare 
systems reflect a hopelessly racist, sexist, and class-dominated society and that 
attempts to change them or work within them waste time and are eventually co­
opted. (pp. 175-176)
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For sure, the fear of the co-optation of domestic violence discourses by the state has 
been one of feminists’ biggest concerns. Some theorists have argued that viewing 
domestic violence as a criminal issue shifts attention away from a political/feminist 
perspective (Ferraro, 1996; Mills, 1996; Schneider, 2000). The primary response to 
domestic violence by the state since the 1970s has been to treat it as a crime, 
effectively “replacing demands for restructuring gender inequality” (Ferraro, 1996, p. 
87). Woman battering is thus not seen as a gendered issue of power and control, but 
solely as a wrong against society. Such a perspective, critics argue, does little to help 
women secure equal access to social resources and power (Brown, 1995).
Another issue for feminists in deciding whether or not to engage with the state 
regards the types of remedies offered by the state for woman battering. Of particular 
concern is potentially legitimating a traditionally “masculine” culture of violence in 
the criminal justice system: “public, legitimate, and presumably benevolent forms of 
male violence cannot be used to prevent private, illegitimate, and malevolent male 
violence in the home” (The Collective, 1997, p. 88). While many hoped the 
criminalization of domestic violence would provide increased protection to battered 
women, as The Collective (1997) points out, such a response does not necessarily
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challenge existing gender, race and class structures, and the enforcement of the law 
may still be carried out in a discriminatory manner.
Similarly, some have argued that the viewing of domestic violence solely as a 
criminal issue has resulted in the overemphasis on particular incidents of violence and 
does not allow for the consideration of women’s experiences in the context of the 
entire relationship (Mahoney, 1994; Wittner 1998). Further, Ferraro and Pope (1993) 
maintain that when police respond to battering, two cultures come into conflict with 
one another. One, that of the police, is the culture of power, “in which decisions are 
based on rational choice and maximization of profit or benefits” (p. 101). Under this 
perspective, through criminal justice system tactics, it is possible to determine the 
“facts” of a particular incident. If a crime has been committed, the offender must be 
processed according to the rules of the system. According to Ferraro and Pope, the 
battered women’s culture is more of a relational culture. They make clear that they 
don’t mean to imply that all battered women respond to violence similarly, but they 
argue that most women in abusive relationships experience confusion, ambiguity and 
fear. They state:
In the culture of relations, decisions are not based on ‘facts’ and a calculation of the 
most propitious outcome for the woman. There are more compromises than 
decisions— strategies for survival in a confusing, dangerous, unpredictable 
situation. It is a culture in which boundaries are shifting and hazy. (p. 102)
According to Ferraro and Pope, the criminal justice system privileges the 
culture of power over the relational culture in its attempt to help women. This is 
problematic because the imposition of the culture of power upon battered women’s 
situation does not empower them, but instead limits their self-determination. Ferraro
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and Pope argue that the perspective of the criminal justice system fails to completely 
account for the contextual realities of battering and the often-incompatible differences 
between battered women and the criminal justice system. They state, “The analytical 
and policy effect of the focus on police response is the disregard of the complex 
power relations of battering and the promotion of a “cure” that brackets sexism, 
racism, homophobia, and poverty” (p. 99).
In contrast to those who have taken issue with the criminalization of domestic 
violence, many feminists have argued that the state’s changed response to woman 
battering in the past several decades has been positive and feminists should continue 
engaging with the state to fight for domestic violence reforms (see Schneider, 2000, 
for discussion). As we have already seen, battered women’s advocates have been 
deeply involved in reform efforts and have been able to change policy. Some 
feminists argue that just because mandatory policies are not without problems does 
not mean they should be repealed; instead, the focus should be placed on making sure 
agents of the criminal justice system implement these policies fairly and are held 
accountable if they do not (Belknap, 2001). Many also believe that the police should 
be held responsible, as agents of the state, for protecting citizens from violence. 
Sparks (1998) writes: “Reliance on the police to further the goal of empowering 
women has problematic and even paradoxical aspects; yet clearly the potential for 
improved police intervention on behalf of battered women cannot be ignored” (p. 36). 
Further, Belknap (2001) makes the argument that through the arrest and detainment 
of batterers, battered women and their children are provided a chance to escape.
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The debates surrounding both the success and nature of criminal justice 
response to domestic violence highlight an important issue discussed by Schneider 
(2000): the complexity of incorporating women’s experiences into law. As she points 
out, feminist lawmaking needs to be “particular” by taking individual experiences of 
battered women into account, but also be “general” in connecting violence against 
women to larger hierarchical social structures. Achieving a balance between these 
two can be difficult, if not impossible. Further, just because women’s experiences are 
taken into account by the law, doesn’t mean the voices of the women themselves are 
actually heard. Schneider states: “Experiences that were previously invisible—rape, 
intimate violence, sexual harassment, incest—are now made visible. But this 
visibility does not mean that women are really being listened to, or that the listener 
(or society at large) gets the point” (p. 103).6 Clearly, even if feminists do engage 
with the state, many questions and issues remain. How should the state represent the 
matter of domestic violence? Should it be viewed as solely a criminal issue? An 
important related issue centers on the way in which battered women are represented 
by the criminal justice system and domestic violence criminal justice policy. The 
criminalization of domestic violence and resulting discourses have positioned 
battered women in particular ways, with particular consequences for battered 
women—it is this topic that I will address in Chapter Three.
NOTES
1 While my discussion centers on the processes that have shaped domestic violence discourses since 
the 1970s, see Kathleen Ferraro (1996) for an excellent discussion of the earlier foundations of 
domestic violence discourse.
2 As many researchers have shown, attempts were made to address the problem of wife-beating prior 
to the 1970’s (Schechter. 1982; Schneider, 2000). Both the temperance movement and the first wave
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of the feminist movement advocated for domestic violence reform in the late nineteenth century but 
were met with limited success.
3 Okin (1991) argues that the phrase “public/private” is somewhat misleading as it has been used to 
refer “both to the distinction between state and society (as is public and private ownership), and to 
the distinction between non-domestic and domestic life” (p. 68). While, according to Okin, in both 
of these dichotomies the state is viewed as public and the family as private, in the former the socio­
economic realm is included in the private realm, yet in the latter is included in the public realm.
Thus, she prefers the term “public/domestic” to describe the dichotomy in which public life is viewed 
as separate from domestic, or family, life and which “enables theorists to ignore the political nature 
of the family, the relevance of justice in personal life and, as a consequence, a major part of the 
inequalities of gender” (p. 69).
4 Research has shown that female victims of violent assaults by current or former intimate male 
partners report less satisfaction with the criminal justice than do female victims of assault by 
nonpartners (Byrne et al, 1999).
5 This controversy is heightened by the fact that some feminists have “registered complaints that 
Sherman and his colleagues appear to be solely in charge of evaluating the pros and cons of arresting 
batterers” (Belknap, 1995, p. 48).
6 What Schneider argues is not being heard is the diversity of women’s voices and experiences.
CHAPTER THREE 
The (Re)Presentation of the “Battered Woman”
Linda Gordon writes, “The modem history of family violence is not the story
of changing responses to a constant problem but, in large part, of redefinition of the
problem itself’ (cited in Bacchi, 1999, p. 166). For sure, a variety of terms and
concepts have been used to portray women’s experiences with violence in the context
of an intimate relationship. These terms have specific and at times, divergent,
meanings in various social arenas such as law, the media, the battered women’s
movement, and various academic disciplines (such as biology, psychology,
criminology, feminism, and sociology) (Ferraro, 1996; O’Neill, 1998). Ferraro
illustrates how such varied influence has resulted in the reflection of both resistance
to and reproduction of power relations in domestic violence discourse. She writes:
This discourse is a feminist victory, on one side, as it has urged social recognition 
of women’s oppression and developed material resources specifically addressed to 
the problem. It is simultaneously a feminist nightmare, as it has absorbed 
grassroots struggles into the machinery of social engineering and mass mediation, 
reinscribing patterns of race, class, and gender domination (p. 77).
While in Chapter Two, I traced the historical roots of domestic violence 
discourses, focusing primarily on influences of the battered women’s movement and 
the criminal justice system, in this chapter I provide an in-depth analysis of these 
discourses and examine their social meanings and impacts. Along with Ferraro, my 
analysis is grounded in a feminist perspective. As such, I am interested in examining 
how and why domestic violence discourses are both a “feminist victory” and a 
“feminist nightmare.” I will illuminate the ways in which power has been resisted 
and reproduced in the dominant cultural narratives that surround woman battering.
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As I will illustrate in this chapter, an examination of the power dynamics in 
domestic violence discourses reveal numerous arguments over social meanings. For 
the most part, these arguments are of two sorts: (1) arguments over social meanings 
themselves (for example how domestic violence should be signified, and how both 
battered women and batterers are constructed); and (2) arguments over who gets to 
determine or make decisions about how domestic violence, battered women, and 
batterers should be represented and consequently, dealt with. My discussion in this 
chapter will pay attention to both types of arguments, and while I include an 
examination of how domestic violence has been constructed on a broad level, the 
majority of my attention will focus on the social meanings surrounding the concept of 
“the battered woman.”
I first focus on the more general ways in which hegemonic domestic violence 
discourses have constructed battered women as victims of domestic violence. As 
such, I provide a genealogy of the term “battered woman.” I examine the ways in 
which battered women have been constituted and represented by domestic violence 
discourses, linking this exploration to the ways in which female victims of crime have 
been constructed in general. I not only continue to explore the roles that the battered 
women’s movement and criminal justice system have had in the creation of these 
discourses, but also examine the roles that other social organizations and groups have 
played. Throughout the chapter, I consider the complex ways all of these social 
forces have been in dialogue with one another. This genealogy forms the basis of my 
work; it draws heavily on the four theoretical literatures discussed in Chapter One and
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I believe demonstrates how these literatures may be woven together and complement 
one another.
In the second part of the chapter, I narrow my focus and concentrate 
specifically on the discursive effects of criminal justice domestic violence policy for 
battered women. Given that woman battering is primarily viewed as a legal issue, the 
criminal justice system plays a major role in the production and reproduction of 
domestic violence discourses. As I discussed in Chapter One, criminal justice 
domestic violence policy and practice are not just based on dominant cultural 
representations of battered women, but also reproduce these representations. 
Considering policy as a form of discourse allows for an examination of the social 
meanings entrenched in this policy, and again, my major focus is on how battered 
women are constructed and represented and the potential implications of this for 
battered women.
Before turning to the next section, I wish to flag a central issue in the way in 
which the “battered woman” has been represented. Many of the portrayals of battered 
women in domestic violence discourses have been based on what has been referred to 
as the “victim/agent dichotomy” (Mahoney, 1994; Schneider 2000). Under this 
framing, women are depicted either as victims or agents, yet never both at the same 
time. According to Schneider (2000), this dichotomy has been a “central tension” 
within feminism in general (p. 74). She cites the issue of pornography as an example 
of this. While some feminists argue that pornography serves solely as a means of 
victimization of women, other feminists are highly critical of this view and instead 
choose to focus on women’s individual agency and ability to exercise choice.
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Schneider states that each of these views “underscores the fundamental inadequacy of 
either victimization or agency.. .to capture the complexity of struggle in women’s 
lives, and highlights how this false dichotomy leads to problematic extremes” (p. 75).
As we will see, frequently, depictions of battered women in U.S. society are 
premised on the victim/agent dichotomy. Both mainstream cultural narratives 
surrounding domestic violence and criminal justice domestic violence policy have 
simplified the interrelationship between victimization and agency in the lives of 
battered women. Thus, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, domestic violence 
discourses are often unable to recognize battered women’s acts of resistance while 
simultaneously accounting for the social and structural constraints these women may 
face. This is one of the key issues in arguments/discussions surrounding social 
meanings of battered women and has been an area of contention not only between the 
battered women’s movement and the state, but also within the battered women’s 
movement itself.
Hegemonic Constructions of the “Battered Woman”
One of the central issues that feminists have confronted as a result of 
increased public and state attention to domestic violence revolves around issues of 
representation. As I discussed in Chapter Two, the battered women’s movement 
originated in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a direct attempt to obtain the 
recognition of domestic violence as an important social problem. As Schneider (2000) 
maintains, the discourse of the battered women’s movement emerged as “explicitly 
political” (p. 21). She argues that this discourse had several functions:
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First, “battered women” were set forth as a definable group or category, with 
battering regarded within the larger context of “power and control”; physical abuse 
was a particular “moment” in a larger continuum of “doing power,” which might 
include emotional abuse, sexual abuse and rape, and other maneuvers to control, 
isolate, threaten, intimidate, or stalk, (pp. 21-22)
Clearly, from the second wave of the women’s movement arose a specific discourse 
and set of concepts in which domestic violence came to be understood; this discourse 
challenged previous ideology that depicted domestic violence as an issue of non­
importance and framed domestic violence as “part of a larger system of coercive 
control and subordination” (Schneider, 2000, p. 5).
Further, the work of the battered women’s movement brought increased media
attention to the issue of domestic violence. And, as Tierney (1982) argues, this was
beneficial to the movement. She writes, “Coverage first gave the movement
visibility. Then, groups used media interest and the public concern that resulted to
recruit support. Finally, wife beating came to be seen as a social problem: authorities
began to recognize and respond to the conditions the media described” (p. 214).
Therefore, many would argue that the increased public attention to the issue of
domestic violence and the creation of support services for abused women was a
triumph for the battered women’s movement. Ferraro (1996) maintains:
The construction of domestic violence discourse between 1970 and 1996 is an 
example of the deployment of power within liberatory discourses. As a challenge 
to male violence it exemplifies the potential for resistance through recasting the 
meanings of gender relationships, (p. 88)
In many ways, feminists and battered women’s advocates were successful in their
attempts to directly alter the social meanings that previously existed surrounding
domestic violence and battered women.
81
However, this success has been somewhat tainted. Tierney (1982) argues that
“As movements grow, they are often co-opted by official organizations” (p. 216).
Indeed, after domestic violence was brought to public attention in the 1970s and
1980s, it became framed as primarily a criminal issue and concerns with addressing
structural inequality and oppression were relinquished. Ferraro (1996) states, “The
ascendance of crime control strategies within the discourse.. .tends to replicate
gendered, as well as racialized and class-based hierarchies” (p. 87). As we witnessed
in Chapter Two, the cooptation of social problems is one of the major issues that
feminists face when deciding to engage with the state. Clearly, state involvement in
woman battering and the criminalization of domestic violence has not come without
costs. As Schneider writes:
.. .feminist ideas about the relationship between violence and gender have been 
simultaneously transformed, depoliticized, subverted, and contained: the broader 
link between violence and gender inequity that animated them has, to a large 
degree, been lost, or at least undermined, (p. 6)
Further, as Schneider (2000) illustrates, several of the approaches taken to 
both study/understand domestic violence and provide services to domestic violence 
victims also have depoliticized the issue.1 A psychological approach has served to 
pathologize domestic violence in its quest to find individual, psychological causes to 
abuse. However, this perspective does not just focus on how batterers are “sick” but 
also considers women who remain in relationships with these men as equally 
troubled, if not more so. An example of this, as discussed by Schneider, is Lenore 
Walker’s controversial conception of “battered woman syndrome,” discussed in 
Chapter Two. Such a framework, according to Schneider, “shifts the focus of the
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violent act to the woman, and the use of ‘syndrome’ suggests that it is she who is 
emotionally or mentally impaired” (p. 24).
Still another approach that shifts attention away from a political/feminist 
perspective on domestic violence has sociological roots. This approach examines 
woman battering under the larger framework of “family violence” and focuses on the 
possibility of all members of the family perpetuating violence (Schneider, 2000).
This perspective has been criticized by many feminists for its gender-neutral 
approach and its failure to take into account factors such as intent, severity and 
consequences (Belknap, 2001).
Despite feminist criticism of both the “domestic violence as individual 
pathology” and “family violence” approaches, as Schneider reminds us, these 
perspectives have been influential in public, legal, and academic realms. The 
criminalization, psychologization and pathologization of domestic violence have 
served to sever the consideration of woman battering from its original feminist 
foundations. Instead, “it is viewed as though it can be ‘solved’ or ‘treated’ through 
legal remedies or mediation or therapy alone, without considering the issues of 
women’s equality and gender subordination” (Schneider, 2000, pp. 27-28).
For many theorists (see, for example, Ferraro, 1996), while criminal and 
psychological perspectives do little, if anything, to increase women’s access to 
economic and social resources and alleviate gender inequality, a positive ramification 
has been the acknowledgment of battered women as victims. However, as Ferraro 
herself allows, a reinterpretation of battered women as victims is not “free from 
cultural and moral baggage” (p. 89). Hegemonic domestic violence discourses have
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constructed, positioned, and interpreted battered women in particular ways and thus 
determine perceptions and understandings of what a “battered woman” is. Such 
discourses provide the social and cultural meanings that shape the identity of 
“battered woman.” However, just as there have existed a plurality of domestic 
violence discourses, there have also been multiple constructions of battered women. 
While an exploration of domestic violence discourses is vital to understanding the 
creation of the category “domestic violence” and accounts of underlying causes, an 
examination of how these discourses have constructed or presented battered women, 
specifically, is necessary to elucidate the meaning given to this identity and in turn, to 
better grasp the experiences of abused women.
Schneider (2000) maintains that while “battered woman” became the most 
common term used to describe the once unnamed harm that women suffered in 
abusive relationships, it “raises critical questions of definition and strategy” (p. 60). 
Particularly problematic, according to Schneider, is the reductive nature of such a 
term; because it focuses on describing the victim and her characteristics, it risks 
defining a woman solely in terms of her experiences with battering. This is 
compounded by the fact that there are often negative social stereotypes associated 
with women who are in abusive relationships. Interestingly, some of these negative 
stereotypes originated from the battered women’s movement itself, in its initial 
attempts to draw attention to the problem of battering and shift the blame away from 
women to both batterers and systems of social inequality and oppression.
Many researchers have argued that constructing a unified image of battered 
women helped victim advocates and claims-makers to establish the seriousness and
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severity of domestic violence in the 1970s (Davies, Lyon, and Monti-Catania 1998; 
Ferraro, 1996; Loseke, 1992). According to Davies, Lyon, and Monti-Catania
(1998), during the early years of the battered women’s movement, a major focus was 
the attempt to convince both the public and policymakers that battering was a serious 
problem that affected many different women. Because both professional and popular 
understandings of domestic violence often portrayed battered women as to blame for 
the violence they experienced, “advocates needed to construct a public image of the 
‘battered woman’ who was more sympathetic” (p. 15). As Davies, Lyon, and Monti- 
Catania and Loseke (1992) discuss, domestic violence discourses thus became 
centered on the image of the battered woman as the “pure victim.” This 
representation of the “battered woman” involves several characteristics. To begin 
with, battered women are depicted as wives who adhere to traditional gender roles 
and are economically and emotionally dependent on their abusers. Further, these 
women are portrayed as passive and not themselves violent. The only time they are 
depicted as using violence is in the case of self-defense. Under this construction, the 
abuse that battered women experience “is presented as a pattern of events that 
necessarily increase in severity and frequency, and that will only get worse unless 
someone intervenes” (Davies, Lyon, and Monti-Catania, 1998, p. 15). Finally, 
battered women are portrayed as extremely fearful, if not terrified by the abuse they 
experience.
The battered woman as “pure victim” construction is strongly tied to the 
notion of “learned helplessness” as developed by Lenore Walker (1979). She used 
this concept to explain why many battered women don’t attempt to leave their
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abusive relationships. Walker, a psychologist, applied research conducted with
animals to battered women and argued that repeated violence makes women passive
and unable to care for themselves. Walker states:
.. .the battered woman does not believe anything she does will alter any outcome, 
not just the specific situation that has occurred. She says, “No matter what I do, I 
have no influence.” She cannot think of alternatives. She says, “I am incapable 
and too stupid to learn how to change things.” (p. 50)
While this concept is arguably problematic in that it paints all battered women with
the same broad brush, the notion of “learned helplessness” has been commonly used
and accepted as a rationale for explaining battered women’s behavior and is one of
the characteristics of battered women’s syndrome.
Sharon Lamb (1999) argues that it is not just the battered woman who has 
been constructed in specific ways, but female victims of all types of abuse, including 
rape and sexual harassment. She maintains that the image of the victim offered up by 
psychologists, researchers, therapists, feminists, victims’ rights organizations, the 
media, activists and survivor groups is “one who is pure, innocent, blameless and free 
of problems (before the abuse)” (p. 108). After experiencing abuse, the victim is 
portrayed as extremely traumatized and greatly suffering. Victims are assumed to 
experience problems such as depression, suicidal tendencies, anxiety, phobias, 
addictions, dissociative identity disorder, eating disorders, sexual dysfunction, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder (p. 111).
Similar to Davies, Lyon, and Monti-Catania (1998) and Loseke (1992), Lamb
(1999) argues that this image of victims was privileged in an attempt to gamer public 
sympathy in order to counter previous discourses that blamed the victim. Further,
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Lamb believes that therapists and victim advocates wished to avoid minimizing abuse 
and any potential harm it produced, as minimization of abuse was common by 
perpetrators and other members of society. As Lamb maintains, it seemed as if the 
only way the public would recognize the severity of the problem of victimization was 
through the belief that abuse leads to severe psychological distress. Lamb and others 
have argued that a consequence of psychologizing the abuse of women is that such 
abuse has become depoliticized. A focus on violence as a pathology obscures both 
the pervasiveness of the abuse of women in U.S. society and the context of unequal 
power relations in which it occurs (Ferraro, 1996, Lamb, 1999, Schneider, 2000). As 
Gondolf (1988) states, the abuse victim’ has consequently become a new population 
to ‘treat’ rather than advocate for or empower” (p. 2).
A potential problem with critically examining public constructions of battered 
women and other female victims of abuse is that such an examination risks implying 
that these constructions are never in accordance with women’s actual experiences 
with abuse and victimization. Certainly, there are many battered women whose 
experiences mirror the “pure victim” construction. Davies, Lyon, and Monti-Catania
(1998) maintain that this construction of the battered woman accurately described 
many battered women in the 1970s and early 1980s. Likewise, there are women who 
experience violence and abuse who do, indeed, suffer greatly. Recognizing that 
victims often experience things such as post traumatic stress disorder, depression, 
suicidal tendencies, and eating disorders is important: “These symptoms are not 
invented or pulled out of thin air. There are victims of severe sexual abuse who
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suffer from these and concomitant disorders, some briefly and some long-term” 
(Lamb, 1999,p. 111).
Thus, for Lamb, it is not the case that no victimized women’s experiences
match the public constructions o f battered women and victims, but she believes that
assuming all victimized women’s experiences to be parallel with those described in
these constructions is problematic. She states:
.. .reactions to abuse vary. Often, the mental illness-like qualities of women who 
have been beaten disappear in the years shortly after leaving the abusive men. And 
sexual abuse researchers have documented recently that the majority of sexual 
abuse victims do not show severe symptomatology (Finkelhor 1990). Many 
victims cope; many recover, (p. I l l )
Lamb is particularly critical of the assumption that all victimized women experience
post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD. She cites research illustrating that “while 95
percent of rape victims show PTSD symptoms a few weeks after the rape, fewer than
25 percent remain this distressed two years later” (p. 111). Instead of conceiving of
all abuse as severe and damaging, Lamb argues that it exists on a “continuum of
severity and harmfulness” (p. 109).
Additionally, Davies, Lyon, and Monti-Catania (1998) maintain that while the 
public construction of the battered woman as a “pure victim” may have accurately 
described many battered women who first sought help in the 1970s and 1980s, not all 
women who needed assistance with domestic violence in ensuing years fit this 
profile. As she points out, not all battered women initiate help seeking, and many 
battered women have additional problems in their lives such as substance abuse or 
participation in criminal activity. She states:
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In short, the “real” battered women who came to public attention were more 
complicated and increasingly diverged from the image that had fueled public 
support. They were not necessarily “pure victims,” nor had all of them 
experienced extreme physical or physiological abuse. They were not necessarily 
terrified of their abuser. Instead, they had more varied sets of experience and needs 
for assistance, protection, and support, which they understood in complex ways. (p. 
17)
Because dominant constructions of battered women are based on an 
assumption that the experiences of all abused women are similar, such constructions 
also fail to account for the varied contexts of women’s lives based on structural 
factors such as race, culture, and class. Theorists such as Crenshaw (1994) and 
Kanuha (1996) have argued the importance of paying attention to the multiple 
oppressions many battered women face, something current constructions of battered 
women commonly do not do. Crenshaw (1994) offers the notion of “structural 
intersectionality” to illustrate how other dimensions of women’s identities besides 
gender influence their experiences with domestic violence. According to her, 
mainstream discourses surrounding domestic violence are created only with the 
interests of women in mind and thus women of color’s unique experiences are often 
not recognized and/or are marginalized. For example, a battered woman who doesn’t 
speak English will likely experience more difficulty receiving assistance in the United 
States than a battered woman who speaks English, yet many domestic violence 
intervention strategies do not take this into account.
Further, several theorists maintain that unified public constructions of battered 
women and other female victims reflect and/or reinforce traditional ideas of 
femininity (Holstein and Miller 1997; Loseke 1992; Lamb 1999). Lamb argues that 
such notions are “pleasing to U.S. culture because they reproduce a notion of girlhood
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or womanhood that we would like to preserve: the helpless female—slight, airy, 
voiceless—who needs reviving (as with Ophelia) or rescuing” (p. 113). Under such a 
framework, female victims are not allowed to act for themselves. As Lisa Sanchez
(1999) has argued, “there is little space for agency within the meta-narrative of the 
victim” (p. 53).
Unfortunately, because public constructions of the “battered woman” play a 
large role in the process of assignment of the identity of victim or battered woman, 
often, whether or not a person is able to claim the identity of victim depends on how 
well their situation mirrors that of the dominant constructions. Lamb (1999) argues 
that not only does there exist an expectation that all women who experience abuse 
will suffer, but an additional implication is that abused women who fail to suffer may 
be viewed as not having been “truly” victimized. Thus, the burden of proof falls on 
women to convince others that they are victims. If an abused woman in any way 
deviates or is suspected of deviating from the “pure victim” image—such as by 
initiating violence or using violence herself—she is not seen as a “real” battered 
woman. Kanuha (1996) reminds us, “we know of too many incidents when we were 
unsure whether a battered woman was ‘deserving’ of protection or other kinds of 
intervention because of particular behaviors she manifested that didn’t fit our image 
of the battered woman” (p. 38). Not only is there a risk that social service and 
criminal justice workers will refuse services to those abused women who fail to meet 
dominant cultural images of battered women, but abused women, themselves, may 
also fail to identify as “victims.” Recognizing their own strength or ability to act in
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their own self interest may prohibit abused women from seeing themselves as victims 
(Mahoney, 1994).
While mainstream constructions of battered women were partially created 
with the intent of bringing increased attention and sympathy to the plight of abused 
women, clearly there are many problems with these constructions, as I have 
demonstrated. The original discourse of the battered women’s movement was 
unequivocally political. However, as domestic violence has became a more prominent 
issue in the past three decades other social forces—including the criminal justice 
system, the media, and various academic institutions-have become instrumental in 
shaping the ways in which woman battering is conceptualized. The resulting 
hegemonic discourses individualize and psychologize woman battering, and therefore 
fail to offer a nuanced view of the social context in which domestic violence occurs 
by ignoring salient gender, race, and class hierarchies of power. Further, such 
discourses assume a uniform identity of “battered woman” and thus position victims 
of domestic violence in very specific ways, shaping and often limiting their potential 
actions. There is little recognition of the diversity of battered women’s experiences 
and their attempts to empower themselves and/or resist the violence they experience. 
This is reflected in much of the criminal justice policy surrounding domestic 
violence, which I will now discuss.
Discursive Analysis of Criminal Justice Domestic Violence Policy
In Chapter One, I discussed what it means to consider policy as a form of 
discourse. To review, a discursive consideration of policy focuses on the production 
of meaning in the policy making process, on “institutionalized patterns of
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interpretation” (Fraser, 1989, p. 146). Of central importance are: (1) the ways in 
which subjects and subjectivities are constituted in discourse; (2) the effects 
following from the limits imposed on what can be said; and (3) the ‘lived effects’—or 
the material, real-world implications (Bacchi, 1999). I conceive of domestic violence 
criminal justice policy—most specifically, mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution 
policies—as a form of discourse and will consider the social meanings entrenched in 
this policy; in particular, I will examine how battered women are constructed and 
represented and how these constructions potentially impact their speech and actions.
Sally Engle Merry (1995a; 1995b) speaks about the “culturally productive role 
of law, or the ways in which law produces cultural meanings and identities as an 
aspect of its power” (p. 14). She argues that the courts and legal discourse are places 
where cultural images and meanings are formed, just as are the media and popular 
culture. However, as she points out, the criminal justice system has the capacity to 
back images and meanings with force through threats of fines, supervision, and 
prison. Thus, representations formed by and through the criminal justice system are 
presented as legitimate actions of the state, and often become institutionalized.
Pitch (1995), for example, examines the discursive construction of rape 
victims by both the women’s movement and by U.S. and European law. She posits 
that the concept of “victim” itself has symbolic significance in that it declares and 
establishes a person’s innocence and constructs victims as “bearers of rights.”
However, she argues that these constructions come with costs: both the loss of the 
sexual and gendered character of rape; and the construction of actors (the victims) as 
acted upon rather than as agents. Pitch argues that when sexual violence laws vv'ere
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initiated by women’s rights advocates in Italy, problems arose surrounding the 
appropriateness of women legislating matters regarding the bodies of other women. 
Pitch asks:
Was it legitimate that women should legislate for, on behalf of, and concerning the 
bodies of other women, when up until then there had been a refusal to translate 
women’s demands into politically negotiable objectives, as this implied the 
inevitable reduction of the ambivalence, the complexity, of their own analyses, 
their own desires and their own battles? (p. 165)
Many Italian women rejected the law as a means of addressing rape due its tendency
to be overly reductive and simplifying. Pitch’s discussion highlights problems that
occur through the formation of law and criminal justice policy. Subjects of such
policy-in this case, female rape victims~are constructed in often problematic and
uniform ways. The mere act of legislating rape serves to reify the category of “rape
victim” and this has concrete implications for the women who experience rape and
become involved with the criminal justice system. As Pitch points out, this process is
additionally complicated by the gendered nature of the crime of rape and by the
androcentric nature of the criminal justice system.2
Similarly, domestic violence legal policy and legal images of battered women 
also communicate particular political and cultural meanings. As I demonstrated in 
Chapter Two, mandatory arrest and prosecution policies originated, for the most part, 
from the battered women’s movement criticism of the ways in which the criminal 
justice system was previously handling domestic violence. If, as Fraser (1989) 
suggests, a discursive consideration of policy focuses on the “institutionalized 
patterns of interpretation,” than the implementation of mandatory arrest and no-drop 
prosecution policies can be considered attempts to change the interpretive frames
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used by the criminal justice system in its response to domestic violence. Prior to the 
work of battered women’s advocates, women battering was viewed as a private, 
family matter that was experienced by a few women who were considered to be 
mostly, if not completely, to blame for the violence. Thus, the criminal justice system 
interpreted domestic violence as a situation best responded to with the use of 
discretion on behalf of police officers, prosecutors, and judges. This was deemed 
problematic by the battered women’s movement, which argued that woman battering 
was a political and public matter that should be taken seriously by the state and 
criminal justice system. Primarily as s a result of this, mandatory policies were 
introduced in an attempt to legislate newer or better interpretive frames for the 
criminal justice system, which would require agents of the criminal justice system to 
treat cases of woman battering more uniformly. While these policies represent a 
somewhat successful effort to change the locus of decision making in the criminal 
justice system’s response to domestic violence, as I will show, the newer “interpretive 
frames” are also not without problems.
In the sections that follow, I will examine how domestic violence criminal 
justice policy—specifically, mandatory arrest and prosecution policies—position 
battered women and impact what they are able to do and say, and how their actions 
are often interpreted. This examination is centered on two interrelated issues: (1) the 
loss of context of the relationship in which woman battering occurs; and (2) the 
victim/agent dichotomy.
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Loss of Context of Relationship
The fist issue that arises from a discursive analysis of domestic violence 
criminal justice policy involves the loss of context of the relationship in which 
woman battering occurs. This involves two interrelated issues—the power dynamics 
within the relationship and the gendered nature of battering. Many feminists have 
described battering as part of a larger picture of power and control. According to 
Evan Stark, battering should be understood as both “the pattern of violent acts and 
their political framework, the pattern of social, institutional, and interpersonal 
controls that usurp a woman’s capacity to determine her own destiny” (as cited in 
Schneider, 2000, p. 12). Thus, physical abuse is often inextricably connected to 
economic abuse, coercion, threats, intimidation, isolation, emotional abuse, and abuse 
of male privilege (Schneider, 2000). However, domestic violence criminal justice 
policy, in its current form, is often unable to account for this. Mahoney (1994) argues 
that law emphasizes acts of physical violence, and “this emphasis in turn hides 
broader patterns of social power, patterns of power within a given relationship, and 
complexity in the woman’s life, needs, and struggles” (p. 60). Mandatory arrest 
policies require the police to arrest based on the existence of evidence that a crime 
was committed. Police typically attempt to determine whether or not physical injury 
has occurred and as a result, over-emphasize physical violence. Battering, instead of 
understood as part of a larger pattern of power and control, is viewed as an individual 
incident to which the criminal justice system responds by arresting the offender.
The work of several researchers helps to illuminate the criminal justice 
system’s failure to understand battering as part of a larger pattern of power and
95
control. For example, Ferraro and Pope (1993), in their examination of battered 
women’s experiences with the police, found that the police often focus on the 
immediate situation—particularly danger and evidence—when responding to a 
domestic violence call. If the officers perceived the physical violence to have eased 
or stopped, they believed the situation to be “under control.” One woman in Ferraro 
and Pope’s study, despite having displayed bum marks around her neck from her 
husband putting her in a chokehold, was told by the police that because the incident 
was over, approaching her husband would only make more trouble. They said, “It 
will just get him riled up, and the baby’s sleeping. Everything’s OK right now” (p.
114). Ferraro and Pope argue that the law “translates battering into an offense that is 
evaluated in isolation from history and relationships” (pp. 114-115). Thus, police in 
their study did little to assess the likelihood of women’s further danger or take further 
action as long as they believed everything was calm at that moment and a “semblance 
of order” was restored (p. 115).
Susan Miller (2001) examines the increase in the number of battered women 
“who find themselves arrested for domestic violence charges by an incident-driven 
criminal justice system that responds uniformly to cases of domestic violence without 
differentiating between the motivations and consequences of such acts” (p. 1340). 
Miller and others (see, for example, Hirschel and Buzawa, 2002) have shown that the 
number of battered women arrested for domestic violence has increased with the 
adoption of mandatory arrest or pro-arrest policies. Prior research, as discussed by 
Miller, illustrates that men often report using violence as a means of control and 
domination over their female partners, while women report they most often use
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violence in self-defense or as protection from or retaliation for previous physical and 
emotional abuse. However, Miller found that the majority of criminal justice 
professionals and service providers working with domestic violence in the state of 
Delaware believe that police officers commonly do not explore possible motives for a 
person’s use of violence or consider the occurrence of different types of violence in 
their quest to make an arrest. The majority of the justice system workers interviewed 
by Miller believed that battered women possess less power in their relationships than 
their male partners; yet, they believed the police often do not take these hierarchal 
power dynamics into account.
Researchers such as Miller (2001) and Hirschel and Buzawa (2002) argue that
mandatory arrest and pro-arrest policies have led to an over-emphasis on violent
incidents, which in turn has prohibited police officers from fully understanding the
context in which much domestic violence occurs. For Miller, domestic violence
policy needs to “address circumstances unique to women and to acknowledge the
asymmetry of power in heterosexual relationships and the gender differences in fear,
injury, and available resources and alternatives,” something she argues mandatory
arrest policies do not currently do (p. 1347). She concludes:
Although the police and the rest of the criminal justice system have—at least from 
a policy standpoint—answered the call to take battering more seriously, the tough- 
on-crime stance is not effective if it penalizes women when issues of self-defense 
or gendered power dynamics are not taken into account, (p. 1368)
Wittner’s (1998) work helps to demonstrate battered women’s frustrations 
with the failure of the courts to take the context of a woman’s entire abusive 
relationship into account. At the court where she conducted her research, women
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were often admonished to stick to the “facts” of the individual cases that brought 
them to court. However, as Wittner states, the women often argued with the court 
staff about what actions were viewed as chargeable offenses: “They wanted the 
lawyers to permit them to recount the history of the violent relationship instead of 
forcing them to decontextualize a violence event” (p. 86). The women often wanted 
to discuss the roles that drug or alcohol played in the relationship and the violence, or 
to discuss the necessity of counseling, but they commonly were denied this ability 
and allowed only to speak about the facts surrounding the incident of abuse.
Mandatory arrest and prosecution policies, originally created with the central 
goal of protecting battered women, not only fail to recognize the gendered nature of 
battering in heterosexual relationships, but also fail to consider the context of the 
relationship in which battering takes place. By focusing on individual incidents of 
abuse—most notably, physical abuse—the criminal justice system is not able to fully 
grasp the complexity of domestic violence. As a result, battered women either may 
not be permitted to discuss pertinent information about the history of their abusive 
relationship, or they are not heard when attempting to do so. Further, a failure by the 
police and other members of the criminal justice system to understand the gendered 
nature of battering and the role of power and control in abusive relationships has 
resulted in an increase of the arrest and prosecution of battered women.
Victimization and Agency.
Another discursive effect of domestic violence legal policy surrounds issues 
of victimization and agency. Mahoney (1992) argues that law forces upon us a 
“discourse of victimization.” She states that “either you are on the playing field of
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liberal competition, in which case you require no protection, or you prove into a 
category as a victim who is being kept off the field” (p. 1306). A key issue, as 
Mahoney (1994) and Schneider (2000) have demonstrated, is that in both legal and 
popular culture discourse, victimization and agency are understood in relation to each 
other. Mahoney (1994) writes, “In our society, agency and victimization are each 
known by the absence of the other: you are an agent if you are not a victim, and you 
are a victim if you are in no way an agent” (p. 64).
Schneider (1993) argues that the victim/agent dichotomy is pervasive in legal 
reform work for battered women. She believes that prevailing conceptions of both 
victimization and agency are problematic in that they are overly narrow and limited. 
For her, victimization claims, while an important means of drawing attention to a 
wrong or hurt and obtaining attention and compassion, are also connected with 
passivity and helplessness, particularly for women. Earlier in this chapter, I discussed 
the construction of the battered woman as the “pure victim,” described by Davies, 
Lyon, and Monti-Catania (1998), which has become a significant aspect of domestic 
violence discourses. According to researchers such as Davies, Lyon, and Monti- 
Catania and Loseke (1992), this unified image of battered women was instrumental in 
establishing domestic violence as a serious and real problem in the 1970s. The “pure 
victim” representation portrays battered women as wives who adhere to traditional 
gender roles and who are economically and emotionally dependent on their abusers. 
They are depicted as passive and helpless. Under this construction, the only time they 
use violence is for self-defense. Further, battered women are portrayed as extremely 
fearful, if not terrified by the abuse they experience. This “pure victim” construction
has been central to the criminal justice system’s understanding and representation of 
battered women. As Mahoney (1991) maintains, the court’s version of what feminists 
have told them is that battered women are “pathologically weak” (p. 4).
Agency, on the other hand, has traditionally been “based on notions of 
individual choice and responsibility, individual will and action: perceptions of a 
world composed of atomized individuals, acting alone, unconstrained by social 
forces, unmediated by social structures and systemic hardship” (Schneider, 1993, pp. 
395-396). As Mahoney (1994) points out, a central reason that this perception of 
agency is problematic is that under this framework, viewing a person as having 
agency obscures any recognition of subordination and oppression. Because agency 
means being completely free of oppression, there is no allowance for acts of agency 
despite or under the constraints of oppression.
Mahoney (1994) examines the issue of victimization and agency in the
context of “exit.” She argues that much of the criminal justice system’s response to
domestic violence is centered on the question of why a woman doesn’t leave the
abusive relationship. She writes, “women who seek love and survival for ourselves
and our families are treated as if our only choices are to ‘stay’ or ‘leave’” (p. 60).
Staying in the relationship is often viewed as identical to victimization, while exiting
the relationship is treated as synonymous with agency. For Mahoney, this view not
only reflects a false dualism between agency and victimization, but it also makes false
assumptions about the lives of battered women. She states:
Emphasizing exit defines the discussion of violence in ways that ignore the 
woman’s lived experience and the personal and societal context of power, 
focusing instead on whether her responsive actions conform with social
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expectation. The idea that women should leave—and that a woman acting in her 
own interest will always leave—is shaped by this atomistic view of agency, (p. 
74)
According to Mahoney, this perspective fails to take into account the reality of many 
battered women’s situations and the complexity of their relationships. As Schneider 
(1993) notes, ignored are the social, psychological, and economic factors that make 
leaving difficult; also ignored is the reality that many women are attacked and/or 
killed by their abusers after leaving the relationship.
Further, I would argue that this tendency of the criminal justice system to 
focus on exit reflects the fact that despite recent policy changes, criminal justice 
discourses (and arguably, mainstream domestic violence discourses as well), continue 
to be centered on the actions of battered women, as opposed to batterers. Prior to the 
battered women’s movement, the dominant ideology and resulting criminal justice 
policy focused on what women did to cause the violence in their relationships.
Current ideology and criminal justice policy focuses on whether or not a woman is 
going to leave the relationship. Despite this change, battered women’s actions 
continue to remain central, and not the batterers.
As I discussed in Chapter Two, one of the arguments against mandatory arrest 
and prosecution policies is that they rob women of agency. While I would not 
disagree with this, I argue that the entire picture is actually more complex than this.
In my view, mandatory arrest and prosecution policies are premised on the 
victim/agent dichotomy discussed by Mahoney (1994) and Schneider (1993). As a 
result of this, two things commonly occur. The first is that some women are viewed 
as “true” victims (or “pure” victims) while other women are positioned as
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manipulative agents. Paradoxically, the second thing that sometimes happens is that 
women are often assumed to be helpless victims in need of rescuing, while 
simultaneously assumed to possess the complete free agency necessary for leaving 
the relationship and cooperating with the prosecution of their batterers. Before I 
describe how these two phenomena occur, let me say that missing from both, is any 
sense of the interrelationship between victimization and agency in women’s lives. 
Mandatory arrest and prosecution policies fail to recognize oppression and social and 
structural constraints battered women face, yet they also often fail to recognize the 
ways in which, short of leaving, battered women are able to act for themselves in 
order to meet their needs and desires. Thus, acts of resistance are too often ignored, 
overlooked, or misinterpreted.
I will first examine how, though mandatory arrest and prosecution policies,
women are often framed either as “real victims” or they are assumed to be somehow
manipulating or abusing the criminal justice system. The victim/agent dichotomy that
mandatory arrest and prosecution policies are premised on prohibits a more nuanced
examination of women’s lives and experiences. For example, Hanna (1996) reports
the following in a training session she led attended by other prosecutors:
One prosecutor commented that he was always very suspicious of battered women 
who wanted to proceed with criminal prosecution because he assumed that they 
might be trying to manipulate the system or to gain an upper hand in a divorce or 
custody proceeding. Another responded that she only pursued cases in which the 
victim wanted to go forward because she assumed that a reluctant woman was 
either lying about the abuse or hiding something, (p. 1882)
Interestingly, while the two prosecutors held opposite opinions about what signified
potential manipulation and/or lying by battered women, both seemed to classify some
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battered women as true victims and others as liars or manipulators. As Hanna argues, 
women who choose to follow through with prosecution are “seen either as the true 
victims of domestic violence or as manipulators with an agenda,” while women who 
do not wish to proceed with prosecution are “characterized either as agents in the 
battering—allowing it to continue because of their lack of cooperation with the 
state—or as true victims who have ‘learned helplessness’” (p. 1883). Unmistakably, 
escaping the victim/agent dichotomy becomes difficult.
Similarly, Wittner (1998) examines battered women’s experiences in a 
centralized domestic violence court in Chicago. The court workers she observed and 
interviewed believed that the court’s biggest problem was the contradiction between 
those women with genuine and serious complaints, reflecting solid cases, who did not 
cooperate with the prosecution of their batterers, and those women with minor 
complaints and injuries who were very adamant about prosecuting and would come 
back to court many times, if needed, in order to ensure punishment of their partner. 
Court workers appeared to classify battered women as being either “true” helpless 
victims or as manipulative agents. Both attorneys and victim-witness advocates 
reflected beliefs that women who dropped cases tolerated abuse because they “just 
didn’t know any better” or because “they don’t have any self-worth” (p. 89). 
Alternatively, the court workers seemed to have a different perspective of women 
who were not viewed as “real” victims. Wittner states, “As for the women who 
bothered the court workers with trivial complaints or pursued hopeless cases, they 
seemed often to be misguided or vindictive women who abused the law for personal
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gain: to get even with a straying husband; to fight a custody dispute; to force a man 
from his home” (p. 89).
Wittner argues that while the court workers’ understandings of women’s 
motives were taken from their daily encounters with the women, these understanding 
were mediated through both legal discourses and experience that provided only a 
partial picture of the women’s lives. As such, workers were often not able to grasp 
the complex nature of the lives of the women who came through the court. Wittner 
writes:
Court workers rarely questioned the assumptions behind their condemnation of 
women’s behavior. They did not wonder if there were sound reasons for dropping 
good cases or if  a plausible argument could be made for persisting with weak 
ones.. ..From within the discourse of the law, women were guilty for the failures of 
the court, either because they did not follow through on good cases, or because 
they wasted court workers’ time and energy by using the law to settle non-criminal 
family disputes, (p. 89)
Again, the power of the victim/agent dichotomy is clear.
Another, perhaps more complex, product of the victim/agent dichotomy is that 
some battered women are assumed to be passive victims in need of rescuing, but are 
also assumed to have the total ability to cooperate with the criminal justice system 
and leave their abusive relationships. As I have already discussed, mandatory arrest 
and prosecution policies became common in the 1980s and 1990s, in response to the 
battered women’s movement claim that the criminal justice system was not doing 
enough in it’s response to domestic violence (Mills, 1998). Additionally, many 
believed these policies served as a deterrent to future abuse, and helped address the 
issue of victim “non-cooperation” in the prosecution of batterers. The latter has been 
achieved because under mandatory policies, battered women most often do not have a
say in whether or not their batterer is arrest and/or prosecuted; they are effectively 
removed from the decision-making the process. Thus, arrest and prosecution may 
take place even if the victim is reluctant or refuses to aid in the process.
One argument in favor of removing women from the decision making process 
is that redefining domestic violence as a crime against the state communicates the 
severity of the crime and indicates the state’s willingness to take it seriously. 
However, returning to Bacchi’s (2000) framework, when conceiving of policy as 
discourse, one must also consider the way in which subjects and subjectivities are 
constituted by policy. I argue that policies that take away battered women’s role in 
the decision making process assume that the state know what is best for women, and 
thus prohibit them from acting in their own self-interest. Premised on the battered 
women as “pure victims” construction, such policies presume battered women are 
helpless, unable to care for themselves, and are in need of state intervention to be 
rescued from their inability to make “good” decisions. Yet, there is an underlying 
assumption in these policies that battered women are able to do whatever necessary to 
leave their relationships and fully cooperate with the criminal justice system, and that 
doing so is in their best interests.
Baker’s (1997) work illustrates the contradictions inherent to the criminal 
justice system’s response to woman battering surrounding agency and victimization. 
In place of the pre-battered women’s movement, mainstream view that battered 
women should stay with abusive partners, Baker maintains that a new discourse has 
emerged. She writes:
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For battered women who participate in social and police services designed to help 
them, a dominant cultural script has emerged. Learned through interactions with 
providers of services, mass media, police, and friends and altered by the context, 
past experiences, and the immediate and future needs of individual women, this 
“new” script includes edicts like leave abuser, maintain restraining orders, and call 
and cooperate with the police, (p. 56)
Thus, for battered women who become involved in the criminal justice system, there
exists an underlying assumption that the best thing for them is to: (1) leave and stay
away from their batterer; and (2) cooperate in the arrest and prosecution of their
batterer. And, under mandatory arrest and prosecution policies, most battered women
have little to no say about their involvement in the criminal justice system.
After conducting in-depth interviews with sixteen battered women, Baker 
found that the women tried to use the dominant cultural script and follow its 
mandates, but they found it to be constraining and limiting in its narrowness. Several 
women left their abusers but continued to be verbally harassed and/or followed by the 
men. One woman’s ex-partner called her repeatedly despite the fact that continually 
changed her number (and paid each time to do so). However, this woman was told by 
the police there was nothing they could do about the calls unless she documented 
them, and she could not afford a device that would allow her to do this. She finally 
agreed to meet with her abuser so he would stop harassing her and they ended up 
reconciling. Other women in Baker’s study, particularly those with children, 
discussed the difficulties in making it financially after leaving their abusers. This 
often prompted them to return to their partners for the children’s sake. Still other 
women reported that calling the police about their partners’ violence was difficult
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because they feared retaliation by their partner and/or police officers were often rude 
and/or ineffective.
Thus, Baker argues that in spite of recent legislative changes, battered women 
still face limited institutional support for their decisions. The social-service, law 
enforcement and legal systems did not provide the help that these women needed for 
them to resolve their problems in a manner deemed successful to them. She 
maintains that there are three problematic aspects of the dominant cultural script 
directing battered women to get away and stay away from their batterers. One, the 
script assumes that leaving and staying away from abusive partners is always the best 
choice for women, and fails to acknowledge both that women have varying needs and 
interests, and that leaving is often dangerous for battered women. She states that a 
consequence of this assumption is that “women who feel it is in their best interest to 
stay are not given an array of choices for help because policies and programs for 
women who stay are rare” (p. 71).
A second problematic aspect of the script for Baker is that it is directed solely 
toward the victim, as she is told she has to leave and stay away. The script assumes 
that for the violence toward her to stop, the woman must change her behavior. Like 
Mahoney (1994)—whom I discussed previously in this chapter-Baker also finds it 
problematic that there is an overemphasis on women’s actions in discussions of 
solutions to domestic violence. She argues that a more useful response would be to 
focus on changing the batterer’s behavior and stopping his violence: “In this way the 
women would be able to continue to lead their lives and make their own choices 
instead of being pulled out of their milieu and pushed into a system that makes
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decisions for them while not providing effective support for those decisions” (p. 71). 
Finally, a third problem with this script for Baker is that it is too directive. She writes, 
“Edicts like leave your partner, call the police, go to a shelter, and seek counseling 
and policies like mandatory arrest and prosecution create ways in which battered 
women lose control and choices” (p. 71). Baker demonstrates how the script not 
only fails to acknowledge the complexity and difficulties of individual battered 
women’s lives but also lacks the coordinated institutional support battered women 
need in order to successfully follow it.
Baker’s research reaffirms Mahoney’s (1994) argument that women’s staying 
in an abusive relationship is often viewed as identical to victimization, while exiting 
the relationship is treated as synonymous with agency. Mandatory arrest and 
prosecution policies are premised upon this assumption. Again, this view is 
problematic in that it ignores structural constraints women face when attempting to 
leave an abusive relationship, but it also reproduces a false dualism between agency 
and victimization, as Mahoney argues. As such, mandatory arrest and prosecution 
policies fail to recognize battered women’s acts of agency outside of both leaving the 
relationship and full cooperation with the criminal justice system. Battered women’s 
acts are often not interpreted as evidence of agency and/or resistance, but as signs of 
women’s victimization and passivity. Ferraro and Pope (1993), in their examination 
of police officer’s responses to domestic violence report that one officer told them he 
always asked battered women why they stayed with their abusive partners. He said 
one woman replied, “I guess I’m just stupid,” and his response was, “I guess you are” 
(pp. 113-114).
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As theorists such as Mahoney and Schneider (1993) argue, victimization and
agency are not extremes in opposition, but instead are interrelated aspects of women’s
experience. Women are not either an agent or a victim, as the dualism suggests—
they may be both at the same time. Schneider argues that a more complex and
contextual portrayal of the interrelationship between these two forces in women’s
lives is necessary. She states:
We must seek to understand both the social context of women’s oppression, which 
shapes women’s choices and constrains women’s agency and resistance, and also 
recognize women’s agency and resistance in a more nuanced way. This means that 
we reject simple dichotomies, give up either/ors, learn to accept contradiction, 
ambiguity, and ambivalence in women’s lives, and explore more “grays” in our 
conceptions of women’s experience, rather than seeing only “blacks” and “whites.” 
(p. 397)
Many researchers have demonstrated ways in which battered women have 
shown agency, outside of either leaving the relationship and/or full cooperation with 
the criminal justice system. Linda Gordon (1993) examines battered women’s 
attempts to exercise agency at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the 
twentieth century. She found simply because women “did not conduct a head-on 
challenge to their husbands’ right to hit them does not mean they liked being hit or 
believed that their virtue required accepting it” (p. 131). Instead, these women often 
actively resisted assault by doing things such as fighting back, running away, calling 
the police, contacting child welfare agencies, and embarrassing their husbands in 
public.
A more current example is found in Baker’s work (1997). She argues that 
staying with an abuser, ignoring and lifting restraining orders, and refusing to call and 
cooperate with the police serve as battered women’s acts of resistance and
recognizing this “is an ironic, yet powerful, way to emphasize that these women were 
making active, reasoned choices by going against the cultural dictate to get away and 
stay away from their abusers” (p. 57). Baker maintains that the women she 
interviewed were exercising as much agency as possible considering the failure of the 
system to provide them with safety and resources.
Wittner (1998) also makes a similar argument in her work. She argues that 
determining why a battered woman decides to cooperate with the prosecution of a 
case or not, is not the real issue: “instead, it is necessary to place these decisions 
within an extended history of the power relations that led to them and that emanate 
from them” (p. 92). Wittner found that battered women often used the court to win 
support for their own claims and strategies. One woman did not show up for her last 
court date because she found that calling the police on her batterer was enough to get 
him to move out of the house. Another woman pursued what was perceived by court 
officials as a hopeless case because she wanted a record of her abuser’s actions. 
Wittner states that while the criminal justice system often silences women and 
subjects them to its control, the domestic violence court “also became a resource 
which women used to their own advantage, an ally in their quest to establish control 
in relationships in which they had been relatively powerless” (p. 83).
David Ford’s (1991) work also illustrates a creative way that battered women 
show acts of agency and resistance. He demonstrates that many women use the 
prosecution process for reasons beyond punishing their abusive partners—for some 
women, prosecution served as a power resource. The mere threat of prosecution 
often served to deter batterers from future violence. Thus, women often bargained for
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security using the threat of prosecution and when they believed they had 
accomplished this, they abandoned the prosecution process. For example, one 
woman’s husband threatened to kill her and their three children. She reported that 
while she did not know what to expect from filing charges, she hoped he would 
receive psychiatric care and she and her children could get obtain their possessions 
and move out of the house. A month after filing the initial charges, she showed up at 
her husband’s arraignment and requested the charges be dropped. She told the 
interviewer the reason that she agreed to drop the charges was because her husband 
agreed to their separation and he also agreed to get counseling on his own.
Still another woman in Ford’s study reported that she had earlier bargained for
safety under threat of prosecution, but when her partner reoffended, she later
participated in his prosecution to prove to him she would follow up on her end of the
bargain. While to some outside observers battered women who drop charges against
their abusive partners may simply be capitulating to the batterers’ demands, Ford
concludes otherwise. He writes:
For many battered women prosecution is one of the few resources they have to gain 
control over their own circumstances. In making a significant threat to prosecute 
by initiating the steps to invoke the process, a battered woman is able to exercise 
power that was previously missing in her relationship. She uses that power in the 
hope of gaining security by demonstrating that she is the one in charge and that 
only she can alter events which are destined to bring a man to court and possibly to 
jail. Thus, she gains leverage for managing the conflicts in her relationship, (p.
331)
Thus, for some battered women, exercising control at various stages of the 
prosecutorial process is empowering, even though members of the criminal justice 
system often fail to see this.3
I l l
Summary
As I have demonstrated, an examination of hegemonic constructions of the 
battered woman in both mainstream domestic violence discourses and criminal justice 
policy, reveals that the subjectivity of battered women is limited. They are 
constituted either as helpless victims, or as manipulative free agents. Battered 
women’s actions and words are filtered through the victim/agent dichotomy and are 
read as either proof of their inability to care for themselves or as proof that they are 
lying and attempting to deceive the system. Further, in domestic violence legal 
discourses, agency is often equated with leaving the abusive relationship and 
cooperating with the criminal justice system. This perspective fails to take into 
account various social and cultural factors that make this difficult—if not 
impossible—for some battered women. Thus, attempts of battered women to resist 
the violence in their lives and empower themselves go unrecognized. Many theorists 
and researchers have argued that moving away from restrictive notions of 
victimization and agency is vital to fully grasping women’s experiences. As 
Schneider (2002) argues, “it is crucial to understand that these concepts are socially 
constructed and that women’s experiences can be envisioned and interpreted in a 
different way” (p. 83).
This chapter has also demonstrated that current mainstream understandings of 
domestic violence are often removed from a political analysis of battering. As such, 
the gendered nature of battering in heterosexual relationships and the power dynamics 
that co-exist with battering have been erased from hegemonic domestic violence 
discourses. Missing is any sense of how abusive men often use tactics verbal,
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psychological, emotional, and economic abuse—in addition to physical abuse—to 
threaten, isolate, and control their partners. Instead, domestic violence discourses in 
general, and mandatory arrest and prosecution policies in particular, over-emphasize 
individual incidents of violence. This has had serious repercussions for battered 
women; not only have they been arrested for defending themselves, but the system 
has failed to fully address the context in which the violence that they experience 
occurs. Thus, many abused women have had difficulty fully remedying their 
situation.
Before concluding this chapter, I wish to make an important point. The 
criminal justice system is by no means a monolithic or unified institution. Just as 
Brown (1995) stresses that the state is an “ensemble of discourses, rules, and 
practices, cohabiting in limited, tension-ridden, often contradictory relation with one 
another” (p. 174), so is the criminal justice system (as part of the state). As such, 
individual actors or agents of the criminal justice system may reflect particular 
aspects of the criminal justice system’s power or interests, but they may also 
challenge or resist them. To speak of mandatory arrest and prosecution policies as 
representing and constituting battered women in specific ways, with certain effects, 
does not mean that all workers in the criminal justice system engage in this process, 
unaware and oblivious. In fact, as I will discuss in the next chapter, the interviews 
with prosecutors in my research reflect that prosecutors, as agents of the criminal 
justice system, have a very complex relationship to domestic violence discourses; 
sometimes they appear to support mainstream constructions of battered women,
sometimes they challenge these constructions, and sometimes they do both, 
simultaneously.
In this chapter I began to examine the three general categories of discursive 
effects of domestic violence discourses, as discussed by Bacchi (1999): (1) the ways 
in which subjects and subjectivities are constituted in discourse; and (2) the effects 
following from the limits imposed on what can be said; and (3) the ‘lived effects’—or 
the material implications of discourse. At this point, I have depicted the current state 
of hegemonic domestic violence discourses and demonstrated the way it has 
constructed the battered woman. The next four chapters—my data chapters— 
continue the examination of dominant cultural narratives surrounding woman 
battering, based on Bacchi’s categories. Specifically, in order to continue to examine 
the relationship between discourse and subjectivity and to better understand the 
implications of domestic violence discourses in the “real-world,” I will explore how 
the experiences of both prosecutors who work with domestic violence and battered 
women, themselves, are mediated by domestic violence discourses.
NOTES
1 A recent exception to this is a “human rights approach” which uses an international human rights 
framework to argue that all persons should be able to live their lives free of violence (Miller and Faux, 
1999). This perspective is explicitly political, as it focuses on state responsibility to respond to 
domestic violence.
2 As Brown (1995) states, “the masculinism o f the state refers to those features of the state that sign ify 
enact, sustain, and represent masculine power as a form of dominance” (p. 167).
3 Further implications of the ways in which prosecutors view women’s lack of cooperation with the 
prosecutorial process will be discussed in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Constructing “Institutional Selves”: Domestic Violence Discourse, 
Prosecutors, and Battered Women
In this chapter, I continue to explore the relationship between domestic 
violence discourses and the criminal justice system. Specifically, I examine how 
prosecutors working on domestic violence cases in Lanville, Rockford County, and 
Easton County, as agents of the state, “interact with” domestic violence discourses. 
As a model, I use Little’s (1999) work that examines how a hegemonic “dependency 
discourse” functions in a welfare-to-work program and the way in which staff drew 
from the discourse. As I discussed in Chapter One, Little’s interest focused on the 
“sources and processes of resistance to a hegemonic discourse” and one of her goals 
was to explore how the institutional framework enabled and constrained resistance (p. 
166). Little recognizes that while the staff of the welfare-to-work program often 
bought into aspects of dependency discourse, they did not accept all of its premises— 
thus, a central question for her is: “How and why are staff able to reconstruct 
dependency discourse within the daily operation of workfare programs?” (p. 168).
Just as dependency discourse provides the “interpretative framework” (Fraser, 
1989; Little, 1999) for the staff of welfare-to-work programs, domestic violence 
discourses—primarily, criminal justice policy—provide the interpretative framework 
through which prosecutors make sense of battered women. According to Spencer 
(2001), in human service agencies, “staff members and clients alike find themselves 
assembling the biographical particulars of clients’ selves in order to dispense the 
agency’s services” (p. 158). Institutional discourses are central to these processes.
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While the criminal justice system is, in some ways, different from other human 
service agencies, there are similarities in the way that “institutional selves are needed 
to conduct institutional business” (p. 158). Thus, I will examine how prosecutors in 
the three jurisdictions in my study draw from the institutional discourses of the 
criminal justice system in their work with abused women. While Little (1999) was 
most interested in how welfare-to-work staff resisted and reconstructed dependency 
discourse, my scope is broader: I pay careful attention to not only the ways 
prosecutors challenge and reformulate mainstream constructions offered by domestic 
violence discourses, but also to the ways they accept and support them.
The connection between subjectivity and discourse that I have previously 
discussed is not just relevant to an examination of the identity of “battered woman,” 
but also to the identity of “prosecutor.” In other words, just as domestic violence 
discourses construct and situate battered women in particular ways, it does the same 
for prosecutors. All of the “players” in the field of criminal justice response to 
domestic violence—battered women, batterers, judges, victim’s advocates, police and 
prosecutors—are embedded in the relationship between subjectivity and discourse. 
Thus, while criminal justice policy—as a part of domestic violence discourses— 
impacts how prosecutors view and interact with battered women, it also shapes and 
limits what prosecutors may do or say.
Prosecutor Interviews
To review, this data is drawn from interviews with twenty-one prosecutors 
from four different sites in three jurisdictions: six prosecutors from the prosecutor’s 
office in Easton County, three prosecutors from the district attorney’s office in
Rockford County, four from the district attorney’s office in Lanville, and eight from 
the city attorney’s office in Lanville.1 Table 1 presents information on whether or not 
each office has a specialized domestic violence unit and on the types of arrest and 
prosecution policies in place in each district.
Table 1
Information on Prosecutor Offices
Rockford 
County 
DA’s Office
Easton County 
Prosecutor’s 
Office
Lanville
District
Attorney’s
Office
Lanville City 
Attorney’s 
Office
Specialized DV 
Unit?
Yes No Yes Yes
Type of Arrest 
Policy in Place?
Mandatory Arrest 
Policy
Pro-Arrest Policy Mandatory Arrest 
Policy
Mandatory Arrest 
Policy
Type of 
Prosecution 
Policy in Place?
Official No-Drop 
Policy
“Informal” No- 
Drop Policy
Official No-Drop 
Policy
Official No-Drop 
Policy
The office in Rockford County and the two offices in Lanville have specialized 
domestic violence units, while the office in Easton County does not. As such, the 
majority of the prosecutors interviewed (twenty-one total) worked solely on domestic 
violence cases. Both Rockford County and the city of Lanville have strict mandatory 
arrest policies, given probable cause that a crime was committed. Easton County has 
a “pro-arrest” policy. While arrest is not mandatory, officers are strongly encouraged 
to make an arrest if the assailant is present and if they have probable cause. Officers 
have to fill out paperwork explaining failure to arrest. Easton County does not have 
an official do-drop prosecution policy—several of the prosecutors did say they had an 
“informal” no-drop policy. Officially, all three attorneys’ offices in Rockford County 
and Lanville had no-drop prosecution policies, although it is interesting to note that
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not all of the attorneys interviewed from the city attorney’s office in Lanville were 
aware of this—several indicated their office did not have a no-drop prosecution 
policy. Finally, while the official policy of all three attorneys’ offices in Rockford 
County and Lanville was to prosecute cases with or without victim “cooperation,” 
prosecutors from all three jurisdictions stated that sometimes they were forced to drop 
cases due to lack of evidence. Thus, despite uniform policy, the likelihood of 
prosecution of a person charged with some form of domestic violence ultimately 
rested on the attorneys’ ability to make the case that a crime was committed.
Many of the prosecutors whom were interviewed reflected the belief that 
domestic violence cases are very complicated cases that are challenging to prosecute. 
For example, one prosecutor from Rockford County stated that he believes he has the 
most frustrating job in the office. Another prosecutor from the Lanville district 
attorney’s office classified domestic violence as the “most difficult” type of cases to 
handle. And a third prosecutor from Easton County said she “dreads” domestic 
violence cases. Several of the prosecutors indicated that these are “no-win” cases in 
which almost everyone ends up mad at them. One prosecutor in Rockford County 
reported believing he is hated by everyone: defendants for obvious reasons, defense 
attorneys because his plea-bargains are tougher than most, and victims because many 
want to recant. He stated that he has been accused by some victims of abusing 
children and breaking up families. Another prosecutor from the Lanville city 
attorney’s office reported that there are a lot of conflicts between the victims and the 
prosecutors. Similarly, a prosecutor from the Easton County prosecutor’s office 
stated that domestic violence cases are the only type where you have to regularly deal
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with the antagonism of the victim. When this happens, she said, “you’re fighting 
everyone involved.”
In Chapter Three, I argued that domestic violence criminal justice 
discourses—in particular, mandatory arrest and prosecution policies: (1) fail to take 
into account the context in which the abusive relationship occurs (including the 
gendered nature of the relationship and the issues of power and control inherent to 
abusive relationships); and (2) are premised on a false dichotomy of agency and 
victimization. The prosecutors’ comments about why they believe these cases to be 
so challenging and difficult and their assessments of domestic violence victims in 
general, both support and challenge these discursive effects.
Loss of Context of Relationship
To review, physical abuse is strongly tied to economic abuse, coercion, 
threats, intimidation, isolation, emotional abuse, and abuse of male privilege 
(Schneider, 2000). However, as I have argued, domestic violence legal policy is 
often unable to account for this. In the previous chapter I discussed how domestic 
violence criminal justice policy and the criminal justice system in general, 
overemphasize acts of physical violence. Under mandatory arrest and no-drop 
policies, a batterer is arrested and prosecuted on the basis of the existence of evidence 
that a crime was committed. The criminal justice system focuses on whether or not 
physical injury has occurred. Battering thus becomes reduced to an individual 
incident which the criminal justice system responds to by arresting and prosecuting 
the offender. Lost are the overall context in which the crime occurs and the gendered 
dynamics of power and control.
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Over three-quarters of the twenty-one prosecutors did not mention issues of 
power and control or the cycle of violence at any time throughout their interviews. 
Most of the prosecutors that did mention these issues did so briefly or in passing. For 
example, one prosecutor from the Lanville district attorney’s office said the following 
when describing her overall impression of offenders: “Manipulative and
controlling..... very good at gaining power and control so that victims don’t report or
don’t follow through.” The majority of prosecutors also failed to offer any sort of 
explanation of domestic violence that addressed the larger context in which many 
theorists believe abusive relationships occur (although clearly, this does not mean that 
all of the prosecutors are necessarily unaware of the relationship between domestic 
violence and larger social forces).
However, one prosecutor from Rockford County was particularly aware of the
criminal justice system’s inability to take the full context of an abusive relationship
into account when prosecuting domestic violence cases (although he did not see this
as a function of mandatory arrest and prosecution policies, which he was supportive
of). He stated that prosecuting domestic violence in “US snapshot courts” is hard:
They want to prosecute based on a snapshot in time, one single event occurring in a 
single instance, like a bar brawl. This rarely applies to domestic violence because 
It is a process, a cycle, involving lots of different type of abuse that precede the 
physical act. Courts have been resistant to hearing about these other types of 
abuse—verbal, mental, emotional—because if the jury saw evidence of the whole 
cycle they would most likely convict the defendant based on this behavior. Seeing 
that he was emotionally abusive for years would paint a picture of him as a bad 
guy. So courts keep this information out of the prosecution process but this 
information is really very pertinent.
Further, very few prosecutors spoke specifically about gender dynamics or the 
gendered nature of violence; interestingly, however, almost all of them spoke of
victims as women and offenders as men. The exception to this was five prosecutors,
all of whom stated at some point that women are sometimes offenders. Consider the
comments of one prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s office:
It’s tough because you don’t always have a clear victim and a clear defendant. 
When you start in this, you look at things black and white. Later, you see a lot of 
blending in terms of conduct. It’s not as clean as the media makes it out to be. 
There are other factors that make it difficult. There are cases where it goes both 
ways back and forth—violence on both sides.
Still another prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s office stated that the
majority of offenders are men, but “we are seeing more and more women offenders.”
And a third prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s office said that he was
finding at least 1/10 or 1/8 of the offenders are female but that in the Hispanic
community, even more women are offenders and he was very surprised by this.
While very few prosecutors discussed unequal gender dynamics or issues of 
power and control, they did mention a wide range of factors that they attributed to 
causing domestic violence or at least correlating with it. These included poverty, a 
lack of education, witnessing family violence, infidelity, mental health issues, 
criminal mentality, and alcohol and drugs. Clearly, many of the prosecutors seemed 
to believe that domestic violence is correlated to socioeconomic status. More than a 
few prosecutors also spoke of domestic violence as being a part of “human nature.” 
One prosecutor said that to help end domestic violence, “human relationship classes 
are needed to develop better habits.” Another stated that abuse in our society “is built 
in. He continued by claiming, “There just are abusive men and women.” Still 
another stated that domestic violence is “an incurable thing that can only be treated 
and hopefully controlled—like diabetes.” Schneider (2000) and others have argued
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that the criminalization, psychologization and pathologization of domestic violence 
has detached the consideration of woman battering from its original feminist 
foundations. Woman battering is viewed as an issue of crime control, mental health, 
or through the lens of broader family and societal violence. These perspectives fail to 
take into account issues of women’s equality. The prosecutors in my research 
confirmed this tendency. Their comments demonstrate that very few, if any, of them 
view domestic violence as an issue of gender subordination.
Several of the prosecutors did discuss the relationship between domestic 
violence and broader social issues, such as the fact that domestic violence is too 
commonly accepted in the U.S, and the fact that many people view it as a private 
matter, not of public concern. One prosecutor from Rockford County said the 
following:
.. .statewide and nationwide, the response is way too lenient. There is not enough 
organized response. This is often due to the controversy regarding the role or 
importance of women in society. The press often doesn’t label domestic violence 
cases correctly—murder cases are often not associated with domestic violence. 
They need preventative and punitive structures. There is little funding for 
intervention.
Still another prosecutor said that domestic violence “is an accepted social norm in 
some segments of society and in some cultures.” However, again, even though some 
prosecutors spoke of the prevalence of domestic violence in the U.S. and attributed 
this to various social factors, gender hierarchies were never directly mentioned or 
discussed.
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Victim/Agent Dichotomy
I will now turn to a discussion of the next theme that emerged from my 
discursive analysis of domestic violence criminal justice policy—the victim/agent 
dichotomy. Earlier, in Chapter Three, I argued that mandatory arrest and no-drop 
prosecution policies result in two related discursive effects. First, some women are 
viewed as “true” victims (or “pure” victims) while other women are positioned as 
manipulative free agents. And second, women are often assumed to be helpless 
victims in need of rescuing, while simultaneously assumed to possess complete free 
agency. The words of the prosecutors illustrate that, through their interaction with 
domestic violence discourses, they participate both in the production and disruption 
of these effects.
About one-third of the prosecutors seemed, at some point, to reflect the “pure
victim” construct in that they portrayed victims as passive, childlike, emotional,
and/or helpless. One prosecutor from Rockford County referred to victims as “lost
souls” whom she felt “very sorry for.” A prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s
office said the following of victims:
I feel sorry for them. They’re at a point where they are like civilian prisoners in a 
concentration camp. They have learned to live with misery. They are so used to it 
that it becomes naturally occurring. The victims are imprisoned by their own lack 
of utility and inability to break out. It’s not their fault, but victims often need a lot 
of help securing resources and gaining confidence.
Still another prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s office, when asked about his
overall impression of victims said, “The saddest thing I’ve ever seen.” One Easton
County prosecutor stated that domestic violence cases require “more hand-holding”
than other criminal cases. And a second Easton County prosecutor says he doesn’t
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like dealing with the victims’ “shifting emotions inherent in these cases.” Comments 
such as these indicate that prosecutors often view battered women not just with 
sympathy, but with pity. As I discussed in Chapter Three, an essential aspect of the 
“pure victim” construct involves portraying battered women as if they need to be 
rescued or saved by the criminal justice system because they are unable to save 
themselves. The words of one Rockford County prosecutors reflect this attitude. He 
stated: “There’s nothing better than giving a victim her self-esteem and life back. At 
the same time, it is very discouraging why some victims just don’t get it. We’re 
bending over backwards to help them and their kids and they don’t get it.”
Some of the prosecutors distinguished between what they perceived to be 
“true” or “real victims” and some other type of victims—presumably, false ones. For 
example, when asked about her overall impression of victims, an Easton County 
prosecutor stated, “Most are TRUE victims.” This highlights the fact that commonly, 
prosecutors do reinforce mainstream discourses that constitute battered women either 
as “real” victims or as manipulative agents. Recall that both Hanna (1996) and 
Wittner (1998) found that court workers believed there to be a distinction between 
those women with real and serious complaints and those women who came to court 
with other motives, such as to gain the upper hand in a divorce or custody battle. The 
prosecutors in my study sometimes reflected similar sentiments. A prosecutor from 
Rockford County said, “Cooperative victims may be vindictive and file a lot of 
motions to try'and get the abuser.” One prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s 
office said that when there’s a divorce and custody battle, domestic violence charges 
seem to be quite a weapon. He stated he believed that in 50% of custody cases,
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someone makes a charge of domestic violence to gain an advantage. Still another 
prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s office said: “There are women who try 
and play the system—a very small percentage, but you have to watch out for it.” And 
a third prosecutor from the same office stated that some people “affix” the label of 
victims to themselves.
Interestingly, several prosecutors claimed knowing if someone was a “true” or
“real” victim based on their level of cooperation with the prosecution process. One
prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s office stated: “Victims who are recanting,
I know that they are the true victims, but sometimes there is not much you can do.”
Similarly, some prosecutors expressed preferences for working with a particular type
of victim, although the type of victim preferred and the reasons behind the preference
differed. For example, several prosecutors said they prefer working with
uncooperative victims. Of these victims, one Rockford County prosecutor stated:
Uncooperative victims often change their story halfway through the case. They 
usually plan a “new” story with the defendant and don’t get the details or specifics 
straight. They get facts wrong on the stand, present spotty timelines, and their 
body language usually indicates they are lying. It’s much easier to poke holes in 
their stories. This scenario is helpful for DA’s. Police officers can testify about 
what the women said originally. Experts can testify as to why the women might 
change their story. We can show a picture of them as the “typical” battered woman 
and then juries are more likely to convict.
Another Rockford County prosecutor reflected a similar sentiment. He said that if the
victim appears to be over-cooperating with the prosecution, he tries to “tone her down
a little” since juries don’t like victims who cooperate “too zealously.” And an Easton
County prosecutor commented that “the ideal victim on the stand is one who is
meek.”
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The above statements illustrate the power of the “pure victim” construct, and 
its influence on both juries and prosecutors. Some of the prosecutors who appeared 
to buy into this construct expressed sentiments that battered women are helpless and 
weak and need to be rescued. Other prosecutors reflected the belief that while there 
are some women who are “pure,” “true,” or “real” victims, there are other women 
who are just out to use the criminal justice system for personal gain. As Mahoney 
(1994) argues, under the victim/agent dichotomy, there is no room to recognize the 
relationship between agency and victimization. Under this framework, if one is a 
victim she is not an agent, and vice versa. Thus, women viewed as displaying signs 
of agency (i.e. manipulating the system) were denied victim status by the prosecutors. 
Further, several prosecutors recognized the power of the “pure victim” construct in 
helping to persuade a judge or jury that a crime was committed. As Dunn (2001) 
argues, “Judges, prosecutors, advocates and others attribute responsibility to the 
victim as they confer identity, and they do so on the basis of a victim’s behavior and 
demeanor” (p. 207). Clearly, prosecutors often draw from dominant discourses about 
battered women in their work, thus reinforcing the effects of these discourses and the 
way battered women are constituted by  them.
However, not all prosecutors wanted to make generalizations about victims, 
and as such, on some level they resisted the constructions of the battered women 
created by hegemonic domestic violence discourses. This resistance was never overt. 
In other words, no prosecutor criticized or critiqued mainstream representations of 
battered women. But consider the comments of one prosecutor from the Lanville 
district attorney’s office, when asked about her overall impression of victims: she
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stated that there is a “huge range of types” and that “you just can’t make judgments.” 
When asked the same question, another prosecutor from that office said that she has 
dealt with every kind of person: “They come from all racial and economic 
backgrounds. I have dealt with cooperative and hostile victims. Some victims are 
very aware and others are not. It crosses all lines.” This prosecutor directly 
challenged the common belief—seemingly held by many of the others prosecutors— 
that domestic violence is linked with poverty and lack of education.
A few prosecutors went a bit further in their resisting of mainstream domestic 
violence discourses and ensuing representations of battered women than simply 
refusing to make generalizations about battered women. Instead of mirroring 
ideology depicting battered women as helpless victims who need to be rescued or as 
manipulative agents wasting the courts time, several prosecutors portrayed battered 
women in ways that directly challenged these constructs. For example, a prosecutor 
from the Lanville city attorney’s office said the following: “I’ve been doing this for a 
good number of years. Domestic violence victims are truthful.” An Easton County 
prosecutor stated of victims: “They need to have a comfort level. They need to have 
their questions answered and to be heard. They need to understand the criminal 
justice system and not be re-victimized. They do not need to be manipulated. They 
have to be treated with respect.” This prosecutor continued by stating that she hopes 
to empower victims and, if the victim doesn’t want to be involved in the prosecution 
process, figure out how to continue the case without condemning the victim. While 
sentiments such as these were rare, they do demonstrate that there is some room for
manipulation of mainstream discourses by workers in the criminal justice system; not 
all agents of the state view or define battered women in uniform ways.
The second discursive effect of the victim/agent in mainstream domestic 
violence discourses that I have discussed is that sometimes battered women are 
viewed as helpless victims in need of rescuing, but are also, at the same time, 
assumed to possess complete free agency to leave their abuser and cooperate with the 
criminal justice system. All twenty-one prosecutors seemed to think battered women 
should always leave their abusers and that involvement in the criminal justice system 
is the best way to achieve this goal. This is not too surprising given the recent 
societal trend of criminalizing domestic violence. It makes sense that workers in the 
criminal justice system would support viewing domestic violence as predominantly a 
criminal matter. Further, it also makes sense that overwhelmingly, prosecutors 
believed the biggest factor that makes domestic violence cases so tough is 
uncooperative or recanting victims. One prosecutor from Rockford County stated 
that victims are the best and worst part of the job. He continued by saying that it’s 
frustrating to have a victim with two black eyes want to drop the charges; he reported 
thinking that 50% of victims want to drop charges after one week and 80% of victims 
want to drop charges after one month. Another prosecutor from the Lanville district 
attorney s office stated of victims: “Most come to court reluctantly. Most want to 
recant, to convince you that it didn’t happen. Many are willing to go under oath and 
say it didn’t happen. Very few say that it happened and that they want to see it 
through.” Other comments from prosecutors include: “the victims don’t cooperate,”
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“the amount of cooperation from the victims is minimal,” and “domestic violence 
victims will frequently recant or not cooperate...”
Almost all of the prosecutors expressed their strong support of policies 
encouraging or mandating arrest and prosecution in domestic violence cases. A 
prosecutor from the Lanville district attorney’s office commented, “Overall, the 
system is doing the right thing with the mandatory arrest and no-drop policies.” 
Another prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s office stated that “we shouldn’t 
dismiss (cases) because she (the victim) says so.” In Easton County—the only 
jurisdiction without a no-drop prosecution policy—one prosecutor was very critical of 
the fact that they couldn’t proceed with prosecution if the victim doesn’t show up.
She believed case dismissals were a huge problem for their office due to this 
requirement. She stated that she encourages victim involvement by sometimes 
threatening perjury against women who say the violence happened but then don’t 
want to go forward with the case.
Those prosecutors that did question mandatory arrest and no-drop policies did 
so either because they believed them to be harmful in some way for the victims 
and/or offenders, or because they wanted to retain the discretion to drop a case for a 
lack of evidence.2 Only two of the twenty-one prosecutors expressed doubt about 
policies that encourage or mandate arrest and prosecution despite the victim’s wishes 
because they believed them to have a negative impact on the victim. An Easton 
County prosecutor reported that she has “mixed” feelings about victimless 
prosecution (a term describing prosecution without the victim’s consent or 
cooperation). This prosecutor stated that people need to decide to get help on their
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own. Another prosecutor from Easton County stated that while their office does 
dismiss a lot of cases, “this if OK, however, because some victims simply aren’t 
ready to pursue their cases.” Two other prosecutors questioned mandatory/uniform 
policies because of the potential impact they may have on the offender. A prosecutor 
from the Lanville city attorney’s office said that mandatory arrest policies border on 
being too harsh since people are automatically arrested. He believed police officers 
need to be given more discretion in assessing the situation since arrest has profound 
impacts on everyone’s life. And another prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s 
office stated:
I don’t know if you can categorize everyone in the same.. ..I don’t know how to 
explain it. There are ones that are classified as domestic violence that should be 
treated harsher, and some that certainly should be treated not on the same par as 
domestic violence. [In those cases, what should they be treated as?] Well, 
certainly criminal, but requiring 36 weeks of counseling is a problem.
A few other prosecutors questioned no-drop policies on that basis that they 
believed in the importance of giving prosecutors the discretion to not pursue weak 
cases in which evidence was lacking. For example, one prosecutor from the Lanville 
city attorney’s office called no-drop policies “preposterous” and evidence that 
victims advocates are “calling the shots.” He indicated that there is pressure from 
his superiors to prosecute all cases: “A lot more cases go to trial than they should 
because you don’t want to get yelled at. You take some bad cases to trial.” Another 
prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s office stated that there cannot be a 
uniform policy regarding prosecution because “it has to be up to the discretion of the 
attorney.”
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Clearly, the majority of prosecutors were supportive of uniform policies
taking discretion away from battered women. Only one or two prosecutors appeared
to be concerned that these policies take away control and choice from battered
women; for most prosecutors, the prosecution of batterers by the criminal justice
system is a positive thing that battered women should support. A prosecutor from
Rockford County said the following: “Some victims are reluctant at first, but will
later turn around and take advantage of services offered to them. They will then see
what the criminal justice system does is right.” This prosecutor frames women’s
reluctance to participate in the criminal justice system process as an inability to see
that what the criminal justice system does is “right.” Another prosecutor stated that
victims who don’t cooperate and show up for trials tend to reinforce, rather than
discourage, defendants’ actions. Prosecutors who reflect this type of sentiment
appear unable to recognize structural constraints that impact and limit battered
women’s ability to cooperate with the criminal justice, or at least expect battered
women to cooperate despite such factors. The lack of cooperation by battered women
is deemed to be a sign of individual weakness of the battered woman, not as a flaw in 
the system.
In Chapter Three, I discussed work by both Ford (1991) and Wittner (1998) 
that suggests that prosecution may be a power resource for battered women. They 
argue that abused women sometimes decide not to go through with the prosecution 
process because they are able to use initial involvement in the criminal justice system 
and/or the threat of prosecution as a bargaining tool for safety. However, while not 
directly asked about this, none of the prosecutors in the interviews to which I had
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access recognized or gave credence to this possibility. There seemed to be a shared 
belief by many, if not all, of the prosecutors that completion of the prosecutorial 
process is central to what they defined as “success.”3 Prosecutors continually 
expressed frustration over what they deemed as a lack of cooperation by battered 
women. While some of them indicated an understanding that sometimes women 
refuse to cooperate out of fear, not one of them suggested a woman might drop out of 
the prosecution process because her needs had already been met. Thus, it appears that 
the majority of the prosecutors hold an “all or nothing” type attitude and that the 
outcome of the case is more important than any benefit a woman may gain by simply 
having the criminal justice system involved (even if she refuses to participate in the 
full prosecution of her abuser).
Interestingly, many of the prosecutors did view the criminal justice system as 
limited in its ability to effectively address and stop domestic violence. These 
prosecutors either were critical of individual actors within the criminal justice system, 
the nature of the criminal justice system itself, or both. At least one prosecutor in each 
jurisdiction made some type of comment criticizing the police. Virtually all of these 
comments reflected a belief that the police often don’t investigate domestic calls 
thoroughly. Similarly, several prosecutors made comments that judges sometimes 
don’t take domestic violence seriously or may blame the victims. When asked if they 
believed that they, as part of the criminal justice system, were in a position to stop the 
abuse, only one prosecutor out of twenty-one answered with a strong “yes.” Others 
gave answers such as: “No, the criminal justice system is merely a reaction to the 
problem,” “No, it’s like holding back the ocean with a broom,” and “I like to think
that I am, but I don’t think that is very realistic. Am I going to change people? No.”
Just about half of the prosecutors also reported believing that the criminal justice
system is not very efficient. One prosecutor from the Lanville city attorney’s office
stated that the criminal justice system “runs about like a 3-legged dog” and is a “mass
production system and another said “Nothing the criminal justice system does is
efficient. Further, only five prosecutors believed the criminal justice system to be
“user-friendly” to victims. Comments included the following: “The criminal justice
system is not user-friendly to anybody,” “The criminal justice system is inherently
UN-user-friendly because it is designed to process and deal with criminals, not
victims,” and “We do what we can to make it user-friendly. But the process can be 
not nice to go through.”
Some of the prosecutors did, at some point in the interview, acknowledge 
structural factors that make it difficult for battered women to leave their relationships 
and/or cooperate with the criminal justice system. Just less than half of the 
prosecutors mentioned emotional ties to the batterer, economic pressures, the 
existence of children, fear of the batterer, and distrust of the criminal justice system as 
reasons they believed women returned to their batterers and/or did not want to 
participate in the prosecution of their batterers. However, despite the awareness of 
the type of social constraints that battered women face and/or a belief that the 
criminal justice system is neither user-friendly to victims, nor efficient, many 
prosecutors still reflected an expectation that women should leave and cooperate in 
the prosecution of their batterers. For example, one prosecutor from Easton County 
stated that he has served bench warrants for women who say they will show in court
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but then don t. He said when victims fail to show, it “pisses him o ff’ since he puts a 
lot of time and effort into these cases. This parallels Wittner’s (1998) findings, in 
which she argues that court workers commonly condemn battered women’s behavior 
without questioning their possible motives and hold women guilty for the failures of 
the criminal justice system.
There were a few exceptions to this. Several prosecutors directly mentioned 
the correlation between women’s experiences with the system and their likelihood of 
using it again in the future. For example, a prosecutor from the Lanville district 
attorney’s office said, “If the process isn’t good the first time, they (the victims) 
won’t use the system.” Another prosecutor from Rockford County stated that he 
doesn’t believe in arresting women who don’t show up to court as this destroys their 
trust and belief in the criminal justice system. And a prosecutor from the Lanville city 
attorney’s office, when asked about common methods she uses to make domestic 
violence victims feel supported, responded: “Treat them with sympathy and 
understanding. Don’t blame them for recanting.” This appeared to be a rare 
sentiment, however. By far, the common sentiment among the prosecutors towards 
recanting or uncooperative victims was frustration, anger, and pity.
Thus, the overwhelming majority of the prosecutors support criminalization of 
domestic violence and reinforce the idea that battered women can and should leave 
their abusive relationships and cooperate in the prosecution of their batterers. While 
these prosecutors appear to give lip service to the recognition of factors that may 
inhibit a woman’s ability to follow this “dominant cultural script” (to borrow from 
Baker, 1997), because they assume women should still cooperate with the criminal
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justice system despite these factors, the majority of them do not seem to recognize 
how powerful such factors may be. Mahoney (1994) argues that because much of the 
criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence is centered on the question of 
why a woman doesn’t leave the abusive relationship, the system is unable to take into 
account the reality of many battered women’s situations and the complexity of their 
relationships. As both she and Schneider (1993) argue, the criminal justice system’s 
assumption that a battered woman has two choices—staying and being victimized, or 
leaving and being “saved”—ignores the social, psychological, and economic factors 
that make leaving difficult. Further, and perhaps more importantly, this view also 
disregards the fact that many women are actually less safe from their abusers after 
leaving the relationship. Not one of the twenty-one prosecutors in my study brought 
up the fact that women are often at greater risk of attack after leaving their 
relationship. Only one—a prosecutor from the Lanville district attorney’s office— 
pointed out that battered women are often concerned with survival. She stated: “You 
have to put yourselves in their shoes as a prosecutor. You have to think about safety, 
bur for victims, they think of survival. This is a big difference. What I think is the 
safe thing, the victim thinks, ‘Are you kidding? I can’t survive with this.’” This 
woman’s words illustrate that prosecutors often interpret battered women’s situations 
quite differently than battered women themselves, do and that overly focusing on 
“exit” (Mahoney 1996) obscures the complexity of many battered women’s 
situations.
While not asked directly about ways in which women may take actions to 
protect themselves or get their needs met outside of exiting the relationship and/or
135
cooperating with the criminal justice system, none of the prosecutors brought up this 
possibility. A failure to leave the relationship and cooperate with the criminal justice 
system was almost exclusively viewed by the prosecutors as signs of women’s 
victimization, passivity, or helplessness, not as possible signs of resistance or agency. 
Again, this highlights the effects of the victim/agent dichotomy. Under this 
perspective, as Mahoney (1994) argues, if you are a victim you cannot be an agent. 
Thus, many battered women’s potential acts of resistance went ignored or 
unrecognized by the majority of prosecutors in this study.
Summary
In Chapter Three, I examined some of the discursive effects of criminal justice 
policy for battered women. In this chapter, following Little (1999), I have examined 
the ways that these discourses and the constructions they offer serve as an 
interpretative framework through which members of the criminal justice system 
understand and make sense of battered women. Through the examination of 
interviews with twenty-one prosecutors who work on domestic violence in four 
separate jurisdictions, I have focused on one realm of the “lived effects,” or the real- 
world implications of domestic violence discourses and further explored the 
relationship between subjectivity and discourse.
As Merry (1995b) has argued, the criminal justice system is a site where 
cultural meanings are both produced and replicated; because the criminal justice 
system is a part of the state, these meanings and representations become 
institutionalized. This process is complex, however. As I have shown in earlier 
chapters, discourses produced by the criminal justice system are also inextricably
connected to discourses produced in other areas, such as academia, victims’ rights
movements, and the mainstream media. Domestic violence legal policy thus borrows
from mainstream discourses in its representation and constitution of battered women
and in turn, it serves to perpetuate these discourses and representations. The
interviews with the prosecutors that I have presented here demonstrate that
prosecutors commonly draw from these mainstream discourses in their workings with
and understandings of battered women. They use the discourses as resources to
“assemble the biographical particulars” of the women’s selves in order to work with
and provide services to the women (Spencer, 2001). Thus, on some level, as agents
ot the state, they participate in the continuation and (re)production of mainstream
discourses about battered women. For example, all of the twenty-one prosecutors in
this study appear to operate under the perception that the criminalization of domestic
violence is a necessary thing and that policies mandating the arrest and prosecution of
batterers are for the good of battered women and society in general. There is an
underlying belief that women must utilize assistance from the criminal justice system
if they truly want to address the violence in their lives. In many ways this makes
sense: dominant narratives surrounding domestic violence perpetuate the notion that
the criminal justice system is the best way to address woman battering. Prosecutors
themselves are situated in these narratives as agents of the criminal justice system,
and this makes it easy to understand their support of the criminalization of domestic 
violence.
However, these interviews also demonstrate that not all of the prosecutors 
accept mainstream representations of battered women, even those on which
137
mandatory arrest and prosecution policies are arguably premised. Not all criminal 
justice system professionals engage in the construction of “institutional selves” in the 
same manner (Spencer, 2001). While, for the most part, prosecutors do reflect 
portrayals of battered women as either “victims” or “agents,” and often fail to 
understand both the context of the relationship in which battering occurs and why 
many battered women will not or cannot leave abusive relationships, there were 
exceptions to this. Some prosecutors were resistant to the idea that the criminal 
justice system needs to take all decision-making power away from battered women. 
Further, some prosecutors refused to make generalizations about the women they 
worked with, or characterized battered women in counter-stereotypical ways, such as 
by saying they are truthful and/or strong. This resistance, while never direct or even 
conscious, does abrupt mainstream ways of understanding battered women and serves 
to challenge the institutionalized discourses of the criminal justice system and the 
legal policy they produce. While very few prosecutors directly questioned 
mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies on the basis of their impact on 
battered women, by asserting that battered women need to be empowered or by 
claiming they need to have their voices heard, several prosecutors provided the 
opportunity for alternative understandings and representations of battered women.
In 1982, Schechter wrote of the dilemma the battered women’s movement 
faced when considering whether or not to work with the criminal justice system in an 
attempt to address domestic violence. While one extreme side of the movement 
believed legal reforms to be the solution to battered women’s problems, the other 
extreme side believed that the police and courts reflected “a hopelessly racist, sexist,
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and class-dominated society” and that attempts to change them or work within would 
be eventually co-opted (pp. 175-176). Today, with the increased criminalization of 
domestic violence and the implementation of legal policies that many believe to be 
disempowering to women, this dilemma still resonates. It does appear that in many 
ways the state has co-opted the work of the battered women’s movement—as I have 
demonstrated, discourses criminalizing, psychologizing, and pathologizing domestic 
violence have, for the most part, usurped and replaced discourses representing 
domestic violence as an issue of gender inequality. The “battered woman” has been 
represented and constituted in problematic and uniform ways with often negative 
ramifications. Yet, these discourses and their effects do not stand unchallenged- 
even workers in the criminal justice system may reflect alternative ways of thinking, 
as my research shows.
I am not claiming that simply because several prosecutors deviated from 
mainstream constructions of battered women in their understandings of domestic 
violence, these discourses may be replaced and their negative effects erased; to do so 
would be naive. However, my intent is to argue the importance of recognizing that 
the power of the criminal justice system and its workers is not uniform. Agents of the 
state do not always merely reflect and reproduce mainstream discourses and their 
resulting interpretations and representations. Mainstream discourses about domestic 
violence do appear to be very influential to prosecutors’ understandings of battered 
women, and this makes discussion about the dangers of feminists in engaging with 
the state to address gendered social problems all the more relevant. Yet, this research 
illustrates that counterdiscourses are co-present with mainstream discourses in the
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domestic violence criminal justice arena and thus, the potential for resistance and 
change exists.
NOTES
While both the city attorney s office and district attorney’s office in Lanville prosecutes misdemeanor 
domestic violence cases the district attorney’s office usually handles the more serious cases such as 
those involving broken bones, stitches, hospitalization, and/or use of a weapon.
2 AHlth? 85-3S Pureviously noted’ in most jurisdictions with no-drop prosecution policies, there exists an 
understanding that some cases simply can’t be taken to trial without the victim’s cooperation as there is 
no other evidence besides her testimony.
'X,
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CHAPTER FIVE
Victim, Agent, or Both?: The Discursive Construction of Victimization
In Chapter One, I discussed what it means to view social identity as 
discursively constructed. I begin this chapter by reviewing several important points 
about such a perspective. Ransom (1993) describes discourse as: “...structured ways 
of knowing which are both produced in, and the shapers of, culture.” Further, 
“discourses are not merely linguistic phenomena, but are always shot through with 
power and are institutionalised as practices” (p. 123). While discourses surrounding a 
particular subject are always multiple, some discourses carry more cultural power and 
weight than others—these discourses are often referred to as “dominant” or 
“hegemonic” discourses. However, as Fraser (1997) reminds us, “hegemony” does 
not describe a process in which dominant groups maintain exclusive control of 
cultural meaning. She states: “on the contrary, ‘hegemony’ designates a process 
wherein cultural authority is negotiated and contested. It presupposes that societies 
contain a plurality of discourses and discursive sites, a plurality of positions and 
perspectives from which to speak” (p. 154). Thus, given that discourses are multiple, 
shifting, and at times contradictory, so are the social identities they construct.
Further, while there may be numerous discourses that construct a particular identity, 
some of these discourses are hegemonic in that they carry more cultural authority.
Gubnum and Holstein (2001), borrowing from Foucault, argue that cultural 
and institutional discourses set the “conditions of possibility” for what constitutes a 
particular identity. For them, “institutional identities” are “locally salient images, 
models, or templates for self-construction; they serve as resources for structuring
selves” (p. 11). I have already explored some of the hegemonic cultural discourses 
that construct the identities of the “victim” and the “battered woman.” As I have 
demonstrated, these identities have been constructed in different ways by a variety of 
different social institutions. Further, “victim” and “battered woman” are not just 
institutional identities, but according to Gubrium and Holstein (2001), are troubled 
ones. The authors maintain that a person’s making connections between their 
personal self and a troubled identity involves “a great deal of interpretive activity,” as 
that person’s lived experience might in some ways be contradictory to ways the 
institutional identity has been constructed (p. 11). Donileen Loseke (2001) uses the 
term “identity work” to describe this process. In this chapter and the next, I explore 
the “identity work” of the women I interviewed. In other words, I examine the ways 
in which the women used discourses surrounding the identities of “victim” and 
“battered woman” to construct their selves. During my interviews, I asked the 
women to describe what the terms “victim” and “battered woman” meant to them; I 
then asked each woman whether she saw herself in these terms. The majority of the 
women reported seeing themselves-at some point-as a victim, a battered woman, or 
both. However, more of the women saw themselves as “victims” than as “battered 
women,” indicating that discourses surrounding these two identities are not conflated. 
Thus, I discuss each of these identities and the discourses that construct them 
separately. In this chapter I examine the complex relationship that women in abusive 
relationships have with “victim” discourses, focusing on the conditions under which a 
woman claims or rejects the identity of “victim”; in the next chapter I do the same for
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the identity of “battered woman.” Consequently, Chapters 5 and 6 are each two parts 
of a larger analysis.
The women I interviewed drew from a variety of discourses in their 
understandings of what it means to be a “victim” and a “battered woman” in U.S. 
society. Through their narratives, they demonstrated that they are very much aware 
of the ways in which victims and battered women have been culturally constructed. 
The conceptions of “victim” and “battered woman” held by some of the women 
mirrored hegemonic constructions of these identities; other women resisted or 
challenged these dominant representations. Not surprisingly, the women’s 
explanations for claiming or rejecting the identities were strongly tied both to the 
meanings they associated with each one and to their own lived experiences. Some of 
the women I interviewed recognized themselves and their experiences in dominant 
representations of “victim” and others did not; some women identified with particular 
aspects of such representations but rejected other aspects. Further, some women 
simultaneously drew from multiple discourses. Thus, the women’s identifications 
with these discourses were often inconsistent; their identity claims often shifted and 
changed throughout my interviews with them. However, as I will argue, 
contradictions in the women s narratives reveal the potential shortcomings of 
available discourses, as opposed to indicating something negative about the women 
themselves.
I will demonstrate that discourses surrounding the “victim” and the “battered 
woman” are both enabling and constraining. While they serve as available resources 
for women to draw from in their self-constructions and self-representations, they are,
in many ways, limited. Hence, identity work was often challenging for the women. 
Just as feminist theorists and researchers struggle with the victim/agent dichotomy 
(Mahoney, 1994), so did the women I interviewed. Their narratives reveal the 
difficulties they faced in depicting themselves as injured or wronged while 
simultaneously acknowledging they were not passive or helpless. These difficulties, 
however, did not keep the women from attempting to craft their own identities. The 
women did not allow their identities to simply be dictated and determined by existing 
discourses; instead, they constructed their selves in particular and specific ways. 
Thus, a central finding that I will discuss is that agency is involved in the creation of 
identity.1
Victimization—Three Hegemonic Discourses
In Chapter Three, I discussed some of the culturally dominant discourses that 
have emerged in the past several decades surrounding the identity of “victim.” To 
briefly review, one construction positions women to blame for the violence they 
experience. A second construction, created by a number of different sources such as 
the victim’s rights movement and various women’s groups, focuses on the harm 
produced by violence against women. This latter construction has produced a version 
of “victim” that removes all blame or culpability from the abused woman (Lamb, 
1999). A third construction, which some have argued is a byproduct of the second, 
portrays victims as weak, powerless, and helpless. My research shows that battered 
women s relationships to these discourses are often complicated and messy; the 
women both draw from the discourses and challenge them in their struggles to make 
meaning of themselves and their experiences.
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Discourse One: Victims as Culpable
My interviews indicate that for many of the women, discourses of blame 
surrounding the term “victim” hold much weight and are often central to their 
decisions about claiming the identity of “victim” for themselves. Women either 
recognized that others in society blame the victim or they themselves reflected this 
belief. For example, when asked what the word “victim” means to her, Lauren, a 21 
year-old white woman (see Appendix D for list o f interviewees) who broke up with 
her boyfriend after the first time he hit her said, “Well, it’s definitely a negative 
feeling, nobody wants to be the victim, nobody wants to because that implies some 
sort of responsibility on your part. You LET yourself be the victim, how did you 
LET that happen?” Jean, a 43 year-old white woman whose husband was physically 
and emotionally abusive (he had thrown her and their children out of the house), 
expressed a similar belief. Consider the following exchange:
Jean: So if you are a victim of domestic violence, there’s still a stigma that goes 
with it.
Amy: Which is? What do you think is the stigma?
Jean: I don’t know—that you’re a troublemaker, you know. That, uh, 
maybe.. ..nobody’s said this recently, but that you brought it on yourself. You 
know, that you’re not quite what society wants you to be.. .and whatever. But I’ve 
really noticed it in [her current] job search and it REALLY bothers me. They don’t 
know who I am. They don’t know who my friends are that are over at the 
Safehouse right now.
Women like Lauren and Jean are very aware of the discourse of blame and the power 
it has in contributing to people’s beliefs that victims are somehow responsible for 
their experiences. However, both women still claimed the identity of “victim” for 
themselves. For example, I asked Lauren if she saw herself as a victim and she 
replied, Yeah, I did, and I didn’t like the feeling. I mean, it’s not a good thing to feel
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like a victim, it’s not a good thing to be seen as a victim.” While Lauren believed she 
was a victim of her ex-boyfriend’s violence, labeling herself a “victim” was difficult, 
given her recognition that it is an often stigmatized identity.
Not surprisingly, some of the women who associated the word “victim” with 
blame and responsibility were less likely to claim the identity of victim, as they did 
not see themselves to blame for the violence in their relationships. As Karmen (1990) 
states, victim blaming entails finding “facilitation, precipitation, and provocation to 
be valid descriptions of what some people do ‘wrong’ that gets them into trouble” (p. 
120). Gina, a 40 year-old white woman, acknowledged this when she stated, “I hate 
to be called a victim. I feel like then it’s my fault. Then it’s like I’m this weak 
person that couldn’t do things right and get out, you know?” Gina does not want to 
be seen as a victim because she does not want people to see her at fault for her 
husband’s violence or weak because she has not left the relationship.
Discourse Two: Victimization as Harm One Cannot Control
In contrast to discourses blaming the victim, Holstein and Miller (1997) 
maintain that to label someone a “victim” means that we believe that person is the 
object of “harmful, unfair treatment” (p. 27). Further, under this discourse, 
establishing someone as a victim frees them from culpability: “Calling someone a 
victim encourages others to see how the labeled person has been harmed by forces 
beyond his or her control, simultaneously establishing the “fact” of injury and 
locating responsibility for the damage outside the ‘victim’” (p. 29). Consider the 
following statements from two interviewees about what a “victim” is: “someone who 
has been taken advantage o f ’ and “somebody that’s had something done to them, that
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was a wrongdoing, I guess, not deserved.” Between one-half and three-quarters of 
the women I interviewed either claimed, or at least in some way related to, the 
identity of victim; they most often did so to highlight the harm or wrong that they had 
experienced. While some women described feeling victimized by the criminal justice 
system (which I will discuss in Chapter Seven), most of the women focused on being 
victimized by their abusive partner. For example, when Heather, a 38 year-old white 
woman who described the abuse she experienced at the hands of her then boyfriend as 
primarily verbal and emotional, was asked how she felt about the term “victim” she 
replied: “Well, a victim is someone who got abused and I’m definitely a victim with 
this situation.” Tammy, a 22 year-old Native American woman whose boyfriend was 
verbally, emotionally, and physically abusive, said:
Yeah, I see myself as a victim. I’ve never gone to any.. .like I’ve never called the 
victim advocacy program or anything, but I would see myself as a victim.
Because, geez, my clothes have been ripped up, my glasses have been broken my 
door s been kicked in, you know.
Tammy—despite focusing exclusively on harm to her belongings and property as
opposed to her own bodily h a m -u se d  a victim identity to make clear that she has 
been wronged in some way.
Some of the women also clearly used the identity of victim to demonstrate 
that the wrong they experienced was caused by someone or something else, outside of 
their control. Paula, a 37 year-old white woman who was arrested after her alcoholic 
husband assaulted her, stated that she felt like a victim and defined victim as 
“somebody that reaped the consequences of other people’s actions. Like, at the mercy 
of whoever, or everybody else, or whatever.” Similarly, Liz, a 36 year-old white 
woman, made clear who caused her victimization when she said, “I’m a victim. I’m a
147
victim of John. What he is doing is not okay.” For these women, identifying as a 
victim helps them to understand-and make clear to others-that their experiences 
were harmful, damaging, and outside of their control. Unlike victim blaming 
discourse, under this understanding of victims, labeling someone a “victim” is both a 
way to deflect responsibility and to assign “victimizer status to others” (Holstein and 
Miller, 1997, pp. 30-31). For women like Paula and Liz, the use of this discourse 
helps them to make a clear demarcation between who is the “victim” and who is the 
“offender.”
Discourse Three: Victims as Weak and Helnless
Clearly, the discursive construction of a blameless victim is an improvement 
on a discourse that positions abused women as responsible for the violence they 
experience. However, an unfortunate result of this discursive strategy is that the 
distinction between a woman not able to control the violence she experiences in her 
life and a woman who has no control of any aspect of her life has, at times, become 
blurred. Holstein and Miller (1997) state:
Exoneration from responsibility accompanies victimization. The essence of being 
a ‘victim’ resides in a person’s perceived lack of control over the harm that he or 
she has experienced. Thus, to ‘victimize’ someone instructs others to understand 
the person as a rather passive, indeed helpless, recipient of injury or injustice.
While this can be situationally useful, it may also convey a general and undesired 
understanding of persons. In a sense, ‘victimizing’ a person “dis-ables” that person 
to the extent that victim status appropriates one’s personal identity as a competent 
efficacious actor.” (p. 43)
Indeed, as we saw in Chapter Three, the discursive removal of blame from battered 
women has also stripped them of the ability to act in their own best interests. As the 
victim/agent dichotomy suggests, a “true” victim is not an agent. Thus, a third
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culturally dominant way of understanding victims involves portraying them as weak 
and helpless—as non-agents.
The idea that a victim is someone who is weak, powerless, or passive was held 
by about a third of the women I interviewed. This led to a rejection of the identity of 
victim by some of the women I interviewed because they did not see themselves as 
weak or helpless. For example, Gloria, a 32 year-old African American and Hispanic 
woman, said the following:
The term “victim” to me means that you’re not able to stand up for yourself and 
kind of advocate for yourself so that you can make a positive change on whatever’s 
going on. Like to me, a victim’s sort of, “Oh, God, he’s going to kill me, and I 
don’t know what to do,” and they’re kind of, like, stuck in the fear mode. And 
that’s not me. I’m not a victim. I’m afraid—don’t get me wrong—I’m afraid, but 
I’m not afraid to stand up and do what I think I can do to alleviate the problem.
Glona’s long-term relationship with her boyfriend (to whom she was engaged at one
point) turned violent after he developed a drinking problem. She broke up with him
after the first time he became verbally abusive. He later returned to her house, broke
down the door, pushed her, and threatened to kill both of them. She immediately
called the police and continued to call the police during several repeat incidents.
Glona sees herself as standing up to her ex-boyfriend and letting him know she will
not tolerate his actions. Thus, in contrast to seeing herself as a powerless victim, she
stated: I see myself as a person who experienced something and they learned off of
it, and they’re trying to go on and fight and do the best thing possible to kind of get it
out of their hair.” This clearly counters the image Gloria has of a victim and leads her 
to reject the identity.
However, some women who reported believing that the term “victim” 
connotes helpless and powerlessness claimed the identity because their experiences
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and/or situation have led to them to feel helpless and powerless. Take the words of 
Mary, a 40 year-old white woman who, at the time of the interview, had been living 
on the streets for nine months with her very abusive boyfriend. When asked what the 
word “victim” meant to her, she paused before replying, “Powerless. You feel totally 
paralyzed and so scared. And to me, alone. Totally alone.” Mary stated that she did 
feel like a victim and made reference to a story she had recounted earlier in the 
interview where one night in mid-winter her boyfriend got drunk and threw 
everything she possessed into a campfire, including both pairs of her shoes and her 
winter coat. He later joked, “Well, we needed some fuel for the fire. It was going 
out.” She described the incident as “the lowest thing you could do to somebody.” 
However, Mary reported lacking social support and felt like her boyfriend was all she 
had. Her mother did not want contact with her and would not let Mary speak to her 
own children when she called. Further, she did not like the type of support offered by 
the criminal justice system—previously, someone else had contacted the police when 
her boyfriend severely beat her on the street and she was upset when the judge 
imposed a no-contact order on the couple. Thus, she did not believe that calling the 
police for help was an option. At the time of the interview Mary was staying at a 
shelter for battered women while her boyfriend was in jail after being arrested on 
outstanding warrants. The campfire incident was central to Mary’s feeling powerless 
and alone. Her boyfriend, the only person she felt connected to in the world, did 
something unfathomably hurtful to her. Her situation led her to claim a victim 
identity. She described how if felt to be a victim: “I don’t feel like a self. I don’t feel 
like a person. I just feel like a nobody.”
The words of Gloria and Mary are illustrative of the way in which battered 
women sometimes invoke discourse that constructs the “victim” as helpless and 
weak. However, their narratives also demonstrate that the women I interviewed used 
discourses in different ways, based on their own lived experiences. Holstein and 
Miller (1997) argue that victims are “interactionally constituted,” in that “victim” is 
“a categorization device—an interpretative framework that provides a set of 
instructions for understanding social relations” (p. 27). Gloria and Mary’s differential 
self-positioning to the identity of victim illustrates this. Both women experienced 
violence at the hands of their partners, and thus both women could potentially be 
viewed as victims. However, to label both Gloria and Mary as victims based solely 
on the details of their circumstances offers a static view of “victim” and assumes 
victim status is inherent to particular persons in particular situations. In reality, both 
Gloria and Mary viewed themselves and their situations differently, and thus their 
beliefs about whether or not “victim” is an appropriate status for themselves also 
differ—this reflects the interactional processes at work. Gloria firmly rejected the 
identity as a means of highlighting the actions she has taken to “stand up” to her 
abusive ex-boyfriend and end the violence and turmoil he brings to her life. She 
made clear that her rejection of a victim status does not mean she is not afraid; 
however, she did wish to differentiate herself from those women she sees as so “stuck 
in the fear mode” that they cannot do what they need to “alleviate the problem.”
Mary, on the other hand, saw her situation mirrored in the identity of helpless victim. 
She viewed her inability to get out of her abusive situation with her boyfriend as 
rendering her powerless and alone. In fact, when I asked her what she thought would
have to happen for her not to feel like a victim anymore, she replied, “Probably to 
finally break up with him.” Both Gloria and Mary discursively interpreted “victim” 
in similar ways; however, they used this interpretive framework very differently to 
make sense of their experiences and, one could argue, to advise others on how to 
view them. As we will see in the next section, this process becomes very complex 
when the discourses women simultaneously draw from to understand the identity of 
“victim” are multiple and contradictory.
“Victim” Struggles 
In the preceding sections I discussed three of the most common ways that the 
identity of “victim” is culturally constructed: as someone who is culpable for the 
abuse they experience; as someone who is harmed by something they cannot control; 
and as someone who is weak and helpless.2 Although the second construction was 
developed primarily to counter the first, all three of these discourses nevertheless help 
to shape the dominant view of victims in U.S. society. For example, although the 
idea that female victims of violence are not to blame for their experiences has gained 
prominence in the past several decades, narratives of blame are still very common 
surrounding women who are victimized (Belknap, 2001). Further, as I have 
previously demonstrated, the idea that female victims lack agency is also very 
common in the legal realm, as Mahoney (1994) and Schneider (2000) have shown in 
their discussions of the “victim/agent dichotomy.” Because these three discourses co­
exist in current understandings of women’s victimization and because they are at 
times contradictory, the total picture they create is complex; we lack a clear story 
about who or what a “victim” actually is. Not surprisingly, then, many of the women
I interviewed were not completely clear about what they thought a “victim” was; 
many of them presented complicated understandings of a victim, drawing from two or 
more discourses simultaneously.
For example, Ellen, a 56 year-old white woman whose ex-husband was
primarily verbally and emotionally abusive while they were married, understood that
a victim identity is associated with blame and powerlessness. She stated:
And when I think about the word victim, I think about oh, poor me, you know. 
People blame the victim. They make you feel like all you want to do is whine.
And I don’t want to whine. I hate, it takes away any permission to like want to 
take care of yourself. You know. Part of being a victim makes you feel like you’re 
powerless. And I’m not powerless.
However, despite Ellen’s recognition that “victim” has been constructed in negative
ways, she still claimed the identity, stating, “I am a victim of domestic violence and a
victim of emotional violence.” Ellen’s narrative simultaneously reflects all three of
the common cultural discourses surrounding victimization.
As we saw in the previous sections, battered women’s identity claims are
inextricably connected to their understanding and interpretations of particular
identities. Therefore, women who perceived the status “victim” as multidimensional
in its meaning sometimes had more difficulty claiming or rejecting this identity for
themselves than did women who had a more simplistic understanding of “victim.”
Consider the following conversation I had with Barbara, a thirty-six year old white
woman who experienced verbal and physical abuse from her now ex-husband at the
end of their marriage:
Amy: And how about “victim”? What does that term mean to you?
Barbara'. Well, that term is actually really frustrating because I feel like it’s come 
to mean something very bad.
Amy: How so?
Barbara-. Because people who are victims, you know, are survivors. It’s just 
become really politically wrong to be called a victim, and so there’s no word that 
can express when something happens to me. This happened to me and I didn’t do 
anything to deserve it and I couldn’t help it, and so.. .but I don’t want to say I’m a 
victim because that congers up well, do I bring this on myself or do I play the role 
“victim”? It’s just such a negative word now.
Amy: It sounds like you think blame is associated with it?
Barbara. Very much so, very much so. But yeah, so that can even make me 
defensive, being called a victim. Because it makes me feel like people are thinking 
well, yeah, I just do this for a living or something. And I don’t. This really did 
happen and I didn’t choose to make it happen.
Amy: Do you relate to the term at all?
Barbara: See, if  it didn’t have a negative connotation, yes. Definitely so. 
Definitely.
Amy: And what part do you relate to? If you could separate the negative, then what 
part of the word do you relate to?
Barbara: The part that says that something happened to me that I didn’t provoke 
and I couldn’t do anything about. Something that was awful.
Barbara astutely recognized that a victim identity is not an innocent one, as it is often 
associated with blame and responsibility. However, she also expressed a recognition 
that being a victim means something “awful” happened to her that she had no control 
over, and it is this construction o f “victim” that she relates to. The competing and 
contradictory discourses that shape Barbara’s understanding of what it means to be a 
victim make it difficult for her to declare herself as one. As she made clear, she 
believes there is “no word” that can communicate her experiences—for her, “victim” 
is just too tainted.
Krista, a 28 year-old African American woman, had a “4 or 5 year, on and 
o ff’ relationship with her boyfriend who was verbally, emotionally, and physically 
violent. Her narrative also reflects multiple dominant discourses surrounding 
victimization and suggests she struggles with the application of the identity of 
victim” to herself. When I first asked her if she saw herself as a victim she said “I 
don’t really think I am a victim” but immediately launched into a discussion of how
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she was a victim of the criminal justice system.3 I later asked her if she saw herself as 
a victim in the relationship. She said: “Yeah, but, but I could easily have made.. .I’ve 
got a lot of hatred in my heart for that man.. .if he ever really tried to.. .1 think I could 
fuck him up, for real. Here, Knsta countered her original refusal of victim status. 
Further, her “yeah, but” response makes clear that she thinks she could fight back if 
she needed to despite seeing herself as a victim in the relationship. This indicates that 
for Krista, victimization is equated with passivity and an inability (or unwillingness) 
to fight back. She saw herself as a victim but also wished to highlight her agency.
I tried to further flush out the contradiction in Krista’s narrative by pointing
out that earlier she said did not really see herself as a victim, and asking if there was a
part of the word she did not relate to. She responded in the affirmative and explained
by stating, “Because I really didn’t have to BE with him, you know, so that part. It’s
not like I had to REALLY.” She said she did not have to stay in a relationship with
her ex-boyfriend at first, but later, when she had several children with him and
became financially dependent on him, she did. She said:
.. .1 didn t see all these signs that he was fucking me up before. You know what 
I m saying, so that s my stupid fault. Cause I never knew, so oh well. You get 
what you deserve, I guess, in that aspect, I don’t know.
Krista saw herself as having some type of control in the situation; she said that
originally she did not have to stay with her boyfriend and she also took responsibility
for missing signs that he was abusive. The control she perceived herself to have had
made it difficult for her to see herself as a victim, indicating that for Krista, part of a
victim identity means having no control over the abuse one experiences. While
Krista did not directly state that her understanding of victimization involves both
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passivity and a lack of control, her narrative indicates that both of these discourses are 
influential to her construction of a victim identity and contribute to her difficulty in 
definitively claiming or rejecting such an identity for herself.
Some of the other women I interviewed also reflected seemingly contradictory
understandings and uses of the word “victim.” Several women used the term
throughout the interview to refer to themselves or their experiences, yet when asked
directly if they saw themselves as a victim they said “no.” Take, for example, Robin,
a 29 year-old white woman whose husband, at the time of the interview, was in jail
for assaulting her. She stated:
I don’t necessarily like the term domestic violence victim because right there you 
have the word victim and most therapists will tell you point blank, that is not good 
psychology to be using those same terms to somebody who has been through 
[domestic violence]... .and it’s just not healthy to be using that same word in those 
connotations. It puts the blame - well, victim usually carries a very negative.. .it 
denotes a state of complete powerlessness.
Robin then stated that she does not feel powerless so she doesn’t see herself as a
victim. However, before Robin made these comments, on eight separate occasions
she, herself, used the word “victim” to refer to women who have experienced
domestic violence. For example, when discussing her opinion of the criminal justice
system she said, “And the reason the courts are backed up is because they’re more
interested in protecting the rights of the perpetrator than the victim’s rights.”
Interestingly, after Robin told me she did not like the term “victim,” she “caught”
herself using it again. While in the midst of telling me that police officers need better
training in dealing with victim’s potential responses to violence, she stated, “...police
officers really need to be more educated about-and I know I don’t like this word, but
it does define- ‘victims’.” Robin acknowledged the contradiction in her stated
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dislike of the term and later use of it, but she made clear that “victim,” while a 
stigmatized terms in many respects, does help to “define” or communicate a 
particular meaning.
Another woman who rejected the identity of “victim” for herself when
directly asked later declared that she was a victim. Recall the case of Gloria, the
woman who firmly denied seeing herself as a victim because she was not “stuck in
fear mode” and was taking active steps to “stand up” to her ex-boyfriend who was
harassing her. During this part of our conversation, she stated, “I don’t see myself as
a victim” and “I’m not a victim.” However, at an earlier point in the interview she
had claimed a victim identity. Gloria was in the midst of telling me how upset she
was that her ex-boyfriend broke his probation and fled the state only to have the
probation officer go find him and bring him back to the city in which Gloria was
living. This meant that as soon as her ex-boyfriend bonded out, he would be back at
her house and bothering her (and sure enough, this is exactly what happened). She
recounted a conversation she had with the victim’s advocate about this:
She (victim’s advocate) just told me, she said, “Well, Gloria, by law, you know, we 
have to bring him back up here.” And I’m, like, “But.. .that doesn’t make any 
sense, because I’m the victim, and I’m down here, and he’s up there where he can’t 
harm me. If you bring him back down here.. .(trails off).”
So, even though at one point in the interview Gloria resolutely declared she is not a 
victim, here, she asserts her victim status. Again, this inconsistency in Gloria’s 
narrative is further evidence of the multiple ways that “victim” is discursively 
constructed, and how it has different meanings in various social contexts. Moreover, 
the inconsistency demonstrates the various ways in which the women I interviewed 
drew from the different constructions of “victim” to make sense of their experiences
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and communicate these meanings to me. When Gloria asserts she is a victim, she 
does so to make clear to the victim advocate that she was the one harmed and that she 
is the one who is still afraid. Further, she is also making a claim to rights from the 
criminal justice system.4 As Holstein and Miller (1997) argue, the process of labeling 
a person a “victim” “also serves as a rationale for sanctioning perpetrators in order to 
‘set things right’” (p. 34). However, Gloria’s rejection of a victim identity is done to 
distance herself from depictions of victims as weak, helpless, and unable to act for 
themselves. Clearly, for Gloria, “victim” has multiple meanings, as it does for many 
of the women with whom I spoke.
There are many ways of understanding what it means to be a “victim” in U.S. 
society. Discourses that blame the victim, that construct “victims” as experiencing a 
harm that cannot be controlled, and that position the victim as weak and helpless exist 
concurrently as interpretive frameworks that people use to make sense of a “victim” 
identity. An examination of the narratives of the women I interviewed reveals the 
cultural power of all three of these discourses. The women both drew from and 
rejected these discourses while constructing their identities and attempting to make 
sense of their experiences. Further, at times they simultaneously drew from 
competing discourses. This demonstrates the complex role that cultural discourses 
have in the process of identity construction.
Also illuminated are the conditions under which battered women chose one 
discourse over another. At one time or another, all of the women’s interpretations of 
“victim” mirrored one or more of the hegemonic discourses. Each woman’s decision 
to claim or reject a victim identity was based on her individual understanding of
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“victim” and how well she felt it explained her own experiences. However, because 
many of the women held multiple understandings of “victim,” their identity claims 
were not always consistent—some claimed to be a victim in one circumstance but 
rejected this status in another. Women were most likely to claim a “victim” identity 
when they wanted to express they had been harmed or wronged in some way, and/or 
to claim rights to justice. They were much less likely to claim a “victim” identity if 
they believed this meant they were to blame for the violence they experienced or that 
they were weak or helpless. This process is explored even further in the following 
sections.
“A Pancake Always Has Two Sides”: Victim’s Perceived Responsibility
As I have argued, one of the ways that “victim” has been discursively 
constructed in U.S. culture in the context of violence against women is through the 
blaming of women for the abuse they experience. While several of the women I 
interviewed told me that they used to blame themselves for their partners’ violence, at 
the time of the interview, none of them appeared to directly hold themselves at fault. 
However, nearly half of the women reported believing that they played some role or 
possessed some level of responsibility in their abusive relationships.5 The women 
claimed varying degrees of responsibility and for a variety of reasons, such as not 
standing up to their abusers or leaving the relationship, playing a victim “role” and/or 
having a victim “frame of mind,” and initiating or participating in verbal and physical 
violence. Often times, as I will show, a woman’s belief that she had some level of 
responsibility was directly connected to her claiming or rejecting of a victim identity.
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Several of the women spoke of “letting” their partners abuse them. For many 
women, this meant either not “standing up” to their partner by calling the police or it 
meant remaining in the relationship and continuing to see their partner despite the 
violence. For example, Liz, a 41 year-old white woman, had a thirteen year on and 
off relationship with John. John and Liz were both longtime speed addicts and John 
had been both physically and verbally abusive to her—he had an extensive criminal 
record including several charges of sexual assault and child molestation. Liz said she 
has frequently reconciled with John both because she loves him and because he is her 
drug connection. She said she has “let him in and out” of her life numerous times. 
Other statements she made were: “I let him get away with it so much” and “I play the 
game.” At one point in the interview she told me she had vowed to her children that 
she would stop doing drugs and she also wanted to permanently end things with John. 
She said, “I’m not gonna let [him] treat me like a victim no more.” Liz used the 
phrase “let him” three separate times, indicating that she perceived she had some 
control or level of responsibility in her situation.
Other women spoke of a victim “role” or “frame or mind.” For example, 
Kathy a 35 year-old white woman, was physically and sexually assaulted one evening 
by Nathan, a man she was casually dating. As a child, she had been sexually abused 
by her brother and physically abused by her mother; her ex-husband was also 
physically violent. She said that part of being a victim “is a belief that you have 
about yourself sometimes, where you somehow believe that you don’t deserve 
something better, and so you end up in this victim role.” She then made a distinction, 
however, between “random victimization” and more systemic victimization:
So I think, you know, a victim can be a variety of different things, where you have 
a victim who is just in a situation that all of a sudden she’s assaulted or raped o r . . .  
you know, by either a stranger or by a casual dating situation, where it’s 
completely out of the blue. You have other victims who have kind of been 
inculcated into the system or this cycle, you know, of a relationship where they’re 
constantly a victim. I think I was a victim as a child throughout my life, and so I 
think that throughout my life I’ve been trained as a victim; I think I’m a good 
victim. And I fit within this model or this perception that I don’t deserve something 
better, and put myself into dangerous situations.
Kathy took some level of responsibility for the violence she has experienced by 
stating that she has a victim mentality that results in her putting herself into 
“dangerous situations” and ending up in a “victim” role.
Kathy said that a victim “can be a variety of different things.” She 
differentiated between women who are in a cycle of victimization in their 
relationships and women who may experience random victimization. Kathy appeared 
to position the latter as more innocent. However, she seemed to struggle to categorize 
the act of violence she experienced from Nathan as random victimization that 
happened “out of the blue” or as something that is part of an overall “cycle.” For 
example, after she said that some violence is “random victimization” she stated, “I 
think with Nathan, that’s what it was. I had no idea. I didn’t see any signs that he 
was going to be violent towards me.” At a later point in the interview, she suggested 
that she had been in a sexual relationship with Nathan to boost her self-esteem. She 
had been going through a rough time in her life, as she had recently been laid off.
She said that when she is under stress, she reverts to a “victim role” and this might 
have contributed to her failure to see signs that Nathan was abusive: “I think I went 
back into a situation where I ignored the red flags that Nathan had, and just went with 
what was going on—saw the good things in Nathan [and] not these red flags that 
would come up.” Kathy appeared to have difficulty deciding whether or not she
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believes she could (and should) have seen Nathan’s violence coming. Despite her 
distinguishing between “cyclic” and “random” victimization (the latter involving less 
responsibility on the victim’s part), she was unable to neatly insert her own 
victimization into one of these categories.
Carla, a 58 year-old African American and Native American woman, also
made a distinction between random victimization and victimization that occurs in an
on-going relationship. Her ex-boyfriend was emotionally and physically abusive and
she believed he was responsible for setting fire to her apartment (although the police
were never able to prove this). For Carla, the word “victim” always indicates
innocence and thus, she did not believe it can apply to women in abusive
relationships, whom she sees as playing some role. When I asked Carla if see saw
herself as a victim, this was her reply:
Not really. I don’t particularly like the term victim. Because I feel like it’s putting 
too much (responsibility) on the other person. They just, you know, in this type of 
situation, it’s a two-way street.. .A victim is like I’m walking down the street and a 
guy just attacks me. And rapes me, whatever. I have no choice.
I then asked Carla if she saw this as different from being in an abusive relationship.
She answered:
Somewhat.. .Because I do think we play a part in being battered women. There are 
things in our personality that probably trigger whatever it is in his personality. So I 
think battered women have something in them that’s not helping, too, that attracts 
the battering man and triggers him. Okay? Do you know what I’m saying? Like a 
pancake. I don’t care how thin the batter. It’s got two sides.
Finally, other women saw their actions or behaviors as playing a role in their 
abusive relationships. Several women believed that their yelling, calling their partner 
names, and/or using violence themselves gave them some level of responsibility for 
their situations. For example, Gina, a 40 year-old white woman, was in a marriage to
162
Joe that she described as verbally abusive. She reported that Joe had hit her at one 
point twelve years ago. On a recent evening, Joe belittled her in front of their 
children. She confronted him about it and they got into a verbal argument. She 
ended up throwing some fruit at him and decided she wanted him to leave. She tried 
to pull him to the front door and they had a physical altercation where he grabbed her 
by the wrists and she scratched him in the face. Her husband called the police and 
she was arrested. At one point during the interview Gina told me: “You know, I felt 
like I let this happen. And to some extent, I did. Had I not, reacted like that.. .Joe can 
push my buttons, and I just really lost it.” She continued by saying that she “wasn’t 
taking care” of herself and was very stressed because they had just moved to a new 
state and she had lost her previous support system (which she defined as several 
support groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Al-Anon, her therapist, and her 
prescription for a low-level antidepressant). Thus, she described feeling that she was 
really “out o f ’ herself. She believed this led to her reacting to Joe’s verbal abuse the 
way she did, leading her to conclude that she had a role in the incident.
Discussing women’s potential “role” or responsibility in their abusive 
relationships poses a host of possible problems. This theme may be perceived by 
some as dangerously close to—if not inseparable from—the discursive construction of 
female victims as culpable for their experiences. Some feminist analyses certainly 
might lead to such a conclusion (see Lamb, 2001, for further discussion).6
It would not be difficult to read these women’s accounts as evidence that they 
have internalized dominant cultural beliefs that blame the victim and/or as proof that 
these women are stereotypical battered women who excuse their partner’s behavior
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because they cannot face the reality of their situations. However, this would be an 
overly simplistic explanation and, I believe, one that would fail to accurately present 
the “truths” of the women I interviewed. As Lisa Sanchez (1999) points out, “the 
voices of women who are considered victims have all too often been silenced and 
devalued, the contradictions in their narratives dismissed as ‘justification,’ 
‘rationalization,’ or ‘false consciousness’” (p. 53).
A closer analysis of these women’s narratives and their beliefs that they had 
some type of role in their abusive relationships reveals two important findings that 
demonstrate this self-positioning is not merely a reflection of dominant discourses 
that blame the victim. The first finding is that all of the women I interviewed who 
claimed some level of responsibility in their abusive relationships distinguished 
between this perceived responsibility and actual culpability. For example, while Liz 
accepts some degree of responsibility for her abusive relationship by not firmly 
ending the relationship with John, she lays the blame for his violent behavior squarely 
at his feet. When I asked her what the word “victim” meant to her, she replied: “I’m 
a victim. I’m a victim of John. What he is doing is not okay.” This highlights an 
important difference between responsibility and blame; while Liz believed her failure 
to end the relationship with John translates into her “letting” him treat her like a 
victim, she did not indicate in any way that she deserves his abuse. Kathy, the 
woman discussed above who stated she is a “good victim,” also seemed to make a 
distinction between what she sees as responsibility and blame. She pressed charges 
against her attacker, Nathan, and was hoping he would receive the maximum 
sentence. She talked about her failure to recognize the red flags in her causal
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relationship with Nathan. I asked her if she blamed herself and at first she said yes. 
However, after discussing the stress in her life at the time of the attack, she stated,
. .1 don’t know if I blame myself, but I think that that victim role has been.. .is 
inside of me. And I constantly fight against it in relationships that I develop. So I 
think that there’s a lot in my history and in my background as to why I do what I do, 
and the choices about who I’m with.”
Even Carla, who came the closest to blaming the victim by saying that she 
believes there is something in a battered woman’s personality that “triggers” her 
abusive partner, did not appear to believe the abuse she suffered at the hands of her 
now ex-boyfriend was her fault—in no way did she exonerate him for what he did to 
her. When Carla ended their relationship he continued to stalk her and she took 
several measures to attempt to ensure her safety, such as going to a shelter for 
battered women and filing for a restraining order. Throughout the interview she 
referred to him both as a “monster” and as a “terrorist.” Later comments she made 
suggested that perhaps her perspective, instead o f meaning to blame victims of 
domestic violence, is a way for her to make certain that she will not get involved with 
any more abusive men (her ex-boyfriend was one of a string of violent men she had 
been involved with). I asked her how her experiences have impacted how she views 
herself. She replied:
I realized that I needed to really.. ..I really needed to find out.. .1 needed the 
solution on how to, you know.. ..it’s not so much spotting the guys. It used to be 
like I could spot these guys. We’d talk about that [at the shelter]: ‘Now how do I 
spot them?’ You do this and you do that.. ..I spotted that. And it didn’t work 
because it’s something in me that draws that [abusive men].
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With obvious difficulty, Carla discussed how she had previously learned from shelter 
staff the potential signs of an abuser. However, she believed this did not work for her 
since she ended up in another violent relationship. This led her to the conclusion that 
it had to be something about her that makes her more attractive to abusive men. 
Because of this belief, Carla said, “I think this relationship has made me even more 
determined to become a whole person,” which for her meant staying out of 
relationships for some time, staying sober, and turning to “spiritual things” such as 
yoga.
Thus, for some of the women, acknowledging that they had some degree of 
responsibility also meant they had a way of controlling the violence in their lives. 
They reported believing they contributed to the abusive relationship by doing things 
such as: thinking like or being a “good victim”; not taking care of themselves; not 
standing up to their partners by calling the police; “letting” their partners abuse them 
by not ending the relationship; and failing to see “red flags” in order recognize who 
may be a potential abuser from the start. Again, the women were not arguing that 
their engaging in these behaviors somehow excused their partners’ violence or made 
it less wrong. Instead, this thinking helped to provide a perception for the women 
that if they changed their behavior or mindset, they would be less likely to be harmed; 
it gave them a feeling of control and countered discourses positioning battered 
women as weak and helpless.
While I argue that the women’s claims of responsibility are distinctly different 
from discourse that blames the victim, their line of thinking appears to reflect what 
Nancy Bems (1999) refers to as an “individual frame of responsibility” for solving
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domestic violence. In her review of popular women’s magazines, Bems found that 
domestic violence is most often portrayed as a private problem that is the victim’s 
individual responsibility to end. Highly ignored by the magazines were perspectives 
that examined the institutional, social, and cultural contexts in which this violence 
occurs. Indeed, as I discussed in Chapter Three, many theorists have argued that 
current domestic violence discourses have effectively depoliticized woman battering 
(Ferraro, 1996, Lamb, 1999, Schneider, 2000). Despite the battered women’s 
movement original insistence that domestic violence is a political issue, increasingly, 
pathological and psychological explanations of domestic violence have become 
common. This effectively obscures both the pervasiveness of the abuse of women in 
U.S. society, the context of unequal power relations in which it occurs, and the 
historical failure of U.S. social institutions to take it seriously.
For sure, it is highly unlikely that if all the women I interviewed simply 
changed their behavior and ways of thinking that they would be safe from violence 
and from becoming involved in future abusive relationships. In fact, several of the 
women discussed believing that they knew how to “keep themselves” out of abusive 
relationships, only to find their next partner also to be violent. For example, Kathy 
seemed somewhat perplexed that, after leaving her abusive marriage and believing 
she was safe from future violence, the man she was involved with sexually assaulted 
her. She stated:
You know, it’s funny, because after leaving my first husband, I said I would never 
be a victim again. And I tried to live a life without becoming a victim, and yet I 
ended up in this situation as a victim again. And I think . . .  I don’t know how I 
ended up being a victim again in a situation.
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She came to the conclusion that she still must possess a victim “mindset.” Certainly, 
some (if not many) women who do change their behavior or mindset likely still 
experience violence. Further, structural factors may impede their attempts at exiting a 
violent relationship. A woman may call the police, only to have them not respond. A 
woman may want to leave the relationship but not be able to support herself and her 
children. A woman may leave her abusive relationship, only to be stalked or even 
killed. However, while a large number of the women I interviewed did reflect an 
“institutional frame of responsibility,” they were not oblivious to the role that larger 
sociocultural factors play in the origin and perpetuation of domestic violence. Many 
of the women reflected an awareness of gender and raced-based hierarchies in U.S. 
society. Further, a large number of the women I interviewed view the criminal justice 
system as an inadequate means of addressing the violence in their lives (and few of 
them believed other options besides the criminal justice system existed).
Thus, I believe that the women’s claims of responsibility in their abusive 
relationships did not simply mirror dominant discourse blaming women for the 
violence or holding women solely responsible for solving the problem of violence in 
their lives. According to Cornel West (1993), there are two predominant ways of 
explaining oppression: perspectives that focus solely on “structural constraints” that 
hinder individuals, and perspectives that highlight “behavioral impediments” of 
individuals (p. 11). He argues that each perspective, taken alone, is inadequate and 
incomplete, stating, “We must acknowledge that structures and behavior are 
inseparable, that institutions and values go hand in hand. How people act and live 
and are shaped—through in no way dictated or determined—by the larger
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circumstances in which they find themselves” (p. 12). The fact that some of the 
women I interviewed claimed some level of responsibility in ending the violence in 
their lives does not mean they remove responsibility from larger social institutions. It 
is because of what they often saw as a failure of larger social institutions to help them 
that they believed they could only rely on themselves. Further, believing that they 
have some type of control is clearly important to women’s senses of self—as I have 
demonstrated, many of the women did not think themselves to be weak or helpless. 
This process is central to some women’s preference of a “survivor” identity instead of 
a victim” one, which I will discuss in more-depth later in this chapter.
A second interesting finding that demonstrates that women’s claiming of 
responsibility is not merely a reflection of dominant discourses that blame the victim 
is evidence that women themselves struggle with this position. They either 
demonstrate an awareness that their claims of responsibility are dangerously close to 
blaming the victim or their narratives contain contradictions about how much control 
they see “victims” (and themselves) to have. Karen is a 46 year-old white woman 
who was in a very abusive relationship with her husband of ten years; she was 
separated from him at the time of the interview. She reported that she called the 
police on her husband at least 40 times both during the course of her marriage and 
during their separation. I asked Karen how she related to the term “victim” and this is 
the conversation we had:
Karen. Now, some of it makes m e.. .(sighs).. .1 don’t know how to explain it. It 
makes me sound as if.. ..OK, if  you know the word “victim” and you know that 
you ARE the victim, what are you still doing in there? You know, cause once you 
KNOW that you’re a victim...
Amy: You mean in the relationship?
Karen. In the relationship, you need to get out of it. OK, so if you’re that alert and
169
grown up enough to know that you have become a victim.. ..but the word victim as 
far as when you go to the cops or you go into something like that, (says in 
patronizing voice) “Well, it sounds like to me you were a victim of violence.” Of, 
“You were a victim of.. .your father MUST have done something to you in order 
for you [to be in this situation].” I put a guard up. It’s like, I have to see what I ’ve 
done, not what I’ve done to cause that, but...
Karen struggled here to articulate what she sees as battered women’s responsibility to
get out of the relationship once they “know” they are a victim; she realized that she
was treading into dangerous ground: “It makes me sound as if....” She trailed off
here, but it is clear that she knew that by making the statements she did about
women’s responsibility, she was risking blaming the victim. She unmistakably did
not want to do this, as evidenced by her statement, “It’s like, I have to see what I ’ve
done, not what I’ve done to cause that, but...”
Karen’s difficulty in describing what she means may be due to both the power
and limitations of existing discourses about battered women and victimization. She
recognized the danger in blaming victims (and, I believe, she herself does not think
that women are at fault for the violence they experience) but she was constricted by
the limited images and concepts available to her. Dominant discourses either position
women as to blame for the violence they experience, or as completely innocent,
passive, weak, and unable to control their lives. Neither of these constructions was
suitable for Karen, yet she lacked the language to communicate any middle ground.
There was no way for her to communicate that she was hurt and wronged while also
demonstrating that she had agency in her relationship and her life.
Several women also seemed to contradict themselves at various points in their
narratives when talking about the amount of control or responsibility they perceived
victims to have. For example, consider the exchange I had with Daisy, a 47 year-old
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African American woman who experienced a brutal sexual and physical assault from 
a man she used to date:
Amy: What about the term “victim?” What does that word mean to you and how 
do you relate to it?
Daisy. I felt I was a victim. It means something that happens to you that you can’t 
control, you have no control. I felt like I was a victim, but I’m not going to be in 
that victim frame of mind so I’m not going to be a victim anymore.
Amy: What is the victim frame of mind?
Daisy: When you always put yourself in a situation where you can’t . . ..(trails off). 
Amy: I know it’s a difficult question.
Daisy: Well, you know, like if you’re naive and you go out with some of your 
friends who are more.. .streetwise than you, and they put you in a situation where 
you don’t know what the hell you’re going to do, you’re a victim. ..cause you 
shouldn’t have been there in the first place. You know what kind of people they 
are.. .There are things that you can do to no put yourself in that position.
Amy: And that’s what you feel you’re better at now? Taking actions to prevent 
being in a situation...
Daisy: Yes. Being aware of your surroundings at all times. That’s what I think 
will help you avoid being a victim.
Amy: So you say yourself as a victim at one time but not anymore?
Daisy: Yes. I was, because I was, I was down on my luck. I was feeling 
very.. ..my self esteem was low. I had a good job, I was in a car wreck.. .1 got 
injured, I lost my job, I lost my apartment in the end. I had no one to help me.
At first Daisy said that being a victim means having something happen to you that
you cannot control. However, immediately after this she said that she’s not going to
be in a victim “frame of mind” and thus, won’t be a victim anymore. This indicates
that Daisy does possibly see her victimization as something she could have
controlled. Most likely, this contradiction is the result of two simultaneous beliefs
held by Daisy: (1) the violence she experienced at the hands of a man she called a
“mad, sick, evil person,” was wrong and not something she deserved; and (2) if she
were not “down on her luck” and in a victim “frame of mind” she may have avoided
being hurt.
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Again, it is not clear if Daisy would have avoided the violence, even in she 
was not in a victim “frame or mind.” She even stated that when she dated her 
attacker previously he was “nice” and gave her no indication that he had the 
capability to be violent. She told me that at the time of the attack, she was living in a 
“seedy” hotel and had invited her ex-boyfriend to her room to have a few beers and 
talk. He left, but returned later to retrieve his backpack—which he had left in her 
room-and it was at this point that he attacked her. Perhaps she felt that in different 
circumstances she would not have invited him to her room nor had beers with him. 
Again, this claim could easily be interpreted to mean that Daisy saw her victimization 
as her own fault since she was drinking with him; similar arguments are frequently 
made about women who are victimized, particularly in rape trials.7 However, this 
was not Daisy’s intent. She recognized she is not to blame for her attack. I believe 
that the contradictions in Daisy’s narratives demonstrate that, like Karen, she was 
unable to express herself with current available “victim” discourses. She wished to 
express she has been horribly violated and wrongly harmed. However, she also 
wished to simultaneously express that she is not helpless and powerless, and that she 
does have some control over events in her life. However, mainstream understandings 
of victims made it difficult, if not impossible, for her to do this.
“I Can Be the Victim or I Can Be the Survivor”: Communicating Agency
The limited ways that “victim” is culturally constructed led some of the 
women I interviewed to reject this identity and instead claim the identity of 
“survivor.” According to Dunn (2001), “from the perspective of [victim’s] advocates 
and victims themselves, victims ‘ought’ to transcend their victimization and become
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survivors in the definitional process” (p. 307). Dunn observed a support group for 
stalking victims and she found that many of the women in the group who had left 
their abusive relationships saw themselves—and encouraged other women in the 
group to see themselves—as survivors. The leaders of the support group instructed 
the other women “to resist victimization, to learn how to rely on themselves rather 
than the criminal justice system, and become ‘survivors’” (p. 308). This meant— 
among other things—“getting off their pity pots,” “empowering” themselves, being 
proactive, and allowing themselves to become “depressed or defeated,” and “not 
letting” their abusive partners take their self-esteem. This way of thinking is not just 
common to victim’s advocates, but also to other groups that work with battered 
women, such as shelter staff, therapists and social workers (Profitt, 1996).
Indeed, three of the four women I interviewed who claimed a “survivor” 
identity were, at the time of the interview, either living at a shelter for battered 
women or involved with shelter outreach counseling. The fourth woman was 
involved with counseling through a drug outreach center. Most likely, these women 
were introduced to “survivor talk” through their counseling experiences. However, as 
the women demonstrated, claiming a survivor identity was also a way for the women 
to demonstrate they are not weak and helpless; this became particularly important if 
the women had taken some measures to end the violence in their lives. As I have 
demonstrated, the victim/agent dichotomy positions women who accept a victim 
status as lacking agency. Daisy’s and Karen’s narratives demonstrate that if abused 
women wish to assert they have experienced harm while simultaneously rejecting
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culpability, there are few discursive options for them to communicate that they have
control over their own lives. Using survivor discourse is a way for women to do this.
For example, Florence, a 50 year-old white woman, described herself as “very
vulnerable” the night she met and moved in with the man who eventually became her
husband (whom she was separated from at the time of the interview). When I asked
her what the term “victim” meant to her, we had this interchange:
Florence-. I have a weird philosophy on that. I don’t think the batterer makes you 
the victim; I think you make you the victim. It’s like the glass of water—is it half 
full or half empty? I can be the victim or I can be the survivor. So I choose to be 
the survivor. For me, I . . .  you know, it took me ten years to get here; I’m not 
going to get psychologically or emotionally or even physically out of this 
overnight. But there’s hope. And where there’s hope, I’ll be more than glad to 
apply myself. I refuse to be a victim. A victim is someone, to me, that, if I haul off 
and punch you right now, you go cower in the comer and then go home tonight and 
tell everyone (mimics weeping), “she hit me.” But if you say, “Hey, you know 
what, I’m not going to call the cops on you, but you’re not going to hit me again.” 
You know, or “That slug, that’s nothing, You’re bullshit.” You know, “You’re not 
going to get me down on that.” That’s a survivor; you know: “I’m going to go 
home, put an icepack on my nose, and forget about you, pal.”
Amy. So that s the difference for you between the two? And you see yourself more 
as a survivor than a victim?
Florence: You know, like I said, it’s you know, it’s going to take thousands of 
dollars and years of therapy, but I’ll be damned if I . . .  if I allow myself to be a 
victim, I’ve beaten me for him. I’m doing his job for him, and I’ll not do that.
For Florence, being a survivor meant “applying herself’ and standing up to her 
abuser, which she equated not with calling the police on him, but verbally confronting 
him. She found this preferable to a victim identity, which she saw as doing nothing 
but cowering and complaining. According to Florence, a survivor identity is a more 
empowered one which she identifies with now that she is out of the relationship.
After I asked her to talk about whether or not her experiences have changed how she 
views herself, she stated:
I’m very codependent; I have to work on that. That’s something about me that I 
need to fix, because I think a lot of me staying with him was [because] I wanted to
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fix him. And . . .  you know, I . . .  I don’t look at some of my things . . .  when I was 
with him, I looked at things as my faults. Today, I look at things as characteristic 
traits that I can build on and go up. I have this theory, most of your major car 
wrecks happen because some idiot was sitting in the road in neutral. You know?
Do something! I mean . .  .so, that’s what I want to do. I’m doing one-on-one with 
my counselor. She bought me a workbook, Codependent No More, and I’m just 
eating it up. Well, I tell you what, that man don’t . . .  if and when I finish that 
workbook, he won’t come around me. [Laughs] But I want to . . .  I can either sit in 
it and think about what all I did wrong and what I caused, or maybe if things hadn’t 
happened to him, this wouldn’t happen, or I can say, “He is just pure and simple a 
jerk. I’m out of here. I’m going to go fix the things in me that he broke, or that I 
allowed him to break. If he wants a welcome mat, he can go get one at K-Mart for 
$ 2 .”
Now that she is out of the relationship, Florence sees herself in different terms: “when 
I was with him, I looked at things as my faults. Today, I look at things as 
characteristic traits that I can build on and go up.” She is “working” on the things in 
her that she perceives as “broken.” What appears most important to her is “doing 
something” and it is this expression of agency that led her to claim a survivor identity 
and reject a victim one.
A survivor identity is also, in many ways, a less stigmatized one that that of 
victim. This is demonstrated by Liz. As discussed above, Liz is addicted to speed; 
she also told me that she was physically and sexually abused as a child and has 
mental health issues. Liz and I had the following exchange:
Liz: I’m not strong, but I have.. .I’m street-smart and I’m a survivor. So that’s the 
only thing holding my ass up.
Amy. How do you see yourself as being a survivor?
Liz: Look at my history.
Amy. Just that you’re still here today and...
Liz: My children are well-mannered, well-behaved, well-dressed, you know what I 
mean. They’re well-taken care of and they’re very, very, very loved. Loved more 
than anything in the world. That gives me a lot of satisfaction. And you know, I 
do keep surviving. My morals, I do have my standards. I do have things that I 
won’t do and I’m a good person.
175
For Liz, being a survivor meant that, despite what she has gone through in her life, 
she is still a good parent and she still has “morals” and “standards.” While she said 
she is not strong, she did make clear that she’s a “good person.” For Liz, her 
“history,” alone, demonstrates that she is a survivor.
Nonetheless, the “survivor” identity was not without problems for the women, 
either. Betsy, a 41 year-old white woman who had just left her second abusive 
relationship told me she did not like the term “victim,” because once battered women 
get out of their abusive relationships, they are survivors. I asked her what the term 
victim meant to her and she said, “Like you’re helpless. And in a lot of ways, we 
are when we’re in that situation. We are helpless. But once we get out, we’re not 
helpless anymore.” However, later in the interview she acknowledged “feeling like a 
victim still” because she was still afraid of both her ex-husband and her ex-boyfriend. 
For her, this fear appeared to be at odds with what it meant to be a survivor. Thus, 
despite her assertion that “once we get out we’re not helpless anymore” she said that 
in some ways I am still helpless” because she was still afraid. This appears to be 
where the “survivor” identity fails her.
Summary
This chapter has examined the role of discourses in battered women’s 
decisions to claim or reject the identity of “victim.” I have explored three culturally 
dominant ways of understanding the identity of “victim”: viewing victims as culpable 
for the violence they experience; viewing them as experiencing a harm they couldn’t 
control; and viewing them as passive, weak, and helpless. Battered women appear 
most likely to claim a victim identity to acknowledge they have been harmed or
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wronged at the hands of someone else. However, tor many women, this discourse is 
insufficient as it is inseparable from the notion that victims are unable to control any 
aspect of their lives. While some women claimed a victim identity because their 
experiences with violence left them feeling weak and helpless, most did not perceive 
themselves this way and thus the identity of “victim” became less salient to them. 
These women’s experiences were inconsistent with constructions of passivity and 
helpless; many of them believed they could and did do things to counter or even end 
the violence in their lives, like calling the police on their abusers, fighting back, or 
leaving the relationship. The women recognized that a victim identity is often a 
stigmatized one, associated with blame and/or weakness and helpless; this influences 
their perceptions on the usefulness of portraying themselves as a “victim.”
In Chapter Six, I examine the identity work of the women I interviewed in the 
context of the identity of “battered woman.” Many of the processes employed by the 
women are similar to what I have discussed in this chapter. Thus, because Chapters 
Five and Six are two facets of a larger analysis, I will forego making additional 
conclusions here and will present the combined conclusions for both chapters at the 
end of Chapter Six.
NOTES
While my sample was racially diverse and included women of varied economic backgrounds, no 
patterns emerged to indicate that women of different social locations use discourses surrounding the 
victim or “battered woman” differently. However, a woman’s social location did appear to directly 
influence her identity work with law enforcement officers; I will discuss this in Chapter Seven.
An aspect of a “victim” identity related to the later of these discourses is a person whose voice cannot 
be contested, as such a person is constructed as “morally superior” to non-victims (Lamb, 1999).
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3 This was a common theme that I will discuss more in-depth in Chapter Seven.
4 Merry (1995a) refers to this as “rights talk,” which she defines as “the way rights are commonly used 
as the basis of claims for help or definitions of self in relations to others” (p. 273).
5 I do not wish to indicate here that “responsibility” is synonymous with “blame”; as I will 
demonstrate in this section, the women I interviewed believed there to be a difference between these 
two. However, I use the term “responsibility” for lack of a better term.
6 Another framework that could be used to explain the women’s claims of responsibility is Lemer’s 
(1980) “belief in a just world” theory, which posits that people have a need to believe that the world is 
an orderly, predictable, and just place. In this “just world,” people “get what they deserve” (p. 11). 
Thus, under this perspective, a person who experiences some type of misfortune or troubles is viewed 
as having done something to deserve her or his suffering. If the women I interviewed believed they 
lived in a “just world,” they would likely view their victimization as a result of something they had 
done wrong. However, it is important to note that some researchers (see, for example Kleinke and 
Meyer, 1990) have found that women, regardless of their belief in a just world, tend not to blame or 
denigrate victims of rape. Further, few researchers have examined how the “belief in a just world 
theory” impacts how people view their own victimization.
7 Daisy’s attacker was sentenced to 23 years for aggravated sexual assault.
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CHAPTER SIX
“I Don’t Need the Pity of a ‘Battered Woman”’: Domestic Violence and
Identity Claims
In Chapter Five, I discussed three hegemonic discourses that construct the 
identity of “victim.” There also exist hegemonic discourses that construct the identity 
of battered woman. These discourses are connected in many ways. Not only are 
both of identities “troubled” (Gubrium and Holstein, 2001), but battered women are 
considered “victims” of domestic abuse. However, the battered women’s movement 
and other social institutions that have addressed domestic violence—such as the 
criminal justice system, the media, and academia—have represented the “battered 
woman” in distinct and specific ways. Thus, the identity of “battered woman” is 
more specific and has more narrow connotations than does the identity of “victim.”
In Chapter Five, I examined the ways in which women use hegemonic “victim” 
discourses in their identity work; in other words, I demonstrated the conditions under 
which women in abusive relationships claim or reject the identity of “victim” and 
how they use culturally dominant “victim” discourses in the process. In this chapter, I 
do the same with the identity of “battered woman.” At the end of the chapter, I will 
discuss conclusions relevant to both Chapters Five and Six.
The Battered Woman”—Three Hegemonic Discourses
There are three culturally dominant ways of understanding the identity of 
battered woman that I will discuss. Just as the three hegemonic discourses I 
discussed in Chapter Five surrounding the identity of “victim” are interconnected, so 
are the three discourses I explore surrounding the identity of “battered woman.” The 
first discourse, which I explored in-depth in Chapter Three, constructs battered
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women as “pure victims” (Davies, Lyon, and Monti-Catania, 1998; Loseke, 1992). 
The second discourse, arguably a product of the first, depicts the “battered woman” as 
powerless and helpless. The third discourse, which serves as the basis for current 
understandings of domestic violence by the battered women’s movement, portrays 
domestic violence as an issue of power and control and constructs the “battered 
woman” as someone who experiences multiple types of abuse.
Loseke (2001) discusses narratives (or “formula stories”) that “can become 
virtual templates for how lived experience may be defined” (p. 107). She maintains 
that the “wife abuse” formula story can be an “interpretive resource” for women, in 
that it “helps women conceive of themselves in terms of the identity or type of person 
that has come to be called the ‘battered woman’” (p. 107). Loseke focuses one 
particular narrative surrounding domestic violence—what she calls the “wife abuse 
formula story”—and its role in a support group for battered woman. My work in this 
chapter is similar to Loseke s; however, instead of focusing on only one 
understanding of the battered woman” and the way in which women use it in their 
identity work, I examine three culturally dominant narratives—which I refer to as 
hegemonic discourses and the way in which women use them to structure their 
selves.
Discourse One: The “Pure Victim”
As Davies, Lyon, and Monti-Catania (1998) have argued, the “pure victim” 
representation was used by the battered women’s movement to counter discourses of 
blame, create sympathy for battered women, and bring increased public awareness to 
the problem of woman battering. This image involves several characteristics. To
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briefly review, under this construction bauered women are portrayed in the following 
ways: as wives who adhere to traditional gender roles and are economically and 
emotionally dependent on their abusers; as passive and not themselves violent; as 
experiencing frequent and severe violence; and as extremely fearful of their abuser.
A major part of this construction involves depicting battered women as unable to 
leave the relationship without outside intervention (Loseke, 1992).
While none of the women that I interviewed discussed all of the 
characteristics of the pure victim” when talking about what the term “battered 
woman” meant to them, many of the women mentioned at least one, and sometimes 
several, of these characteristics. A few reflected the notion that battered women are 
wives who adhere to traditional gender roles. For example, Jewel, a 37 year-old 
African American woman who had just moved across the country to get away from 
her abusive fiance, described how—prior to her own experiences with violence—she 
viewed a battered woman” to be: “.. .a woman, mostly a woman at home, a 
homemaker who always has a bruise or a black eye, you know, who walks around 
skittish... Jewel demonstrated that at one time she believed a battered woman to be 
a woman who stays at home, adhering to traditional gender roles. As I will discuss 
later in this chapter, Jewel reported that eventually her understanding of a “battered 
woman” broadened and this led her to claiming the identity for herself.
The most common aspect of the “pure victim” construction reflected in the 
women s narratives is the belief that to be a battered woman means experiencing 
severe physical violence. Several of the women, although they themselves did not 
believe this, demonstrated awareness that this is a common cultural conception.
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Take, for example, Gina, who stated that she hated the term “battered woman”
because it sounds like you have to be “battered and beaten” to be taken seriously.
Other of the women’s own conceptions of “battered woman” involved the belief that
to be a battered woman means experiencing primarily physical violence. Because
they did not see the violence they experienced as falling into this category, they
rejected the identity of “battered woman” for themselves. I asked Barbara how she
related to the term battered woman” and we had the following exchange:
Barbara'. I still don’t see myself as a battered woman.
Amy: So how do you see that term?
Barbara: I see that as somebody who ends up in the hospital, who is repeatedly hit. 
Amy: So you don’t relate to the term because that’s not what happened to you? 
Barbara: Right. Although I feel like I should, but maybe it’s because [the abuse 
from my ex-husband] has been more emotional than physical. And I think of 
battered as being more physical.
Barbara demonstrated the power of discourse that constructs the “battered woman” as 
someone who suffers serious physical abuse. She described a battered woman as 
someone who “ends up in the hospital” and said that while she “feels like she should” 
identify with the term “battered woman,” she does not because her husband was more 
emotionally abusive than physically abusive.
Tammy also was not able to definitively claim or reject the identity of
battered woman.” When I asked her if she saw herself as a “battered woman” she 
said the following:
Um, yeah. I had a lot of bruises. I never had black eyes or anything, I used to get 
my lip cut all the time. He would hit me and I’d be bleeding from my lip. I’ve 
heard of women being really, really beat up and I was never beat up to where I 
couldn’t move or anything like that, I never had no bones broken, but I had bruises 
and stuff. But, I don’t know.. .1 don’t think I see myself as a battered woman I 
was never REALLY beat up.
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At first Tammy said she did see herself as a “battered woman,” by replying “urn, 
yeah” when asked. She described how her boyfriend hit her and repeatedly gave her 
a bloody lip, she even stated, “I had a lot of bruises.” However, interspersed 
throughout this commentary are statements that also downplay the extent of the 
violence she experienced: “I never had black eyes.. ” and “I never had no bones 
broken.” Ultimately, she decided to reject the identity after concluding “I was never 
REALLY beat up. Tammy clearly struggled to make sense of her experiences with 
the use of the “battered woman” identity. The idea that violence must be severe for 
someone to be a “battered woman” appeared to hold much weight with her. She 
seemingly rejected the identity of “battered woman” in order to minimize the 
seriousness of her own situation.
A final aspect of the pure victim” construction involves portraying the 
battered woman” as unable to leave the relationship without outside intervention or 
assistance. This notion was also reflected by several of the women I interviewed and 
again, women often used this as a way to reject the identity of “battered woman.” 
Shondra, a 55 year-old African American woman, was physically assaulted one 
evening by her fiance in what she described as an isolated incident. She had reported 
the assault to the police the morning after it occurred, and a warrant was issue for her 
fiance s arrest. She never told her fiance about this and it was not until months later 
that he was picked up on the outstanding warrant. At the time of the interview, she 
had not spoken to him since he had been arrested. I asked her if she saw herself as a 
battered woman and she replied that a battered woman is someone who is “trapped” 
in an abusive relationship and cannot get out, and this is not her. Shondra seemed
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unsure about whether her relationship would continue. However, she clearly felt that 
if she wanted to leave the relationship, she could. This led her to reject the “battered 
woman identity, as her understanding of such an identity is a woman who “can’t get 
out of the relationship. Shondra’s words demonstrate that a consequence of the 
“pure victim” construct is that the “battered woman” has become someone who is 
unable to act in her own best interests.
Discourse Two: Battered Women as Powerless
As I have discussed, while the image of battered women as “pure victims” 
was generated to gain public sympathy for the plight of battered women and 
communicate the need for social institutions to assist women who are abused, it has 
effectively rendered the “battered woman” helpless; this has become another 
culturally dominant understanding of the “battered woman.” Loseke (1992) writes:
...[the “battered woman”] representation furnishes a mandate for intervention 
since, in the final analysis, a battered woman type of person requires help if she is 
to be able to remove herself from her plight. After all, she is constructed as a 
person who “cannot cope with the outside world without some assistance and 
intervention,” as “too demoralized to assert herself,” as “bewildered and helpless ” 
and as overwhelmingly passive and unable to act on her own behalf.” (p. 28)
This construction of the “battered woman” is strongly tied to discourse constructing
the “victim” as weak and helpless. Again, while both of these representations were
originally created to remove blame and/or responsibility from a person, the end result
has been the creation of a subject lacking power or agency. In Chapter Five, I
demonstrated that many of the women I interviewed recognized that “victims” are
often viewed as weak and helpless and some of these women subsequently rejected
this identity, as it did not match their experiences or perceptions of themselves. The
narratives of the women reveal that a very similar process occurred with the identity
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of “battered woman.” As Robin stated of the term, “there’s just a real sensation of
hopelessness when you hear that word. I don’t know how to describe it.”
Over one-third of the women equated the term “battered woman” with
helplessness and passivity and this most often led them to reject the identity for
themselves. For example, Veronica, a 24 year-old African American woman who has
been in several physically violent relationships and, at the time of our interview, was
in a relationship with a man who was occasionally verbal abusive, said the following:
.. .Ok, “battered woman.” I mean, to m e.. .1 mean, it means what it says. But I just 
don’t apply it to me because.. .1 know I can defend myself; I know I can. So it’s 
like to m e.. .even dealing with the [criminal justice] system.. .I’d rather take care of 
it myself. I don’t even want to deal with the police.. .now, if something gets bad, I 
wouldn’t even call them myself. I would just see what I could do, wait it out, and 
just silently call around and see how I could get out of here. That’s how I would 
deal with it.
For Veronica, a “battered woman” is someone not able to deal with violence or abuse 
on her own. She, however, did not appear to have any doubt that she could deal with 
the situation herself. She stated that she does not want to deal with the criminal 
justice system or call the police, not only because she had prior bad experiences with 
them (which I will address in the next chapter), but because she “knows” that she can 
“defend herself.” All of this led her to reject the identity of “battered woman.”
Like Veronica, Paula also did not see herself as a battered woman. Paula and 
her husband had been in a relationship for eleven years. He had been physically 
violent on one occasion in the beginning of their relationship. One evening several 
months prior to my interview with her, however, her husband got drunk and became 
verbally abusive. She threw some water on him and he became violent, kicking and
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choking her. She then ended their relationship. After I asked her what she thinks of
when she hears the word, “battered woman” we had the following interchange:
Paula: The victim of.. .a woman maybe more frail than me that.. .see, I 
wouldn’t . . .1 don’t know. I would never consider myself a battered woman. I mean, 
the way that all came down, yeah, but I mean, when I think of a battered woman, 
it’s something that’s been going on and a woman that’s left herself and not stood 
up to the guy or whatever. And I would be, like, “Come on!” [Laughs] You know, I 
mean...
Amy: OK. Someone who’s more passive, maybe?
Paula: Yeah.
Amy: And you don’t see yourself as that.
Paula: No.
Paula said that a battered woman is someone who is “frail,” has “left herself,” and 
hasn’t “stood up” to her abusive partner. She did not see herself in this depiction and 
thus, she also rejected the identity of “battered woman” for herself.
While Paula, like Veronica, saw a battered woman as not being able to stand
up for herself or defend herself, she also stated that a battered woman is someone who
has “left herself.” This reflects Loseke’s (1992) argument that the “battered woman”
is often viewed as so beaten down that she has no sense of self: as “too demoralized
to assert herself’ (p. 28). Such an idea is also central to Lenore Walker’s (1979)
notion of “learned helplessness,” which I discussed in Chapter Three. Walker argues
that repeated violence diminishes women’s self-esteem and leaves them passive and
unable to care for themselves. Paula was not the only woman I interviewed who
reflected this idea. For example, Gloria said the following:
Well, I think battered woman can be a physically abused woman or an emotionally 
abused woman. And I think “battered” has a lot to do with the self-esteem and the 
breaking-down of your self when someone’s abusing you in whichever way it is.
And so, I don’t know. That’s what I think of “battered.” I mean, it could be a 
physical thing, like,- you know, you physically got beat up. Or it could be an 
emotional thing where he s telling you, “You’re nothing; you’re never going to 
be.. .you’re a loser and nobody wants you, and...” You know, the whole works.
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Gloria’s conception of a “battered woman” moves beyond the “pure victim” 
discourse in that, for her, a battered woman may experience more than just severe 
physical violence: she said, “it could be an emotional thing.” However, she did see 
“battered” as involving a loss of “self-esteem.” When I asked her if she saw herself 
as a battered woman she replied, “my personality is so strong, I couldn’t . . .  I 
couldn’t even see myself, like, as a person who is getting beat up or a person who was 
allowing someone else to emotionally tear me down. So, no, I couldn’t . . .  uh-uh, I 
couldn’t claim that I’m a battered woman.” Gloria rejected the identity of “battered 
woman” for the same reasons she rejected the identity of “victim” (discussed in 
Chapter Five). She views herself as “strong,” and like Paula and Veronica, believes 
that she is able to stand up to her abusive ex-boyfriend. She stated that is not going to 
“allow” anyone to “emotionally tear her down.”
Veronica, Paula, and Gloria have all experienced verbal abuse from their 
partners; further, Paula and Gloria have also experienced physical violence.
However, none of these women saw themselves as battered women. For them, being 
a “battered woman” involves something beyond experiencing abuse from a partner: it 
also involves passivity and a loss of self-esteem. Thus, their interpretations of the 
identity of “battered woman” reflected hegemonic discourse that positions battered 
women as helpless and weak. However, there was also an underlying sense 
(particularly for Paula and Gloria) that a “battered woman” is someone who “lets” 
their partner abuse them. Several other women also reflected this belief. For 
example, Liz said that the term “battered woman” does not describe her. When I 
asked why, we had the following interaction:
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Liz: Because I’m not gonna let any man beat me up like that. I’m not. I don’t need 
[the] pity of a “battered woman.”
Amy. So you feel like that word evokes pity?
Liz: Mmm-hmm.. .I’m not being beat up. I’m being emotionally abused and 
that’s a long scar. Physical [abuse] heals. [Emotional abuse] doesn’t leave marks 
forever, but.. .it’s a whole new ball game.
Clearly, some of the women I interviewed distanced themselves from the identity of
‘battered woman” because they believe that battered women, for whatever reason,
“let” their partners beat them up.1 The women’s rejection of the identity was done in
order to demonstrate that they are not passive and weak.
The narratives of the women discussed in this section also highlight the
complexities in determining what actually constitutes a “battered woman.” As
Belknap (2001) writes:
.. .there is not complete agreement over what qualifies as battering. Researchers 
have suggested disagreement over such issues as to whether “only” psychological 
battering makes a woman battered. There is also disagreement as to whether a 
woman who is hit “only” once is battered. Some researchers’ definitions of 
battering require a systemic occurrence where battering is an ongoing aspect of the 
relationship, (p. 269)
According to the “pure victim” construction, a “battered woman” is someone who
experiences ongoing physical battering and has difficulty leaving the relationship.
Many of the women I interviewed reflected this belief; the majority of women who
had experienced violence from their partners on “only” one or two occasions were the
least likely to see themselves as battered women. This included both women who
ended their relationships because of these one or two violent incidents (like Paula and
Gloria), and women who believed the one or two incidents they experienced were an
anomaly in their relationship and not likely to happen again (like Veronica).
Other women also believed that battering is equated with ongoing, physical
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violence. Lauren’s boyfriend hit her in the head and after this incident he became
increasingly emotionally abusive, which led her to break up with him. She said the
following when I asked her if she saw herself as a “battered woman”:
No, I really consider that more a woman who’d go back. And be hit again, and then 
leave and be like, oh he loves me, he won’t do it” and then go back and be hit 
again And in a sense, I did that, because I was back the first time after he hit me.
nd he never, between those episodes he never hit me or anything, but became 
increasingly violent and as soon as I realized what was going on, one month, it was
Lauren saw a “battered woman” as someone “who’d go back” repeatedly, and
experience multiple incidents of physical violence. While she acknowledged she
“was back” after he hit her, she rejected the identity of “battered woman” since she
ended the relationship because of his escalating emotional and verbal abuse. Daisy,
who was sexually assaulted by a man she used to date, expressed similar sentiments.
We had the following interchange after I asked her if she thought she was a “battered 
woman”:
? UlSy'}  d°n>t ruelate t0 that word because I’ve never been in a battering situation I 
have friends who are in that situation, where men are beating them, and I cannot 
understand how they sit there and let someone do that to them. When there’s 
physical, and mental, I cannot understand.
Amy. So for you it means something long term, both physical and mental?
Dmsy. Yes, I think it’s something that you live with every day. Every day you feel 
like you have no choice but to stay there. And I’m not in that.
Daisy, like Lauren, saw a “battered woman” as experiencing long term a b u se -
something they “live with every day.” And, as she stated, “I’m not in that.” The
narratives of the women I interviewed illustrate that, for many of them, being a
“battered woman” means experiencing ongoing abuse. Women view a “battered
woman” as someone who stays in the relationship— why the “battered woman” stays
does not seem to matter. Whether she stays because of “low self-esteem,” fear,
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because she “feels she has no choice,” or for social structural reasons, the point is that 
she is somehow “trapped” in the relationship and is unable to leave. Women who did 
not see themselves as helpless or powerless to leave were much more likely to reject 
the identity of “battered woman.”
Several women who experienced one or two incidents of violence, like
Veronica, did choose to remain in their relationships. None of these women saw
themselves as a “battered woman” because they viewed the incident as isolated. For
example, Ann, a 36 year-old white woman and her long-term boyfriend, Alan, were
out drinking one night and got into a fight on the street. When he punched her in the
chest, she ran to a nearby hotel and a desk clerk called the police. Ann said that Alan
had never been violent before. She separated from him for awhile and then got back
together with him after he stopped drinking and went to anger management classes.
She said that since then, there’s been “no problems” and “everything’s fine.”
Veronica said she has never thought of herself as a “battered woman.” She described
how after the incident happened she did research on the internet to see what the
typical battered woman” is like and she concluded her relationship did not fit into 
this profile.
Ann told me that in college she worked at a shelter for battered women and
she had always thought if a man hit her she would end the relationship. She said 
the following:
And after [the incident] I thought, what’s wrong with me that I, you know, made up
, ;  ow’ cause 1 was always the type of person that would say “Oh
my god, ifaguy  ever hits a woman, that’s IT. No matter what the reason is or 
anything. They can never, ever go back with them.”
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I asked Ann why she thought she ended up getting back together with Alan if this was 
her belief and she replied:
Well, because, every situation is different. And, you know, hopefully what 
happened will never again happen. I can make up all kinds of excuses: Alan was 
drunk, I was drunk, I provoked him, whatever.. ..I mean, he still did it and it’s still 
wrong. But, you know, he did go to counseling, he did quit drinking, um,
he..... and 1 1 started to think, well, maybe not everybody who hits someone
does it again. I mean, who says it HAS to be like that.
Ann reported wondering what was “wrong” with her that she “made up with” Alan: 
she was obviously aware of dominant discourse that negatively depicts situations 
women who “stay.” She told me that she herself had thought a woman who is hit by 
her partner should never stay in the relationship. Yet, she said that Alan went to 
counseling and quit drinking and she has contemplated the idea that “maybe not 
everybody who hits someone does it again.” For these reasons, she decided to stay in 
her relationship. However, Ann rejected the identity of “battered woman” for herself 
because she sees Alan’s hitting her as a one time incident and she did not see herself 
fitting into the profile of a “typical battered woman.”
Discourse Three: Battering as About Power and Control
As I have demonstrated, the battered women’s movement politicized domestic 
violence. As Schneider (2000) argues, part of this involved situating battering within 
a “larger context of ‘power and control’” (p. 22). She writes, “The ‘power and 
control wheel developed by the Domestic Abuse Prevention Project in Duluth 
identifies interrelated dimensions of physical abuse, economic abuse, coercion and 
threats, intimidation, emotional abuse (using isolation, minimizing, denying, and 
blaming), and abusing male privilege” (p. 12). Thus, under this perspective, battering 
can (and usually does) involve much more than physical violence. While the “pure
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victim” discourse also recognizes that batterers use more than physical abuse to 
control and dominate their partners, it emphasizes the “extreme” physical violence 
that the “battered woman” experiences (Davies, Lyon, and Monti-Catania, 1998). 
Therefore, I argue that the “power and control” discourse constructs a much broader 
conception of the battered woman” than does the “pure victim” discourse. 
Understanding a battered woman” to be a victim of more than just severe physical 
violence was the most common theme reflected by the women I interviewed.
Over half of the women alluded to the belief that a “battered woman” is 
someone who experiences multiple types of abuse. Take, for example, the words of 
Mary. Battered means much more than just physical. It means mental, verbal, and 
.. .these kind of men, they find you when you’re really vulnerable.. .And they prey 
on that. They’re like predators.” Like Mary, many of the women’s conception of 
“battered woman” included more than just physical harm; they described the 
following types of abuse: “emotional,” “mental,” “verbal,” “sexual,” 
“psychological,” and “financial.” They reported being kicked, choked, slapped, hit, 
punched, burned with a cigarette, and sexually assaulted. The women spoke of 
having broken bones, bruises, black eyes, scratches, and missing teeth. One woman 
described how her husband came very close to killing her. The women had 
property destroyed, broken, and burned. They were stalked, followed, harassed, 
and threatened with weapons. They spoke of having to turn over their paychecks, 
not being allowed to work, and having their spending habits monitored. One 
woman described hiding packages of meat in her young son’s pants so her husband 
wouldn t beat her for spending too much money at the grocery store. The women
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were told they were psychotic, hysterical, crazy, and were called “bitches,”
“whores,” and “sluts.” Other women spoke of being isolated and not being allowed
to get the mail, use the phone, or have contact with friends and family. A few
women spoke of incidents where they were kicked out of the car or the house.
Carla summed up her conception of what it means to be a “battered woman” with
her statement that a battered woman is “not recognized as a human being.”
Just under half of the women I interviewed claimed the identity of “battered
woman.” Almost all of the women who claimed the identity used discourse that
framed battering as an issue of power and control. Women seemed most likely to use
this discourse in order to show the harm of violence that is not physical in nature.
This was seemingly done to counter “pure victim” discourse that depicts battered
women as most damaged by severe physical abuse. For example, Karen said the
following of a “battered woman”:
.. .She’s not battered, she’s broken. She’s broken in more ways then battered, I 
think. She’s broken emotionally and physically and he’s broken down every part 
of her...that has to be mended. So she’s battered, yeah. But.. .battered means 
bruised. When you first think of battered you think of bruised. So, unless [women 
are] bruised, too many people [don’t see] them as battered. But they’re battered if 
they’re emotionally, you know, shot down, or left out on the street on their own... 
The mental and verbal abuse.. .they’re battered in so many ways. When I .. .hear 
the word battered, the only thing I think of is there’s this woman who’s black and 
blue all over. But the woman that’s battered is battered EVERYWHERE, [on the 
inside], from head to toe.
Karen saw herself as a “battered woman,” although she did struggle with the identity;
for her, it had limited cultural connotations. She was aware of people’s tendency to
focus on the physical aspect of battering, such as bruising. However, she made clear
that a “battered woman” is also abused “emotionally,” “mentally,” and “verbally”: a
woman whose partner has “broken down every part of her.”
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For many women, stressing the impact of the non-physical abuse they
experienced appeared to be important. Two women discussed the abuse of their
“souls.” For example, Ellen reported that her ex-husband was very controlling and
verbally abusive. He also broke things in their house when he got angry. When I
asked her if she saw herself as a battered woman the following exchange ensued:
Ellen: My soul has been battered. You know, my soul, I sold my soul to him. I 
sold my soul. Anything that was important to me, I relinquished. I gave 
everything that I had, physically, emotionally, financially, to this man, who had 
everything he needed...
Amy: Do you see yourself as being battered emotionally?
Ellen: Emotionally. I don’t see myself as being physically battered because he 
never [hit her].. .although it’s really not okay to smash things.
As I have demonstrated, some of the women whose idea of a “battered woman” was
strongly influenced by the “pure victim” discourse rejected the identity because they
did not experience severe physical violence. However, Ellen did see herself as a
“battered woman” despite the fact that her ex-husband was not physically abusive to
her. While she acknowledged that smashing property is “not okay,” she focused most
on the emotional abuse she experienced.
Florence expressed a similar sentiment. However, unlike Ellen, Florence did 
experience physical violence from her partner, Dan. In fact, at times it was quite 
severe: one incident involved Dan beating her so badly that he ruptured her spleen 
and she required surgery and a three-week hospital stay. Another time Dan and 
Florence were traveling with a co-worker of theirs. Dan forced Florence to have sex 
with the co-worker in exchange for drugs. After the two men passed out, Florence 
hitch-hiked a ride to a nearby city; she was staying at a battered women’s shelter
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when I interviewed her. We had the following conversation after I asked her what the 
term “battered woman” meant to her:
Florence A lot of people look at the term ‘battered woman’ as being physically 
hit. I don’t look at it that way. I look at it mentally, emotionally. My soul gets 
raped. You know. He’s not laying a hand on me right now, and I feel battered.
Amy: After...as a result of everything that’s happened?
Florence: Oh, yeah. [At the shelter] they’re thoroughly convinced that I’ve got 
post-traumatic stress disorder. (Discusses how she doesn’t want to take any 
prescription medication and will have to deal with things on her own).
Amy: So you see yourself.. .how you relate to the term “battered woman” is that 
you see yourself still.. .being battered now by the aftermath of it all?
Florence: Oh, sure. Sure. I’m the one that had to hitchhike with a truck driver You 
know. I didn’t know what was going to happen to me. But, see what I was 
leaving a man that would threaten to beat me if I don’t sleep with his friends.
You know. I’d rather [have] some unknown guy rape me.
Florence described still feeling battered by her ex-boyfriend even though, “he’s not
laying a hand on her.” She said of Dan, “He’s hurt me more than I love him, now.”
Here she was referring to emotional hurt, which she viewed as worse than anything
physical that Dan did to her. Battered women commonly report psychological and
emotional abuse to be the most damaging (Belknap, 2001). Indeed, this was true for
many of the women I interviewed. Again, this served not only as a direct challenge to
discourse that frames battery as primarily about physical violence, but it also was a
way for women to assert that their experiences with non-physical abuse are extremely 
damaging.
Battered Women and Stigma
There appeared to be similar interpretive processes surrounding the identity of 
“battered woman” as there were for the identity of “victim”: contradictions appeared 
between several of the women’s understandings of what it meant to be a “battered 
woman and their own identity claims.2 For example, Nicki, a 24 year-old African
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American, was separated from her husband Thomas at the time of our interview. He 
had gone to Nicki’s house one day because he was upset with her that she had gone 
out to a club the previous night. They got into a verbal altercation and she reported 
that he pushed her a few times. At one point, he picked up a knife, but she said it was 
not done to threaten her. Nicki was on the phone with her sister when Thomas came 
over and Nicki’s sister, after hearing how upset Thomas was, called the police. Nicki 
stated that this was not the first time that the police were called because of Thomas’ 
actions—she had called the police on him a year ago when he hit her. Nicki said that 
a “battered woman” is not just someone who is physically beaten, but is also 
“verbally and emotionally” beaten. However, when I asked Nicki if she identified 
with the term “battered woman,” she said “no” since Thomas never “got really 
physical” with her; he pushed her around and yelled at her but never really hit her 
with his fists. While Nicki at first provided a broad definition of the identity of 
battered woman,” that included verbal and emotional abuse, she later reverted to 
discourse framing battered women as only experiencing severe violence. She rejected 
the identity of “battered woman” for herself, because, while she said Thomas pushed 
her and yelled at her, he never hit her with a fist.
Darla, a 36 year-old African American woman who had left her abusive 
boyfriend at the time of our interview, reported that her boyfriend had “slapped [her] 
a couple, punched [her], and things like that.” Additionally, he threw a glass at her on 
one occasion. She also described how he tried to pressure her into buying drugs for 
him and was extremely jealous of her relationships with other male friends. She 
understood a “battered woman” as someone who has “been through emotional and
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verbal besides physical. It’s all of the above.” I asked her if she thought this
described her experiences with her ex-boyfriend and she replied, “Yes, uh-huh. It
really did.” However, when I asked Darla if  she saw herself as a “battered woman”
she stated, “I really don’t know. I haven’t really looked at it like that.” Darla defined
battered woman in a way that would seemingly describe her own experiences.
However, while she did not directly reject the identity as Nicki did, she also did not
readily apply it to herself. While she says that “in [her] heart of hearts” she “feels”
like a “battered woman” she is hesitant, on some level, to describe herself in these 
terms.
It is not immediately clear why women like Nicki and Darla fail to claim the 
identity of “battered woman” despite describing it in a way that seemed to match their 
lived experiences. Just as many of the women demonstrated that “victim” discourses 
are narrow and constraining, some of them appeared to see “battered woman” 
discourses in the same light. I have already discussed the fact that the understanding 
of battered woman offered by some of the women I interviewed involved an 
association with weakness and helplessness and this is one reason women rejected the 
identity. My interviews also reveal that the identity of “battered woman”-like the 
identity of victim —is a stigmatized one for some of the women. At Liz stated, “I 
don’t need pity of a battered woman.”
In a similar vein, Carla said the following when I asked her if she saw herself 
as a battered woman”: “The term is very.. .it covers it, but I hate to have that label.
It just sounds like just another label, but not too cool.” I asked her what was negative
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about the term for her and she related the following incident that occurred while she 
was staying at a shelter for battered women:
The things that I don’t like about [the term] “battered woman” is sometimes you 
look down on [battered women], and you’re treated like a child because that kind of 
happened like at the safehouse. One of the ladies came in, one of the advocates or 
whatever, and obviously she doesn’t have that much training on women’s studies or 
anything else. And I know that. It doesn’t matter. All [advocates] have to do is 
have a good heart and do what [they] have to do. But she’s like, “oh, everything’s 
going good at group today. The girls have been so good. The girls haven’t been 
any problem. The girls have been good today” (Saying “girls” in a snide way). And 
here I am sitting there and here I am fifty-eight and a Black woman. And I said, 
excuse me, but I’m not a girl, I’m a woman. Can I be a woman today?”
Carla’s words indicated that she believes battered women are looked down upon
and viewed as unable to take care of themselves. She did not like the patronizing
attitude of the shelter advocate who called the clients “girls” and talked about them
as one might talk about a group of children. Carla took offense to this, using her
age and racial identity to assert that she is a woman, not a girl.
Shifting Interpretations 
Some of the women I interviewed described how their understandings of their 
own experiences shifted after the way they defined “battered woman” changed.
Often, the women’s original idea of what was constituted a “battered woman” 
reflected the pure victim discourse; thus, they believed a battered woman was 
someone who experienced severe physical violence. Holding this image at first 
resulted in the women not seeing their own experiences as abusive or problematic and 
consequently, they did not view themselves as “battered women.” However, after 
becoming introduced to the discourse of power and control that frames battering more 
broadly, the women’s notions shifted and they came to view their experiences 
differently.
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For example, Beth a 48 year-old white woman, characterized the abuse she
experienced from her ex-fiance, George as primarily emotional. The following
excerpt from her narrative illustrates how she came to recognize herself as a “battered 
woman”:
Well, now.. .battered to me means they’ve just totally tom you down, physically 
and emotionally. I never realized [that], “Battered woman” to me prior to meeting 
George was someone with bruises on them, you know, battering seemed more like 
a physical thing than an emotional thing. And in fact when I got this [brochure] 
from [the battered women’s shelter] and it went into some of the 
psychological.. .[George has] broken.. .everything that he has returned to me has 
een broken or damaged. And I have boxes full of evidence on that. That’s one of 
the things in [the brochure]: Isolating you. I never realized, in the beginning he 
didn’t seem that way to me, and my girlfriend said something about [him] being 
controlling, and I said really? Because I didn’t see. Then when I got this 
[brochure] and I saw George in every single one of these definitions, I went “oh 
my God!” Now to me battering-even though I have had some bruises on the 
occasion—I have been much more battered emotionally and as a woman, with the 
dirty, ugly, the verbal harassment that he’s done to me. The other women [he’s 
been with] two days after he kicks me out or I leave or whatever the case may be 
he has another woman in there immediately. That’s battering. Holding [my carl’
I m now without transportation. You know, that’s battering.
Here, Beth described the process of how she changed the way she viewed her own
experiences after being introduced to a “new” discursive construction of a “battered
woman. She reported that at one point she believed battering to be only about
physical violence. Then, she received information from a local battered women’s
shelter. The brochure, which constructed battering as about power and control, listed
signs of a battering relationship; included in these signs were behaviors such as
isolating a woman and emotionally abusing her. This challenged Beth’s previously
held conception of a “battered woman.” She described recognizing George in “every
one of the definitions” on the brochure. This gave her a new interpretive framework
through which to understand his behavior. She came to see things he did like holding
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her car and having sexual relationships with other women as battering. This new, 
broader definition of a “battered woman” that Beth adopted after looking at the 
brochure resulted in her claiming of the identity for herself, when she previously did 
not.
Ellen had a similar experience as Beth. Her introduction to a “new” discourse 
or way of understanding “battered woman” came from a friend who had worked in 
the domestic violence field and who witnessed how Ellen’s husband, Curt, treated 
her. Ellen described what happened one night after she had invited her friend and her 
friend’s husband over for dinner:
.. .Curt was furious that I’d invited someone to the house. And so he just started 
making terrible jokes about me in front of them, really, and I didn’t even realize it 
was a problem. I was so used to it, you know. And then he didn’t laugh at their 
jokes, and he got really mad and went storming out of the house, you know, and 
[my friend] said, Ellen, I used to work in domestic violence. Do you suspect that? 
I’m really worried about you. I think you’re really meant to be hurt here.” I was 
totally shocked. I couldn’t imagine she was talking about me.
I asked Ellen why she didn’t see herself as a battered woman. She replied: “I thought
it meant you really had to get the shit beaten out of you. I never saw myself in that
role [with Curt], I never saw myself in that role with my first husband. I just thought
they were mean and they wouldn’t listen to me.” Ellen said that she never saw Curt’s
emotional abuse as problematic. She thought his behavior, and the abusive behavior
of her first husband, meant they were “mean” and “wouldn’t listen to her.” Further,
she professed to thinking a battered woman was someone who was severely
physically abused. For these reasons, she did not see herself as a “battered woman.”
Through her friend, however, Ellen was introduced to a new interpretive framework
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and was thus given an alternative way of understanding her experiences. This 
resulted in her claiming the identity of “battered woman.”
Finally, Jewel also changed her understanding of what it means to be a 
“battered woman,” which led not only to her claiming the identity but also changed 
how she looked at other women. Earlier in this chapter I quoted her saying that at one 
point she believed a battered woman” to be a “skittish” homemaker who “always has 
a bruise or a black eye.” Because she held this image, she did not see her own 
experiences as abuse: “I thought well, I've got too much wherewithal about me to be a 
battered woman. It's not that bad. Battered means bad.” Gradually, Jewel came to 
realize that her fiance, who had hit her in the face, repeatedly yelled at her, and 
physically threatened her daughter, was “abusive.” She said that her understanding of 
a “battered woman” has now changed:
Now my picture of a battered woman is it could be a teacher. I look at a lot of 
people, professional people, people that come into my stores to get their cigarettes.
I work in a cigarette store, and I wonder, I look at them and they're in their great 
looking suits and their heels, their hair is done, and I wonder what kind of pain they 
have to endure when they go home, if any at all. So a battered woman to me is 
anybody, woman who endures any kind of abuse. Physical, psychological. And 
most times it’s the people that we won't ever think it will be.
Originally, Jewel thought she had too much “wherewithal” to be a battered woman
and that her experiences were not “bad” enough to qualify her in this way. After
Jewel’s fiance threatened her daughter, she realized there was something wrong. She
started talking to people about what she was going through, and they convinced her
that her fiance was abusive. After this, she left him and went to a shelter for battered
women. Jewel said her understanding of a “battered woman” had changed and now
she sees that abuse can by “psychological” as well as “physical.” Her thoughts about
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who might be a “battered woman” have broadened and she has come to recognize that 
battered women may be “people that we won’t ever think it will be.”
Summary
In Chapters 5 and 6 ,1 have examined the role of discourses in women’s 
decisions to claim or reject the identities of “victim” and “battered woman.” In the 
past several decades, numerous domestic violence discourses have arisen from social 
institutions such as the battered woman’s movement, the media, the criminal justice 
system, and academia. While these discourses at times overlap and at times diverge, 
each offers its own unique representation of a victim of domestic violence. Thus, 
there are multiple ways to understand and interpret the identities of “victim” and 
“battered woman”; all of these are available discursive options for battered women to 
draw from in their attempts at self-construction and self-presentation (or “identity 
work”). The women I interviewed were introduced to these different discourses by a 
variety of means, including: friends and family; stays at battered women’s shelters; 
books and other written materials; counseling and therapy; and involvement in the 
criminal justice system.
I have presented three culturally dominant ways of understanding the identity 
of “victim”: viewing victims as culpable for the violence they experience; viewing 
them as experiencing a harm they couldn’t control; and viewing them as passive, 
weak, and helpless. Similarly, there are multiple ways of understanding the identity 
of battered woman : as ‘pure victims”; as powerless; and as enmeshed in a larger 
pattern of power and control. As I have demonstrated, there is some overlap between 
these discourses; viewing victims as passive, weak, and helpless, is very similar to
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understanding battered women as powerless. Further, there are understandings of 
both “victim” and “battered woman” that focus on harm, abuse, or wrongdoing. 
However, as I have also shown, these identities are not identical.
The women I interviewed demonstrated an acute awareness of the multiple 
ways that both of these identities have been constructed and at times, their 
understanding of what it means to be a “victim” and a “battered woman” mirrored 
hegemonic discourses. The women appeared most likely to claim the identities of 
victim and/or battered woman to acknowledge they have been harmed, wronged, 
or hurt. There are numerous additional possible reasons that women may chose to 
structure their selves in this way. Holstein and Miller (1990) argue that assigning a 
person a “victim” status serves to absolve that person of responsibility, identity the 
source of a person’s harm, specify a response and/or remedy, and account for failure. 
Indeed, for many of the women, claiming a “victim” or “battered woman” identity 
helped to make clear who was the abuser and who was the victim. And, as I will 
discuss in the next chapter, women recognized the importance of presenting as a 
“victim” and/or “battered woman” in order to receive services and assistance from the 
criminal justice system. Other women clearly claimed the identity of “victim” or 
“battered woman” to explain aspects of their own behavior that they knew others may 
view as problematic, such as ignoring “red flags” or staying with an abusive partner. 
Finally, as Loseke makes clear (2001), the “battered woman” narrative can be 
“lifesaving” as it “encourages women to leave life-threatening relationships” (p. 124). 
Thus, claiming a battered woman” identity may also be a way for women to come to 
terms with the seriousness of their situations.
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However, many of the women recognized that both “victim” and “battered 
woman” are stigmatized identities. While some mainstream discourses remove all 
responsibility or control from victims and battered women, they concurrently indicate 
weakness, passivity, helplessness, and powerlessness. The experiences of many of 
the women I interviewed were inconsistent with constructions of passivity and 
helpless, many of them believed they could (and did) do things to counter or even end 
the violence in their lives, like calling the police on their abusers, fighting back, or 
leaving the relationship. Attempting to demonstrate their agency while 
simultaneously demonstrating they had been unfairly harmed was perhaps the biggest 
struggle the women faced when attempting to represent themselves. A large number 
of women reported believing they had some level of control or responsibility in their 
abusive relationship, yet they had a great deal of difficulty expressing this belief.
They wished to distinguish this idea from the notion that women are to blame for 
violence in their relationships—none of the women appeared to believe they deserved 
the violence or provoked it in any way. However, the limited cultural discourses 
available to them made this task tricky, if not impossible.
For the women that I interviewed, the identity of “battered woman” was less 
appealing than was the identity of “victim” as a means of structuring their selves. 
While nearly three-quarters of the women I interviewed claimed a “victim” identity, 
less than one-half of the women claimed the identity of “battered woman.” One 
potential reason for this is that “victim” clearly has broader meaning than does 
“battered woman” and describes a wider range of situations. However, I believe there
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are other processes at work here. Loseke (2001) argues that women may reject the
“wife abuse” formula story as a way to make sense of their experiences because:
.. .[it] focuses exclusively on the experience of abuse; it leaves little space to 
include the complexities, indeterminancies, and situated nature of marital troubles. 
Furthermore, unless the abuse is experienced as extreme, there are questions about 
whether or not it is an example of morally intolerable “abuse” or of the more 
common—and less pejorative—cultural category of “normal violence.” Still 
further, unless the partner can be constructed as a man with no redeeming qualities, 
it might be difficult to case him as an abuser who is nothing but evil. (pp. 122-123)
Indeed, the women I spoke with who saw themselves as victims but not battered
women most often rejected the identity of “battered woman” if they did not see
themselves as trapped in their relationships, and/or if they viewed their partner’s
abusive behavior as an isolated incident and not as part of an ongoing cycle of
violence. The assignments of both a “victim” and “battered woman” identity
represent claims about the world (Holstein and Miller, 1997) and arguably, the latter
claim is a more loaded one. While a “victim” has been injured in some way—
perhaps from a single action by another person—“battered woman” is descriptive of a
woman’s relational self. More is said about a woman’s relationship if she is a
“battered woman” than if she is a “victim”; thus, more is required of her (i.e that she
exit the relationship).
Not every woman who is abused in the context of an intimate partner 
relationship sees herself as a “victim” or a “battered woman.” From an interactionist 
perspective, this makes sense, as social identities are not objective statuses—a woman 
is not a “victim” or a “battered woman” by virtue of the “facts” of what has happened 
to her (Holstein and Miller, 1997). Instead, these identities are created by discourses 
and are thus interpretations available for women to use in the process of self­
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construction and self-representation (Gubrium and Holstein, 2001). As Fraser (1997) 
states: “people’s social identities are complexes of meanings, networks of 
interpretation” and descriptions that are “drawn from the fund of interpretive 
possibilities available to agents in specific societies” (p. 152). Theorists and 
researchers have shown that the process of drawing from discourses to construct 
identity is often a complex and untidy practice (see, for example, Gubrium and 
Holstein, 2001). My examination of the identity work of women who have been 
abused by an intimate partner confirms this.
As Loseke (2001) argues, assigning meaning to the lived experience of 
troubles is complex because “in lived experience, troubles do not come to us with 
labels describing their names, meanings, seriousness, and so forth” (p. 108). Indeed, 
most of the women that I interviewed demonstrated an unwillingness to neatly 
categorize and label their experiences with one of these culturally dominant 
understandings. They alternately drew from, manipulated, and challenged existing 
hegemonic discourses. Thus, their understandings of themselves were not simply 
determined by a single discourse. This demonstrates two important findings: it 
shows the limited nature of current domestic violence discourses and it reveals the 
existence of agency in the process of identity construction for battered women.
As I have shown, battered women draw from the “fund of interpretive 
possibilities” (Fraser, 1997) surrounding women’s victimization to make sense of 
their experiences, yet, as my research demonstrates, this fund is limited in many 
ways. Women attempted to use existing discourses to represent themselves and they 
found these discourses to be both enabling and constraining to the construction of
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identity. The process of self-representation was, for some women, a struggle. At 
times they clearly had difficulty expressing themselves and their narratives displayed 
contradictions and inconsistencies; this demonstrates that current discourses do not 
always mesh with the women’s interpretations of their situations and experiences. 
Loseke (2001) maintains that women’s lived experiences “contradict or collide with” 
our dominant understandings of what it means to be a “victim” or “battered woman” 
and “this leads to stories that vary significantly from the institutionally preferred 
narrative” (p. 120). Further, she argues that instead of viewing abused women’s 
resistance to mainstream narratives surrounding domestic violence as a sign of 
“individual psychopathology,” perhaps we should examine the narratives themselves 
(p. 124). Indeed, my research demonstrates that abused women often find hegemonic 
narratives surrounding the identities of “battered woman” and “victim” to be 
inadequate means of understanding their selves and their lives.
To complicate matters, while these identities are narrow, limited, and not 
preferable to some of the women, the practicalities of certain social institutions 
necessitate the claiming (or at least presentation) of them. Researchers have 
demonstrated the importance of presenting oneself as an appropriate “battered 
woman” or “victim” in order to obtain sympathy and/or receive assistance from 
shelters, social service organizations, and the criminal justice system (Dunn, 2001; 
Holstein and Miller, 1997; Loseke, 1992). And, as Gubrium and Holstein (2001) 
remind us, “not everyone has access, or is subjected, to the same field of possibilities” 
in these various institutional discursive environments (p. 13). Women who are more 
privileged by virtue of their class and race may experience less pressure to “prove”
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they are a worthy “battered woman” or “victim” and they may have less to lose if 
they cannot—or refuse to—do so. A poor woman who is attempting to escape an 
abusive relationship and find refuge has fewer options than a woman who has more 
money. While the woman with more money may be able to afford a hotel or travel to 
another city, the poor woman’s only option may be a local battered women’s shelter. 
Thus, it becomes more important for the poor woman to “present” as a “battered 
woman” in order to receive services at the shelter. Her survival becomes dependent 
on this identity. Further, as I will demonstrate in Chapter Seven, African American 
women may try hard not to present as a “battered woman” to prevent their partner’s 
arrest and involvement in a racist criminal justice system.
Despite the fact that existing discourses are limited and make self-construction 
challenging for the women, and despite the fact that social institutions often demand 
particular self-presentations, the women I interviewed often resisted being 
pigeonholed or neatly labeled. Many refused to use one hegemonic discourse to 
make sense of their experiences. In their “identity work” they often pieced together 
parts of different discourses to create a narrative that fit with the way they wanted to 
perceive themselves. Ultimately, the identity they constructed and presented was of 
their own design and choosing. This illustrates that agency is involved in the creation 
of identity, even under institutional conditions that dictate ways in which people 
should be understood. The women I interviewed frequently disrupted and 
destabilized hegemonic domestic violence discourses, demonstrating that women’s 
agency and resistance occur in varied, subtle, and often complex forms. This theme 
will be explored further in the next chapter.
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NOTES
1 This is similar to the theme, explored in Chapter Five, that victims have some degree of responsibility 
or control in their abusive relationships.
2 Although this was far more common for the identity of “victim,” indicating that “victim” is perhaps a 
more complex identity.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
“Just Another Number”: Battered Women’s Identity Work in the Criminal
Justice System
In the preceding chapters, I have discussed the genealogy of hegemonic
domestic violence discourses and have demonstrated how these discourses are often
central to the identity work of women abused by intimate partners. The criminal
justice system is a place where domestic violence discourses—and identity work with
them—become particularly important. As Sally Engle Merry (1995a) argues, not
only does the law produce “cultural meanings and identities as an aspect of its
power,” but the criminal justice system also has the structural power to enforce these
images and meanings (p. 15). She writes:
Courts, for example, provide performances in which problems are named and 
solutions determined. These performances include conversations in which the 
terms of the argument are established and penalties determined. The ability to 
structure this talk and to determine the relevant discourse within which an issue is 
framed in other words, in which the reigning account of events is established—is 
an important facet of the power exercised by law.... (p. 15)
Thus, constructions surrounding both domestic violence and battered women that are
formed by and through the criminal justice system are presented as legitimate actions
of the state, and commonly become institutionalized. This means that the identity
work of battered women involved with the criminal justice system becomes
particularly salient, as women’s claims of victimization (or lack thereof) take place
within a specific institutional context. How actors in the criminal justice system treat
a case—in other words, the determination of who is arrested, and the nature of
punishment and/or rehabilitation—is inextricably connected to how these actors
perceive the woman involved in the case. Most women who call the police and
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“choose” to have the criminal justice system involved in their lives need some type of 
help or assistance. Consequently, these women need to present as legitimate and 
deserving victims of domestic violence. Dunn (2001) argues: “ ...a ‘true’ or ‘worthy’ 
victim meets the criteria held by relevant actors in the criminal justice system. They 
determine whether or not (1) a prosecutable crime has occurred, (2) the victim is 
credible, and (3) the victim needs and/or merits the services provided by the victim 
advocates” (p. 287).
Once again, we see that hegemonic discourses surrounding the “victim” and 
the “battered woman” are central to the processes of self-construction and 
interpretation in interactions between battered women and agents of the criminal 
justice system. As Spencer (2001) states, “dominant institutional discourses not only 
serve to articulate the prevailing set of accounts for constructing troubles, but provide 
staff members with related orienting questions, ways of issuing directives, and the 
means for challenging resistance from clients” (p. 159). The existence of multiple 
and sometimes contradictory discourses that influence the ways in which agents of 
the criminal justice system understand a “victim” and/or a “battered woman” may 
make women’s identity work all the more challenging.
In this chapter, I demonstrate how hegemonic discourses shape and constrain 
women s experiences in the criminal justice system. Specifically, I explore women’s 
identity work and their attempts at self-construction during their interactions both 
with the police who respond to domestic violence calls and with judges and attorneys 
during the prosecution process. There are multiple discourses that seemed to prove 
relevant to these processes: the discourses surrounding what it means to be a “victim”
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and “battered woman” that I explored in Chapters 5 and 6; Baker’s (1997) “dominant 
cultural script” that I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4;1 and mandatory arrest and 
prosecution policies. Again, I will demonstrate how these discourses are enabling 
and constraining, in both the ways that they influence agents of the criminal justice 
system s understandings of women who are abused by intimate partners, but also in 
the ways that they dictate how these women can and should behave. Finally, I will 
explore how women resist hegemonic discourses and thus, the institutional power of 
the criminal justice system, with varying degrees of success.
Identity Work in Interactions with Police 
For domestic violence victims (as with victims of most crimes) interactions 
with police officers often prove to be most pivotal of all interactions in the criminal 
justice system. These interactions potentially mark the “entry” stage into the criminal 
justice system; it is at this time that decisions are made about whether someone will 
be arrested and charges will be filed. However, presenting as a “true” victim can be 
difficult, for as I have shown, multiple institutional discourses surrounding 
victimization characterize the discursive environment of the criminal justice system. 
The implementation of mandatory arrest policies further complicates this process and 
has changed the stakes for women. Not only is it now more likely that a woman’s 
partner may be arrested against her wishes, but women themselves face an increased 
risk of arrest. Prior to the implementation of mandatory arrest policies, if police 
officers decided a woman was not a true victim, they most commonly refused to 
arrest her partner (Schecter, 1982). Mandatory arrest policies, designed to alleviate 
this problem by removing discretion from the responding officers, require—or at least
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strongly encourage—officers to arrest someone. This someone might be the man, 
regardless of the wishes of the woman, or it might be the woman herself. Indeed, 
research indicates that an increased number of women have been arrested for 
domestic violence after the introduction of mandatory arrest policies (Hirschel and 
Buzawa, 2002; Miller, 2001). Mandatory arrest policies were implemented in all of 
the jurisdictions in which the women I interviewed cases were based. This meant that 
the presentation of a particular self became vital for the women. In some situations, 
women needed to prove they were not real victims if they wanted to attempt to avoid 
the arrest ot their partners, yet in other situations, women needed to demonstrate that 
they were the “true” victims in order to avoid their own arrest. Several women’s 
narratives demonstrate that they did both of these things simultaneously.
The women I interviewed who called the police themselves (as opposed to 
someone else calling) reported doing so for a wide variety of reasons: because they 
were fearful; because they were encouraged to do so by someone else; to get their 
partner help; to have their partner removed from the home; and to show their partner 
that the abuse was not acceptable. Some of the women were certain that they wanted 
their partners arrested. Presenting as a “true” victim was most important for these 
women. However, there were many factors that influenced whether or not police 
officers saw women as credible victims, including: a woman’s emotional state, the 
degree to which she had followed the “dominant cultural script,” how she compared 
to the “pure victim” image, and her social location.
Emotional State
A woman’s emotional state when the police arrived appeared to be an
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important factor determining the success women had in presenting as the “true” 
victim. Researchers have found that emotion management is important to the 
successful presentation of a victim identity for female victims of violence involved in 
the criminal justice system (Dunn, 2001; Konradi, 1999). Kondradi (1999) discusses 
how rape victims in courtrooms often face contradictory expectations surrounding 
their emotional presentations, as the norms require “emotional suppression on the one 
hand (the rational witness) and evocation on the other (the traumatized rape victim)” 
(p. 56). My interviews demonstrate that a similar process occurs during battered 
women’s interactions with the police. Around one-quarter of the women I 
interviewed believed that their emotional state influenced their credibility with the 
police in that women who were very upset were less likely to be taken seriously then 
women who were calm. For example, Julia, a 21 year-old Mexican American woman 
said of the police, “There have been times where they would go and treat me like a 
whiny female, I guess, because I’m crying and that.” Robin described how on several 
occasions when the police came to her home because of her husband’s violence, she 
was so upset that they took her to the psychiatric unit of the hospital and placed her 
on forced lock-down. She said that as a result of a childhood accident, when she is 
“forced into a trauma situation” she gets “very agitated and very upset.” However, 
the police taking her away made her angry because she said that they were not 
addressing her husband’s behavior. She then described another occasion when her 
husband threw her into a wall, repeatedly slapped her, and then left. She called the 
police shortly afterwards and had a better experience with them. She said:
And so I think too, the thing that helped [this time] was [that] I had had that thirty
to forty-five minutes to calm down. I was very teary-eyed, but I wasn’t hysterical.
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And cops on an outward appearance aren’t real clean in that area. They can’t tell 
the difference between somebody who’s hysterical for some other reason. They 
just... cops are sitting there and they’re looking at things and my general 
impression is that they.. .don’t know how to [read a situation and say], okay, this 
person is upset and is not responding well because she was just attacked by her 
spouse, her boyfriend or whatever.
This marked a more positive experience with the police for Robin, which she
attributed to the fact that, on this occasion, she “wasn’t hysterical.” She said that the
police are not able to see that women who are attacked are upset and may have
difficultly responding to their questions.
Many of these women reported that their partners used the women’s emotions 
as “proof’ that they was crazy and therefore, less credible. For example, Gina, who 
was arrested, said she was crying and distraught when she talked to the police and had 
a hard time explaining herself. She contrasted her behavior with that of her husband, 
whom she described as “calm and cool and collected” while he was telling the police 
his story. She believed this influenced the police’s decision that she was not as 
credible as her husband. Florence’s husband, Jack, was also able to present a more 
rational ’ emotional state to the police than she was when officers arrived at their 
house after a neighbor called them. While Florence wasn’t arrested, the police did 
not arrest Jack, despite the fact that Florence was severely injured. Here is the 
exchange I had with Florence about this incident:
Florence:., .he beat me up one night. . .  and of course, you know, a head wound will 
bleed more than any other wound. But I had blood all over my T-shirt I didn’t call 
the police; the neighbors called the police. The police come to the door, Jack 
immediately, he’s Mr. Calm, you know. And I’m hysterical; you know. I answer the 
door, and I’m hysterical. I’ve got blood all over me. You know, John’s [in a chair] 
kicked back.. .with a beer in his hand, telling the cop, “You see what I put up with? 
Look at her.” And I’m telling the cop, I’m saying, “Look at me!” you know? And the 
cop said, Lady, if you don’t shut up,” he said, “I’m going to take you to jail.” And I 
shut up and sat down. He never asked me what happened.
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Amy: He only talked to Jack?
Florence: He only talked to Jack. And Jack said, “Well, she went berserk on me; 
look how she is. And I really didn’t mean to hit her. I was just trying to get her away 
from me. She was jumping on me.” [The cop asked Jack], “Would you like to press 
charges against her?” [Jack replied], “Nah, she’s a good ole gal. She’s just 
drunk.. .I’ll just let her sleep it off.”
The fact that Jack was much calmer and more rational than Florence led the officer to 
privilege Jack’s story over Florence’s (whose story the officer didn’t even ask for). 
Florence said she was “hysterical,” (as any person reasonably would be after being 
physically assaulted). However, Jack used Florence’s distress and hysteria to 
discredit her attempts to establish herself as a “real victim” and clearly the police 
officer bought the story. Jack was not arrested, despite the fact that Florence had 
visible (and quite extensive) head injuries.
“Dominant Cultural Script”
A woman’s failure to follow Baker’s (1997) “dominant cultural script” was 
another factor that appeared to influence police officers’ opinions about whether or 
not she was a “true” victim. In other words, if police knew that a woman had 
previously experienced violence from her partner, but had not left the relationship nor 
had filed for or maintained an existing restraining order, police seemed less likely to 
take her request for assistance seriously. Many of the women that I interviewed 
reported believing that police treat women who have called the police on multiple 
occasions differently than women who have not. For example, Angela, a 37 year-old 
multiracial woman, told me that after the police had been to her house repeatedly 
because of her husband’s violence, an officer said to her, “Well, why are you putting 
up with this kind of stuff? If you’re gonna put up with him, if you’re gonna see him 
or talk to him, don’t bother calling us no (sic) more.” Two women told me that the
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police simply stopped responding to their calls and both women believed this was 
because they had called for help on multiple occasions.
Several of the women I interviewed who were arrested were told by police 
officers that they were being taken into custody precisely because they had called the 
police previously yet had not left their abusive partners. For example, one evening 
Heather called the police due to the violence of her then-boyfriend, Roger. However, 
she just wanted him to leave her house—she did not want him arrested because she 
was afraid of what he would do in retaliation. When the police arrived, she did not 
tell them that Roger had been violent, but told them she wanted him to leave and they 
escorted him from the property. Heather and Roger ended up getting back together 
and he moved in with her again. A week later they were driving home and Roger 
became extremely verbally abusive, kicked her out of the car, and drove away. She 
was very upset and was picked up by a passing motorist. Heather was afraid that 
Roger was going to go steal things from her house, as this was a pattern with him. At 
the urging of the motorist who picked her up, she called the police.
Three police officers responded to Heather’s call, pulled Roger over on the 
highway, and found that he had stolen some of her books. They met her at her house, 
with Roger. Heather described what happened:
And I was just hysterical, crying, crying and crying, but then they started talking to 
Roger and they’re like “why did you dump her in the canyon?” And Roger said 
well, “she hit me in the car. She hit me a lot.” And I didn’t hit him in the car. If I 
had, he would have clobbered me, he would have killed me. And it was a lie, but 
they believed him. And since I was the one saying don’t arrest him, don’t do 
anything, they thought I was the guilty party. But really I didn’t want Roger 
arrested because he, number one, he’d come back and kill me; number two, he had 
no money to bail bond out of jail, and guess who would feel so guilty? I’d bond 
him out because I’m that way. So I didn’t want.. .1 just wanted to get the stolen
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stuff and tell Frank to go to California like he had planned. And they didn’t do 
that. They arrested me.
I asked Heather if she spoke to any of the responding officers and she replied that she
talked to one of them: “Yeah, from the start [one of them] came up to me and he
treated me like dirt. And.. .1 said [that] I [had] called the cops a week ago on Frank.
And he goes, ‘yeah, yeah and that’s why you’re getting arrested too. Because you
called a week ago and you couldn’t stay away from him, could you?”’ Heather was
apparently arrested for several reasons. Not only did Roger lie to the police and say
she hit him, but she also did not want Roger arrested; she believed these things made
her look guilty to the police. Further, one of the officers also told her she was
arrested for her failure to “stay away” from Roger, or for her violation of the cultural
script. All of these things seemingly diminished Heather’s credibility with the police
and resulted in them not viewing her as a “true” victim.
Dunn (2001) states that “law enforcers, and the generalized juries to whom 
they mentally refer, expect victims to be ‘innocent’ (to bear no responsibility for their 
own victimization) yet proactive (to take responsibility for their own safety)” (p.
298). A woman s going back to her partner violates these expectations and makes 
it harder for her to present her self as a legitimate victim to the police. As a result, 
police sometimes stop providing assistance to these women. This confirms research 
by Stephens and Sinden (2000), who found that battered women who had multiple 
encounters with law enforcement officers were more likely to report that they had 
negative experiences with officers than battered women who had a single police 
encounter. The arrest of women in my study who failed to follow the cultural script 
not only indicates a belief by the police that these women are not “true” victims, but
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also may represent the “punishment” of women who do not follow the “correct” 
culturally proscribed steps to exit the abusive relationship.
“Pure victim” Image
Some women who did not have marks on them had a difficult time getting the 
police to take them seriously. These women were most at risk of being arrested 
themselves. Over one-third of the women I interviewed were arrested when the 
police responded to a domestic violence call; two of these were dual arrests (both the 
woman and her partner was arrested). Additionally, two of the women were arrested 
on multiple occasions. All of the women believed they were the “real” victims in 
their cases and thus, all believed they were arrested wrongly. Apparently these 
women were unsuccessful in their attempts at presenting a legitimate victim identity. 
Their lack of success appeared to be largely influenced by how well the woman fit 
into the “pure victim” image—clearly this discourse is instrumental in police officers’ 
determination of who is a real “victim” or “battered woman.” Once again, to review, 
the “pure victim” discourse depicts battered women in the following ways: (1) as 
wives who adhere to traditional gender roles and are economically and emotionally 
dependent on their abusers; (2) as passive and not themselves violent; (3) as 
experiencing frequent and severe violence; and (4) as extremely fearful of their 
abuser. Criteria #2 and #3 appeared to be most salient to police officers’ decisions 
that a woman was not a legitimate victim.
Some of the women who were arrested admitted to the police that they in some 
way used violence, although the women reported it was done out of frustration, anger, 
and/or in self-defense. For example, recall Gina, the woman who threw fruit at her
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husband, Joe, after she became frustrated with him when he belittled her in front of
their children. Gina tried to pull Joe to the front door and they had a physical
altercation where he grabbed her by the wrists and she scratched him in the face. Joe
then called the police. When two officers arrived, Gina and Joe were separated; one
officer listened to her story and another listened to his. Gina described how she tried
to demonstrate to the officer listening to her that she was the victim in this situation:
I kept telling her, you know, I told her, 12 years ago I lived in the [battered 
women’s shelter] for a month and [Joe] was charged with reckless endangerment 
and almost ran me over with a car. I go, “there’s records on that—you need to find 
those records because he has a history of doing this to me” and I said, I said, “he 
was hurting my wrist.” But I didn’t explain that good enough.. .that like, like I was 
in self-defense.. .that’s why I hurt his.. .1 scratched him. And I don’t think I was 
really clear about that...
Gina offers Joe’s past arrest and her stay at the local battered women’s shelter as
proof that she is the real victim here. She realizes that the scratch on Joe’s wrist
damages her attempts to demonstrate this and she makes an effort to explain that she
scratched him in self-defense. However, the two officers then questioned Gina and
Joe’s 10 year-old son, who witnessed the incident. The police went outside to confer
and when they came back inside, they told her that not only did her son’s story match
her husband’s story, but they could find no records of her husband’s prior arrest.
They then arrested her.
Miller (2001) interviewed criminal justice professionals and service providers 
who deal directly with women arrested for domestic violence charges. Many of them 
believed that women often use violence for different reasons than do men; most often, 
they use it out of frustration or in self-defense. Further, they believed that police 
officers often do not take the time to carefully investigate incidents and are not
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always trained to take into account the power dynamics in which domestic violence 
most often occurs. Miller argues that because police officers are now directed to 
make arrests, “rather than ignoring women’s behavior as they had in the past, the 
police focus on the violence itself and not the context in which it occurs” (p. 1351). 
Thus, the police simply arrest the person they think is the “abuser.” As I discussed in 
Chapter Four, because when police officers respond to a domestic violence call their 
investigations usually focuses on—as one prosecutor described it—“one single event 
occurring in a single instance,” the context in which this event occurred is not taken 
into account. Miller states that there is a “need for police to thoroughly investigate 
the context of the situation, not just rely on he said/she said commentary from the 
combatants or automatically accord greater credibility to the authoritative voice of 
men” (p. 1356). The officers in Gina’s case apparently decided that her use of 
violence was not out of self-defense. In spite of her attempts to present herself as the 
“victim,” the police did not see her in this light and she was arrested. Clearly, when a 
woman does not fit into the “pure victim” construction—when she is not visibly 
injured and/or she reports using violence herself—the police are less likely to view 
her as a legitimate victim.
According to Miller (2001), evidence suggests that many abusive men are 
learning how to use the criminal justice system to their advantage. The criminal 
justice professionals and service providers that she interviewed reported either 
directly observing men manipulate the criminal justice system or hearing about this 
from victims they work with. Manipulative behaviors included: “men self-inflicting 
wounds so that police would view the woman as assaultive and dangerous, men being
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the first ones to call 911 to proactively define the situation, and men capitalizing on 
the outward calm they display once police arrive (his serenity highlights the hysterical 
woman)” (p. 1354). Indeed, many of the women I interviewed reported that their 
partners engaged in such behavior and often, this limited women’s ability to 
successfully present a credible victim identity to law enforcement officers. As a 
result, not only did police officers in some instances fail to arrest women’s partners, 
but sometimes the women themselves were arrested.
This is not to say that women are always innocent and free of all 
responsibility. Indeed, as I demonstrated in Chapter Five, many of the women I 
interviewed would not characterize themselves in this way. Research has shown that 
women do, at times, use violence in intimate partner relationships (see, for example, 
Renzetti, 1999). However, as Dasgupta (2002) found in her review of literature on 
women s use of violence, “the majority of research findings report that women who 
use violence are battered themselves and use physical aggression to escape or stop 
this abuse” (p. 13 78). Further, research indicates that women are more 
psychologically and physically injured by intimate partner violence than are men and 
are at greater risk of being stalked and killed upon leaving a violent relationship 
(Saunders, 2002). Again, the majority of researchers stress that when examining 
differences between men’s and women’s use of violence, understanding the social 
context in which the violence occurs and the power dynamics involved is essential 
(Miller, 2001; Osthoff, 2002; Saunders, 2002).
Interestingly, some of the women who were arrested reported that at least one 
of the responding officers either seemed hesitant to arrest them or directly stated at
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some point that they probably should not have been arrested. This happened to five 
of the eleven of the women I interviewed who were arrested. Gina described how 
when she was arrested, one of the two responding officers was much kinder to her 
than the other, trying to make sure her neighbors did not see her get into the police car 
and asking about her wellbeing during her transport to the jail. Later, her lawyer told 
her that this police officer had contacted the district attorney on two separate 
occasions to say that he did not feel good about the arrest and thought that they had 
arrested the wrong person. A similar thing happened to Heather. After she was 
arrested, while she was sitting in the police car, one of the responding officers told 
her that he believed her story and thought she was innocent, but he could not do 
anything about it because the arresting officer had more authority than he did. This 
illustrates that a woman’s attempt to demonstrate that she was victimized may be 
assessed differently by each police officer who responds to the call. Evidently, 
officers do not always agree on who is the “true” victim. According to the women’s 
accounts of their interactions with law enforcement officers, these officers appeared 
to draw from different discourses in their attempts at deciding who is a “real” victim 
and/or a “battered woman.”
Not all of the women that I interviewed wanted their partners to be arrested. 
Some of the women did not want the police involved in their situations at all but had 
little choice because someone else had called the police, like a family member or 
neighbor. Other women called the police themselves but were not aware of 
mandatory arrest policies; thus, they did not know that if the police responded to a 
domestic violence call and determined that abuse had occurred, an arrest was
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mandated. Still other women knew if the police had evidence that a man was violent,
they would likely arrest him; thus, these women knew they had to hide any proof
and/or lie about what happened to avoid their partner’s arrest. The identity work of
women in all of these categories often involved trying to convince police officers that
they were not “true” victims in order to avoid the arrest of their partner. For example,
Julia, a 21 year-old Mexican American woman, told me that she had to call the police
multiple times because of her boyfriend Marc’s physical and verbal abuse. However,
she did not want Marc to be arrested so when the police would arrive she would not
tell them about his violence; she would simply tell them she wanted him removed
from her house. She said the following:
And it’s, like, it was so dumb, because every time the police would come, it would 
just be, like [the officers would say], “You know, you guys need to calm down. 
[Marc’s] going to leave for a little bit.” But he would come right back, and we 
would just start right up. And it’s, like, “Why don’t I tell the police that he hit me? 
He’ll go to jail.” I mean, there’s so many times that I wish I had.
Julia knew that if she told the police that Marc had hit her he would have been
arrested. At the time of our interview, she wished she had done this. However, when
the police would come to her house she told me she did not want Marc to get in
trouble so she would lie. The only time he was actually arrested was when he had hit
her in the head with a soup can and she was bleeding. She said she “had to tell the
police then” since they saw her injury. This instance was the only time that Julia—
because of her visible injury—knew she would be unable to convince the police that
she was not a victim in order to keep Marc from being arrested.
Women attempting to avoid their partner’s arrest by convincing police officers 
that they were not “true” victims needed to be cautious—trying too hard to avoid the
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arrest of their partner by showing they were not victimized sometimes put them at 
greater risk of being seen as the abuser. Susan, a 30 year-old white woman, called the 
police on her husband, Robert, after an episode which she described as the only 
incident of violence in their relationship. They had gotten into a verbal altercation 
one evening over a mess Robert had made while he was installing insulation into their 
house and his refusal to clean it up. Robert tried to leave the house and Susan 
blocked his path, kicked him in the leg, and took his keys. Robert attempted to grab 
the keys from her and pushed her while she was holding their 9 month-old daughter. 
Susan fell on the bed, hitting and cutting her head on a curtain rod (the baby was 
unhurt). Susan then called the police. She said that after this, Robert immediately 
calmed down and started shaving because he knew he was going to go to jail. She 
described their interaction: “And I was like, I know I started really kind of freaking 
out, [saying] like ‘What do you mean they’re going to arrest you? I didn’t really want 
them to arrest you. I just want this to stop.’ And he’s like, ‘I’m telling you, Susan, 
they 11 arrest me. They’ll.. .they have to arrest someone if they come.’”
When the police arrived, she told them what happened and showed them the 
cut on her head. She said that while she did not want Robert arrested, she also did not 
want to lie to the police. Robert also admitted pushing Susan, so the police decided to 
arrest him. However, Susan did her best to convince the police that the incident was 
not a “big deal.” She said she had no control over what the police did and this was 
upsetting to her:
I mean I just wish they would have talked to me and him and realized after talking 
to me.. .[I was saying to the police officer] “This isn’t a big deal, this thing on my 
head. It was an accident. I was just as much to blame by yelling and keeping 
[Robert] from going, taking his keys, cussing at him, provoking him basically.
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He’s not like this, he’s never done this before, [you need] to trust me that I’m not 
lying to you. You see my daughter, she’s perfectly fine. Yeah, she’s a little upset, 
but look, you see what happened, you see the insulation all over the place, that he 
was just doing this and it caused this stuff.” And that I told him I’m gonna go to 
my brother-in-law’s house. I told them that. I said I’m gonna go to his brother’s 
house to go spend the night, so you know, I’m fine.
Susan tried to convince the police that she was not a “true” victim in order to prevent
Robert’s arrest. She offered a great deal of “evidence” as proof of this: she said the
incident was an accident; she claimed at least partial responsibility for their
altercation; she said that Robert has never been violent before; she assured the officer
that her daughter was fine; she pointed to the condition of the house that led to their
argument; and she told the officer that she was going to leave the house. However,
she also recognized that her framing of the incident as partially her fault might have
resulted in her own arrest. She said:
I told them that I kicked him too, which thank God they kind of dismissed that or 
they said I kicked “at him” because they could have arrested me, too. And they 
knew that I cussed at him and everything and that I was yelling, but they 
overlooked that, I guess, because I’ve heard that they could even have arrested me 
for that. And I’m like “Whoa!” So obviously they just saw that, you know, I think 
they sympathized with me being a mom to this baby and everything and that I was 
the one with the cut on my head and all that and I’m the one that called, so they 
arrested him. And he didn’t say that I’d hurt him in any way or try to change that.
In an attempt to prove to the police officers that she wasn’t a “real” victim, Susan told
them that she “yelled” and “cussed” at Robert and that she kicked him. However, by
doing this, she risked constructing herself as abusive, which would provide the police
with grounds to arrest her. She said, though, that because she was a mom, was the
injured person, and was the one who called the police, the officers “sympathized”
with her and she avoided her own arrest.
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Social Location
Poorer women and women of color sometimes had a more difficult time in 
their identity work with law enforcement officers. There are several reasons for this. 
First, as I discussed in Chapter Six, women who are less socially privileged may have 
more to lose if they are not able to demonstrate that they are a worthy “battered 
woman” or “victim” because their options for assistance are often limited. Secondly, 
dominant constructions of battered women and other female victims often reflect 
traditional ideas of femininity (Loseke 1992; Lamb 1999) and, thus, predominantly 
describe white, middle-class, passive, and “moral” women (Crenshaw, 1994; Kanuha, 
1996). As Kanuha (1996) agues, “the battered woman as ‘the bad’ woman who is 
poor, or drug addicted, or a racial/ethnic minority, or all of these” was not part of the 
original cultural construction of who was a “battered woman” (p. 42). Thus, police 
officers may have a harder time seeing women in these categories as potential 
battered women. Further, officers may hold stereotypical beliefs about women of 
color and/or poorer women that shape their interactions and responses to these 
women.
For example, Angela told me that the building she lived in used to be a crack 
house and this seemed to influence police officers’ attitudes toward her. An officer 
told her, I see what kind of a place this is.” Angela said the police officers seemed 
to expect that someone living in that building would have trouble. She said, “Their 
attitude was, ‘you ain’t nothing but slime. You’re nothing but slime,’...like, ‘you’re 
nothing because you!re doing this, you’re allowing [your husband’s violence] to 
happen. You are nothing.’” Angela believed that because she lived in a poor
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neighborhood, in a building that the police associated with drugs, they treated her 
badly and blamed her for her husband’s abusive behavior. Similarly, when Tiffany, a 
28 year-old African American woman went to the police station to await transfer to a 
battered woman’s shelter, she had a black eye, a split lip, and missing patches of hair. 
An officer commented to her, “I can just imagine what the other person looked like,” 
reflecting his belief that Tiffany must also have been violent. She described herself 
as a “big girl,” as she was almost 6 feet tall and weighed 290 pounds. She believed
this influenced the officer s comments: “I think_I looked like an intimidating
person, you know what I mean? My size, my weight.. .it’s hard for anybody to 
believe that I would just let someone hit on me.” Tiffany did not fit into the officer’s 
conception of what a “battered woman” looked like due to her size and, quite 
possibly, her race. He thus assumed that she must have been a mutual participant in 
any episodes of violence she experienced. Both Angela and Tiffany, because they 
apparently violated police officers’ expectations about who is a “battered woman,” 
had a difficult time presenting themselves as a worthy or legitimate victims. For 
Angela, this resulted in diminished assistance from the police officers who responded 
to her call.
A final factor that made identity work more difficult for women of color is 
that in communities of color, there is often a mistrust of the criminal justice system 
that is perceived as hostile and racist (Crenshaw, 1994; Richie 1996). Women of 
color may not want the criminal justice system involved in their abusive relationships 
in order to protect their partners from entering the system. Vicki, a 25 year-old 
African American woman I interviewed, told me of a situation where she believed the
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police wrongly arrested her husband, Geoffrey, and beat him up in the process. Vicki 
was separated from Geoffrey, who had a history of violent behavior. When he came 
to her house one evening and began yelling at her while she was on the phone with 
her sister, her sister called the police. In the meantime, Geoffrey had picked up a 
knife that was on the table. Vicki said she did not feel threatened by Geoffrey, but 
she took the knife away from him “out of instinct”; Geoffrey was cut in the process. 
When the police officers arrived Geoffrey was attempting to leave and, in Vicki’s 
words, they “jumped him and beat him.” This upset Vicki immensely. She said she 
tried to tell the police officers that Geoffrey did not attempt to use the knife against 
her. However, they did not believe her and asked her why she took the knife from 
Geoffrey if she did not feel threatened. The police arrested Geoffrey, despite the 
attempts made by Vicki to change the police officers’ beliefs that she was victimized. 
Vicki thought the police treated Geoffrey the way they did because he was a black 
man and they assumed that he was some kind of “violent gangster.” She said that she 
would have no problem having the police arrest him—in fact she would want them 
to— if he had actually done something that she believed warranted this (she had called 
the police herself on a prior occasion when Geoffrey was violent). However, in this 
situation, Vicki did not believe she was a victim. In fact, she believed Geoffrey was 
the victim since he was the one who was cut and the police made him sit for an hour 
out on the grass, handcuffed and bleeding.
Vicki’s experience and her interpretation of the police officers’ actions led her 
to the conclusion that she would not want the police involved in her relationship 
again, as she did not trust them. Indeed, battered women of color may be less likely
229
to use the dominant cultural script as they may not view calling the police as a sound 
option. For example, Darla, a 36 year-old African American woman, stated that she 
did not want to call the police on her abusive boyfriend, Eddie (who was also African 
American), out of respect for Eddie’s mother: it was the first time in quite a while that 
neither Eddie nor his brothers were incarcerated and Darla knew Eddie’s mother was 
glad to have all of her sons around. As Darla’s case illustrates, given that African 
American men are disproportionately imprisoned by a criminal justice system that 
some have argued is racist (Tonry, 1995), battered African American women may be 
hesitant to present themselves as “real” victims and follow the culturally prescribed 
mandate to call the police on an abuser, in order to prevent their partner’s 
involvement in this system.
Finally, it should be noted that not all underprivileged women that I 
interviewed who were hesitant to call the police were treated poorly when they did. 
Daisy, the African American woman who experienced a violent physical and sexual 
assault from a man she used to date, said that although she asked someone to call the 
police after the assault, she did not think anyone in the criminal justice system would 
believe her. When I asked her why, she replied, “Here I was homeless, no job, down 
there with the scrounges of the earth.” She said she was worried that the police 
would assume that because she was in “such a run-down, seedy hotel” that she must 
have asked for the attack. She also said that usually the police do not take “black- 
on-black” crime very seriously (her assailant was also African American). However, 
Daisy said that the detective who responded to the scene was very caring and 
supportive and believed her. She said that everyone in the criminal justice system
with whom she interacted was “very, very supportive” and that they literally saved 
her life. She told me that this positive experience completely changed her view of the 
criminal justice system. Daisy was aware of the fact that as a woman of color who 
was poor and homeless, she risked not being taken seriously by the police officers 
who investigated the crime against her. However, for her, this was not the case. She 
was immediately regarded as a “real” victim and was pleased with the services she 
received.
Hegemonic domestic violence discourses were highly influential in shaping 
women’s interactions with police officers. Police officers appeared to frequently rely 
on dominant constructions of both victims and battered women when making their 
decisions about what to do and who to arrest when they responded to domestic 
violence calls. These constructions were also central to women’s identity work and 
their attempts at influencing police officers’ decisions. Sometimes women embraced 
dominant constructions in their interactions with the police and other times they 
actively resisted them. However, because of both mandatory arrest polices and the 
police officers’ ultimate authority in determining what happened and who was 
arrested, women’s identity work was sometimes fruitless. I will now turn to a 
discussion of how similar processes occur during the prosecution process.
Identity Work in the Courts
Identity work seemed to be somewhat less relevant during the prosecution 
process for the women I interviewed. This is primarily because “no-drop” 
prosecution policies were in place in all of the jurisdictions in which the women’s 
court cases were centered. According to this policy, theoretically, if a person is
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arrested on domestic violence charges, he or she is automatically prosecuted by the 
state. Thus, a woman did not have much control over whether or not the case against 
her abuser (or herself) was dropped. Whereas identity work is very important to 
demonstrate who is the abuser and who is the victim (and who is neither) when police 
first respond to a call, when the case is turned over to the courts, these decisions have 
already been made. Nevertheless, while identity work is less relevant during the 
prosecution process does not mean it completely lacks significance.
As I demonstrated in Chapter Four, prosecutors often are forced to drop and 
reduce charges if there is not enough evidence to proceed with criminal cases.
Further, judges have leeway in the type of sentences that they bestow. Thus, 
prosecution and sentencing are not always automatic. Given this, women who want 
their abusers prosecuted may do whatever they can to prevent the dropping of charges 
by attempting to prove they were victimized; further, these women may wish for a 
particular sentencing for their abuser (i.e. jail versus counseling or vice versa) and 
attempt to present themselves and their situations in a way to ensure their desired 
outcome. Likewise, women who do not want their abusers prosecuted may do what 
they can to encourage the dropping of charges, such as failing to cooperate with the 
prosecution process. Finally, a woman who believes she was wrongly arrested and 
wants the charges dropped against her may try to convince the court of her innocence. 
These behaviors are reflective of women’s attempts to present particular selves in 
order to influence the outcomes of their cases. However, as I will show, the women’s 
attempts at self-presentation were often thwarted by the often constraining and 
coercive nature of the criminal justice system. There were two major problems that
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women faced: not being given an opportunity to be heard; and not having any control 
over the prosecution process.
“I Felt Like Just Another Number”: The Loss of the Specific
The biggest problem that women faced in their presentation of selves was that 
many of them believed that the criminal justice system does not care about the 
specifics of each woman’s individual case. Many women were given little 
opportunity to tell their stories (particularly women who were arrested). More than a 
few women described not having much (or any) opportunity to speak with the 
attorneys who were representing them. Some women reported that they did speak to 
the prosecutor but they had to take responsibility for initiating the contact, while other 
women were not able to speak to the prosecutor at all. Tricia, a 38 year-old white 
woman who wanted her abusive ex-husband prosecuted, said the following: “Getting 
a hold of [the DA’s office], if something would come up, was almost impossible. [I 
was] leaving voice mail messages all the time, and he would call me back sometimes, 
but most of the time I’d end up talking to his assistant.” Tricia said that the contact 
she had with the DA was always the result of her efforts: “If I didn’t pursue it then I 
was left in the dark.”
A lack of contact with their attorneys led some women to believe they did not 
receive adequate representation. These women were upset that they were not able to 
tell their side of the story. This was particularly true for women who believed they 
were wrongly arrested—they had little or no chance to demonstrate that they were 
really victims in the situation. Beth and her ex-fiance, George, were both arrested on 
domestic violence charges. One evening she had agreed to meet with him, despite the
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fact that there was a no-contact order placed on them (George had been arrested 
several times previously on similar charges). They went out to dinner and afterwards, 
he took her back to his house and dragged her out of the truck (she did not want to go 
inside). He wanted to have sex with her against her wishes and ended up physically 
attacking her. She pushed him several times in self-defense. George called the 
police Beth said he had learned that if he was the caller he was less likely to be 
arrested—and when the officers arrived, Beth admitted that she shoved George. 
Despite the fact that Beth had multiple bruises and George had no visible injuries, the 
police arrested both of them.
Beth attempted to contact the district attorney on multiple occasions before 
the pretrial conference; however, the DA never returned her calls. She described 
what happened at the pretrial conference:
[The DA] went over to George and came back and said [George is] not pleading 
guilty and it I were you, I would take a deterred sentence.. .He did not ask me if I 
thought I was innocent or if I was hurt.. .he didn’t ask me anything. He just simply 
said to me if I were you, this is what I would do. And he said, “Plead guilty to 
this.” And I said, “Well, why is [George] pleading not guilty?” He said, “Don’t 
worry about him, worry about yourself. This is what I would do if I were you.
This is the best offer you’re gonna get.”
Beth ended up pleading guilty to the charges against her and told me that she felt 
coerced into doing so. She was very upset about all of this. Beth believed that her 
attorney’s failure to listen to her and find out what happened made it impossible for 
her to present her innocence. She stated, “I don’t even know if he read the police 
report because the [it] refers to me as the victim throughout the thing. Why wouldn’t 
he [ask me], ‘Do you think you’re guilty?”’ Beth told me that the DA did not even 
know about George’s violent history (his previous arrests were in a different county).
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She said, “I felt like just another number...I was just not an individual case at all. 
That’s why [the DA] presented the information the way he did.” Beth was 
unsuccessful at presenting as a “real” victim to the attorney because he did not give 
her a chance to explain what happened. As a result of her guilty plea, she had to take 
classes designed for abusers. She told me, “[I] don’t want to be treated this way. I 
am a victim in this case. I have been a victim from the very beginning...” 
Unfortunately, however, Beth’s arrest led to the district attorney automatically seeing 
her as a perpetrator and she was not given the opportunity to demonstrate to him 
otherwise.
“I’m The Victim Here!”: Lacking Control
The majority of women I interviewed also reported having little control over
the prosecution process. In all of the jurisdictions in which the women’s cases were
processed, an arrest for domestic violence meant a no-contact order was automatically
placed on the parties involved.3 Several women were very unhappy about this. For
example, Mary’s boyfriend beat her up—so badly that her entire face was bruised and
one of her eyes was swollen shut—and a bystander called the police. Her boyfriend
was arrested and they were not allowed to have any communication with each other.
When I asked her how she felt about this, she said the following:
This is what I think is wrong. I totally believe in a regular restraining order, you 
know, like if you want [to get one], you do that yourself.. .1 know they do these 
mandatory things to protect the person and this and that. Well, I do understand that
in a way, but I think it’s very unfair for..... I didn’t even get to speak my piece. I
wasn’t even allowed to come into court and say what I thought, and what I felt, and 
what I wanted. The judge just automatically sent this [no-contact order] 
and.. .because of this one incident, which was a bad incident, I’m not saying
that.....but just, because of that, telling us that we can’t see each other again and
we can’t be together again.
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Mary acknowledged that the incident leading to her boyfriend’s arrest was “bad”; she 
did not try to deny that she was victimized. However, despite this, she was unhappy 
with the automatic no-contact order and she did not want to be prohibited from seeing 
or communicating with her boyfriend. She wanted a chance to speak to the judge and 
have a say in the matter.
Susan, who had tried hard to convince the police that she was not a victim and
that her husband, Robert, was not an abuser, faced similar problems. She, too, was
very upset about the no-contact order that prohibited communication between her and
Robert. Susan wanted the charges dropped altogether, but when she realized that this
was not possible, she focused her energies on getting the no-contact order lifted. She
was told that it could be months before the final disposition of the case and thus, if the
no-contact order was not lifted, she would not be able to communicate with Robert
for this entire time. She said that she wrote letters to the judge, made numerous
phone calls, and went to the court on three separate occasions to fill out paperwork
requesting the order be lifted. She described the process:
I kept saying, “Look, you know what, this is worse for Robert to not be able to 
come home and not be able to be with his family, with his daughter. With the no 
contact thing, it’s actually worse. I can’t talk to him.. .this [was] just a one-time 
thing, you’re not listening to me. It seems like you’re putting me lumped in with 
all these other people.” I’m telling you, that’s what I was upset about actually.
And finally they listened to me and they had the social worker come talk to me and 
they realized they could lift it, so they did. I guess that’s pretty unusual.
Susan believed the no-contact order made things much worse for her family. She did 
not see herself as a victim or see Robert as abusive; thus, she believed that the no­
contact order was unnecessary. Further, she felt like she was “lumped together” with
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other battered women and this upset her. With a lot of work and effort, she was 
finally able to convince the court to lift the no-contact order and Robert came home.
Many women also believed that they had no control over the outcome of their 
partners’ cases. Some women wanted their partners and ex-partners to “get help” and 
receive counseling or treatment for alcohol or drug abuse. For example, Beth did not 
want her ex-fiance, George, to go to jail, as she was worried about the fact that he was 
financially supporting four children (none of them hers). Further, Beth believed the 
source of George’s problems and his violent behavior was his drug addiction, telling 
me, “I truly believe that if he was not on drugs, that nothing would have escalated this 
way. You know. I knew a whole different man the first five or six months that I knew 
him.” She told me how she repeatedly called the DA to convince him to try to get 
drug treatment for George instead of jail time, stating, “He’s not gonna get the drug 
help that he needs sitting in prison, you know.” The.DA told her he would do what 
he could, but he believed that George’s propensity towards violating his probation 
would likely ensure jail time.
Other women specifically wanted jail time for their abusers. These women 
attempted to demonstrate the severity of their victimization in order to convince the 
courts that punishment of their abusers was warranted. Tricia’s husband beat her up 
repeatedly throughout their seventeen year relationship. He was arrested on multiple 
occasions but never served any time in jail. When I asked Tricia why she went to 
court to testify against her ex-husband during the last case against him, she replied, “I 
went to court because I wanted to tell the judge, I wanted them to know, what a 
horrible person he was. You know, I wanted them to know both sides of the story.
237
He’s very manipulative, very.. .he could lie his way through anything. So I wanted
them to hear the other side of the story.” However, Tricia said she was never given a
chance to talk to the judge and that everything was decided without her input. Her
ex-husband was not sentenced to jail, but was given probation and had to take anger-
management classes. When I asked her about changes she would like see in the way
the criminal justice system handles domestic violence, she said this:
I would like to see more support from the district attorneys, for the women that 
can’t afford an attorney, from the victim’s advocates, spend more time with us.
The judges, for God’s sake, let us talk when we got to court! I wanted to talk, but I 
never got to say a word. He would get up there, say what he had to say, and boom,
another continuance. It’s like, wait a minute! Why am I not allowed.......and the *
times I did talk, I would say what happen, he’d tell his side of the story, and boom, 
he’d go free...The judges need to let the victims speak. You know, and, take into ’ 
consideration the prior history of the perpetrator. You know, please, do something, 
don’t just continue to let him go!
Tricia was upset that many times when she went to court, she was not given the
opportunity to speak. Further, she believed the judge did not take into account her
husband’s criminal record. For Tricia, these things contributed to her husband
avoiding any serious jail time, which angered her.
Beth and Tricia, along with many of the other women I interviewed, 
attempted to present their stories and selves to the courts in ways that would facilitate 
outcomes that they desired. Some women drew from dominant constructions of the 
“battered woman” or the “victim” in their attempts to do this. For example, Tricia 
wanted to show the courts that she was a legitimate victim and that her ex-husband 
was “manipulative,” a “horrible person,” and clearly at fault. However, Beth chose to 
frame her victimization from her ex-fiance, George, as resulting from his drug 
addiction, in an attempt to get him help and avoid his going to jail. Both women had
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different ways of making sense of their experiences with violence, and both wanted 
different outcomes from the prosecution process. However, neither Tricia nor Beth 
had much, if any, power to impact the outcomes of their cases, given the way the 
criminal justice system is structured.
Finally, some women were upset at their lack of control over the length of the
prosecution process. Often, it took months before the final disposition of a case.
Some women were assigned a new DA midway through the case. Other women told
me stories about their partners’ lawyers filing for multiple continuances, dragging
their cases out for up to a year. All of these proved frustrating. For example, Tricia,
who reported having to go to court “many times” during the prosecution of her ex-
husband, said the following:
I—-I didn’t feel like I had good representation. Every time that [my ex-husband] 
would get a continuance, I would ask [the DA], why does this keep happening? 
Why can’t we go up there and say blah, blah, blah, this is what happened and get 
this over with! Why? And they’d say, “well, his attorney this and his attorney 
that.. But [I was saying], “why aren’t you guys defending me? I mean, I’m the 
victim here! Hello?”
Tricia did not understand why the court repeatedly allowed her ex-husband’s attorney 
to file for multiple continuances. She went to court many times, despite feeling afraid 
to face her ex-husband who had previously threatened to kill her. She told me that 
she felt like she lacked support from the criminal justice system. This was frustrating 
to her, and she attempted to use her victim status (“I mean, I’m the victim here!”) to 
“call forth a remedy” to the situation (Holstein and Miller, 1997) and communicate 
her right to adequate defense.
Robin was also upset about how long it took for her husband’s case to move 
through the system; at the time of our interview, the case had yet to close. The arrest
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was her husband’s second for domestic violence, and she said that at first, she wanted
him to do “the maximum amount of jail time.” She submitted a five page “impact
statement” detailing her experiences with her husband’s violence during the five
years prior to his arrest. However, over the course of the months following this,
Robin became frustrated with how long the case was taking to move through the
system and she changed her mind about wanting to cooperate with the prosecution 
process. She explained:
It seems like once my husband got into the system, the system was very interested 
in quote unquote protecting his rights and they set up all of these court dates that 
really, just from my viewpoint, unnecessarily dragged this whole thing out. We’re
looking at something that happened in November and it may be June or July_if it
does to go trial—before it’s even gonna hit the courts. And to me, that is not quick 
justice. To me. ..my husband is out there doing whatever. He’s working, he’s 
going to school; his life is not affected. Realistically the amount of time, even if he 
was found guilty by a jury, the amount of jail time he might get is gonna be shorter 
than what amount of time passes for this whole court thing to happen. And that 
doesn’t make any sense to m e.. .I’m gonna be drug through the mud, you know 
this, that and the other thing. It’s not worth it. This whole thing has not been 
worth it to me. It’s caused more pain and more stress than it has alleviated.. ..1 
mean.. .this should be able to be taken care of within two or three months, not nine 
or ten. That’s ridiculous. And the reason the courts are backed up is because 
t ey re so interested in protecting the rights of the perpetrator then the victim’s 
rights, which one of the rights to a victim is for a speedy conclusion. I’m sorry.
Nine to ten months is not a speedy conclusion.
Robin was ready and willing to testify against her husband and participate in his
prosecution when he was first arrested. In fact, she wanted him to be sentenced to jail
for what he did to her. However, the process was taking so long that she became
frustrated and withdrew her support, declaring, “It’s not worth it.” Robin believed
that the criminal justice system is more concerned with protecting the rights of the
offender that the rights of the victim. This led her to conclude that the system does
not care about what happens to the victim in domestic violence cases. She said:
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“I’ve really felt like honestly nobody cares about what happens to me in all of this. 
So maybe I don t matter. I guess that’s the major thing that’s been coming up. And 
the only thing [that] matters is what the DA, what they want: win the case.”
It is possible that Robin’s resistance would be read by members of the 
criminal justice system as proof that she wanted to reconcile with her husband. As 
we have seen, women who do not cooperate with the prosecution of their abuser (and 
who do not follow the “cultural script”) are frequently viewed with suspicion, their 
lack of cooperation viewed as “proof’ of their passivity, ignorance, lack of self­
esteem, emotional connection to their abuser, and/or rebellion. As Wittner (1998) 
found in her study of the happenings in a domestic violence court, “Immersed in the 
logic of legal discourse and in professional concerns with winnable cases, admissible 
evidence, and compliant witnesses, lawyers and court workers rarely contemplated 
the drawbacks involved in using the law as they prescribed” (p. 89). Indeed, as Robin 
demonstrates, women’s reasons for not cooperating with the prosecution process are 
complex and may be more illustrative of problems with the criminal justice system 
than shortcomings of particular women.
Agency and Resistance
Some women that I interviewed were able to successfully use the criminal 
justice system to achieve their needs. In fact, several women expressed a belief that 
women in abusive relationships should always cooperate with the system in the arrest 
and prosecution of their abusers. As one woman stated, “The system, the justice 
system, they can’t really do anything if you’re not helping them...” For women who 
received the support and assistance they felt they deserved and achieved their desired
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outcome, being involved in the prosecution process was empowering. Take, for
example, Angela, who said that going to court helped her to realize her husband’s
“crime” was against her and that she was a victim. She said:
A lot of times you get to thinking, well, maybe I’m not such a victim, maybe I’ve 
done this, maybe I’ve done that. But when you’re actually sitting right there, you 
realize that you are the victim. And it helps, it helped me. I don’t know about other 
people. It helped me to stand my ground, to keep pushing forward.
But, for many women, the process was not this beneficial. For women who were not
recognized as legitimate victims, and for women who believed their needs and wants
were not heard and/or accounted for, involvement in the criminal justice system was
not a positive or useful experience. Consider the astute observations of Tiffany, a 28
year-old African American, on the usefulness of the criminal justice for battered 
women:
I think if you, if you’re willing to go through pressing charges, and getting 
restraining orders and things like that, then they’re fine with it, depending on how 
long you were in the relationship. If you were in the relationship for a period of 
time, then they look down on you, (mimicking them): “why would you stay that 
long, why didn’t you do this earlier.” And then even if.. .you press charges and 
then don’t follow through with it and want to drop the charges later or something 
like that, then it’s “you asked for it” type thing. And I think that’s wrong, I 
mean.. .we want [the abusers] away.. .A lot of the times, you sit back and you think 
about [the violence], and it’s like, “I knew that was going to make her mad, make 
him mad, whatever, I shouldn’t have done it. I shouldn’t have said it.” We have to 
go through that enough without someone else pointing the finger, like, you know, 
“you should’ve done this.. .and why didn’t you do this sooner... and this is the 
right thing and punish them, punish them, punish them, punish them type thing. It 
doesn t help us out any. And then, I don’t know.. .1 think there should be 
more.. .they should be more trying to find out what it is that woman’s feeling, what 
it is that she s going through, because we’re putting ourselves through enough as it 
is, we don’t need no one else putting us through more.
Many of the women I interviewed believed that the criminal justice system, 
with all of its policies, rules, and regulations, is simply not able to take into account 
women’s individual experiences. As Hopper (2001) found in his study of divorce
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proceedings, many divorcing people who seek legal help encounter a legal system 
that works in terms of a “legal self,” which Hopper defines as “a self that is grounded 
not in the particulars of their own situations.. .but in a system of generalized, 
bureaucratic rules...” (p. 127). Similarly, while the women I spoke with wanted an 
opportunity to present the details of their individual situation, the very nature of the 
criminal justice system prohibited this. Police officers, judges, and attorneys, as 
agents of the state, are bestowed with institutional power and it is they who 
determines what is said and when, not citizens. Many women reported feeling as if 
they were not heard at the time of the arrest and/or during the prosecution process and 
as a result, they did not believe the system cared about them as individuals. As one 
woman stated, the criminal justice system simply viewed her case as “business as 
usual.” For many women, their experiences with the criminal justice system were so 
negative that they did not want future involvement with it. Almost one-half of the 
women I interviewed told me that they were either hesitant to use the criminal justice 
system again or would definitely not use it again, as a result of their negative 
experiences. One woman told me she had “lost faith in the system” and another told 
me said she “wouldn’t trust them for shit.”
Despite the constraining nature of the criminal justice system, women did 
what they could to assert some degree of power and control. Baker (1997) found that 
the battered women she interviewed attempted to use the dominant cultural script to 
get away and stay from their abusive partners. However, she argues that not only did 
the women find the script limiting in many ways, but institutional support was 
lacking: the social-service, law enforcement, and legal systems did not provide the
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assistance necessary for women to negotiate a successful resolution to their problems. 
The complexity and difficulties of individual battered women’s lives were not 
acknowledged” (p. 56).4 Many of the women that I interviewed also attempted to 
follow this script but, for the reasons discussed above, found it problematic. Further, 
some women rejected the script outright, from the moment their partner was arrested 
against their wishes. Baker found that given the script’s limitations, the battered 
women she spoke with often resisted it by “staying with their abuser, ignoring and 
lifting restraining orders, and refusing to call or cooperate with police” (p. 56). The 
women that I interviewed often engaged in similar behaviors. Thus, my data 
confirms Baker’s conclusions; however, my work goes further by demonstrating that 
the women s resistance frequently continues throughout the prosecution process.
Women s resistance was at times direct, and at other times more subtle.
Some women, like Robin, withdrew their participation from the prosecution process
(or never gave it to begin with). Some women refused to go to court, despite being
subpoenaed. Many women, however, went to court and/or repeatedly attempted to
speak to court officials to make their wishes known. Women like Beth, Susan, and
Tricia, all made numerous attempts to get someone to listen to them. Another
woman, Karen, told me that she finally got people in the criminal justice system to
listen to her and take her seriously once she changed how she interacted with them:
Karen: They’re taking [my husband’s violence] more seriously. And I can see that 
from past experience to this last one. And it has a lot to do with my attitude 
towards them and their attitude towards me. Cause if you go to them and say “well 
you guys never do nothing” you know, nobody’s going to take you seriously.
Amy: So how do you think your attitude towards them changed?
Karen. Well, finally, to the point where I said, “Do you realize how many times 
this has happened?” And [I] said it in a calm voice. And [I said], “I will not allow 
it. Somebody needs to be accountable for it.” So you have to take ownership of
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following through. You have to say, “This is my job.”
Further, at times, women resisted identities that agents of the criminal justice
system attempted to bestow upon them. As Fox (2001) argues, while institutions set
the conditions of possibility for self-construction, “selves cannot be institutionally
dictated or determined” (p. 191). Women often challenged the criminal justice
system agents’ interpretations of their actions and words that they believed were
wrong and by doing so, attempted to construct alternative selves. Additionally, they
used their identities to assert their rights when they felt these rights were neglected by
the criminal justice system, claiming “Fm the victim here.” One interesting
discursive move utilized by some of the women involved the appropriation of victim
discourse to highlight ways in which they felt victimized by the criminal justice
system. Veronica, who was arrested after defending herself against her boyfriend’s
attack, said she was a victim of the system. When I asked her if she thought she was
a victim, she answered affirmatively and said:
And it wasn’t necessarily from the hitting, believe me. The hitting was just one 
thing, by for me, that was over and done. It’s just, once I got hit, it’s, like, “OK, got 
to take another step in life; another direction.” But from all this stuff that I had to 
go through after that [with the police and the court]...that really dug it into me. 
Losing my home and job and my daughters going through so much; it was just 
crazy. So to me, I felt like I was [a victim] the whole way.
Veronica saw herself more of a victim of the criminal justice—which she believed
caused her to be wrongly arrested, resulting in the loss of her job and home—than of
a victim of her boyfriend. The hitting was something that, for her, was “over and
done” but the ramifications of her arrest were far more lasting.
Women’s resistance to the institutional power of the criminal justice system 
and the limits it sets on self-construction took many forms. This resistance was not
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always successful. However, the important point is that women were not completely 
powerless in their interactions with agents of the criminal justice system and they 
demonstrated agency in their attempts to craft “institutional selves” (Spencer, 2001) 
that would enable them to be heard by police officers, attorneys, and judges, get their 
needs met, and ultimately, end the violence in their lives.
Summary
In this chapter I have demonstrated how the discursive environments of 
institutions shape and limit interaction and self-construction. There are many 
interactional processes at work during battered women’s involvement with the 
criminal justice system. The women I interviewed attempted to present their 
situations and thus, their selves, in specific ways during their interactions with police 
officers, attorneys, and/or judges in order to influence both the proceedings and the 
outcomes of the criminal cases in which they were involved. Simultaneously, women 
described how their words and behaviors were interpreted in particular ways by 
police officers, attorneys, and/or judges. All of these processes were centered in 
available discourses surrounding domestic violence—these discourses include 
criminal justice policies, dominant representations of the “battered woman” and the 
“victim,” and cultural prescriptions about how battered women should act.
Not only have we seen in this chapter, once again, that “victim” and 
“battered woman” discourses are limited and restrictive, but we also have seen how 
the criminal justice system produces and enforces such discourses and the identities 
they offer (Merry, 1995a). If there existed a discrepancy between a woman’s self­
presentations and the way she was interpreted by a police officer, attorney, and/or
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judge, because agents of the criminal justice system are backed by institutional 
power, ultimately, it was their interpretations (and not the women’s presentations) 
that prevailed. This often came with direct costs to the women. As Martha Mahoney 
(1991) states:
...cultural assumptions about domestic violence affect substantive law and 
methods of litigation in ways that in turn affect society’s perceptions of women; 
both law and societal perceptions affect women’s understandings of our own lives, 
relationships, and options; our lives are part of the culture that affects legal 
interpretation and within which further legal moves are made. Serious harm to 
women results from the ways in which law and culture distort our experience (p 
2)
Given that discourses shape subjectivity, the labeling of a woman as a 
“victim,” a “battered woman,” or an “abuser” by agents of the criminal justice system 
determined not only her allowable words and actions, but also the acceptable 
remedies for her situation. Thus, while some women reported having positive 
experiences with the criminal justice system, many did not. Not only did some 
women believe they were wrongly arrested, but others believed that the structure of 
the criminal justice system barred them from having a voice and/or any control over 
the processing of their cases and the eventual outcomes. Policies that encourage or 
mandate arrest and prosecution in domestic violence cases were implemented to 
remove discretion from criminal justice system workers in an attempt to ensure that 
these cases were treated uniformly. However, as many have argued, such policies 
also limit women’s choices and strip them of having control over their cases (Baker, 
1997; Hoyle, 1998). As my research shows, the actual experiences of many battered 
women demonstrate the truth of this. While some women praised these policies, most
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did not, finding them incapable of addressing the diverse nature of women’s 
individual experiences.
In this chapter, I also demonstrated further ways in which battered women 
exercise agency. Mahoney (1994) argues that, “social stereotypes and cultural 
expectations about the behavior of battered women help to hide women’s acts of 
resistance and struggle” (p. 60). Indeed, for many of the women I interviewed, 
resistance was something other than leaving their relationship and cooperating with 
the criminal justice system. As Mahoney maintains, women’s responses to 
violence—and, I would argue, to unwanted forms of criminal justice system 
intervention—are “shaped by the needs, struggles, and commitments of our lives” (p. 
60). In spite of the constraints imposed by the institutional and structural power of 
the criminal justice system, the women I spoke with used a variety of tactics to be 
heard, to communicate their needs and wants, to use the criminal justice system to 
their advantage, to resist potentially damaging constructions of identity and 
prescriptions on how to act, and ultimately, to end the violence in their lives.
NOTES
1 According to this “dominant cultural script,” women are required to leave their abusers, maintain 
restraining orders, and call and cooperate with the police. Clearly, this script is strongly tied to 
mainstream discourses that advocate for the criminalization of domestic violence and assert that the 
criminal justice system provides the best means for addressing woman battering.
2 See Chapter One for a discussion of viewing policy as discourse.
3 No-contact orders differ from permanent restraining orders. A no-contact order is a temporary 
criminal restraining order prohibiting the victim and defendant from having any contact with each 
other until the final disposition of the case. Parties may have no-contact orders lifted prior to the 
closing of the case by petitioning the judge. Permanent restraining orders are issued after the party 
requesting the restraining order appears before a judge and demonstrates proof that they are in danger 
from the party to be “restrained.”
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4 Indeed, in Chapter Four, I demonstrated how all of the prosecutors who took part in the study I 
worked with supported this script. None of them acknowledged that leaving a relationship may be 
more dangerous than staying for some women. Further, some of the prosecutors expressed anger and 
frustration at the women they worked with who did not cooperate with the criminal justice system’s 
prosecution of their abusive partners.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion
Drawing from bell hooks, Ferraro (1996) states that “domestic violence 
discourse is ‘a place of struggle’ which shapes experiences and subjectivity” (p. 79). 
In this dissertation, I have attempted to illuminate these processes. I first traced the 
cultural roots of modem day domestic violence discourses, focusing primarily on the 
way they have been shaped by the battered women’s movement and the criminal 
justice system. In particular, I examined dominant cultural constructions of the 
“victim” and the “battered woman.” Next, I explored how twenty-one prosecutors 
from three different jurisdictions both drew from and challenged hegemonic 
representations of battered women in their work. Finally, I examined the ways in 
which these representations influenced the identity work of forty women who were 
abused by an intimate partner and who were in some way involved with the criminal 
justice system because of this abuse. This involved an exploration of how women 
used domestic violence discourses in their processes of self-construction, in framing 
and making sense of their experiences, and in their self-representations during 
interactions with police officers, attorneys, and judges. In this chapter, I briefly 
discuss how an examination of domestic violence discourse has been central to my 
work. I then consider conclusions in three areas: issues of agency and resistance; the 
effects of the criminalization of domestic violence; and women’s perceived 
responsibility in their abusive relationships.
To begin, a central component of this dissertation has been to illustrate how 
discourse mediates experience and constructs subjectivity. Gubrium and Holstein
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(2001) argue that in the postmodern world, “social relationships have come under the 
purview of countless institutions—schools, correctional facilities, clinics, family 
courts, support groups, and self-improvement programs, among others—that function 
increasingly to assemble, alter, and reformulate our identities” (p. 9). Thus, we are 
provided with a multitude of “discursive environments” for identity work. According 
to the authors, these distinctive milieus for self-construction comprise institutional 
discourses that characterize particular settings but they also encompass the practical 
contingencies of interaction as well as the material features of the environments, as 
they are interpretively brought to bear on self-construction” (p. 13). Indeed, after 
woman battering was brought to public attention in the early 1970s, a variety of social 
institutions and groups—such as shelters for battered women, counseling centers, 
academia, and the criminal justice system—began constructing this problem in 
different, although often interconnected, ways. Thus, particular discourses originated 
from each. While many of the women that I interviewed had experiences with 
several of these institutions, my focus has been on their experiences with the criminal 
justice system, in particular. Arguably, such a focus is especially relevant when 
examining the impact of domestic violence discourses, given the “ascendance of 
crime control strategies within the discourse(s)” (Ferraro, 1996, p. 88).
I have argued that domestic violence discourse mediates the experiences of all 
social agents involved in the criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence. 
Domestic violence discourses situate battered women and shape and constrains their 
words, actions, and identities. However, it does the same for agents of the criminal 
justice system. While there are certainly some differences in these processes, as
power intersects each subject position differently, all of the social “players” are 
embedded in the relationship that exists between discourse and subjectivity. 
Therefore, interactions between these players are also structured by available 
discourses. Further, given that the criminal justice system is characterized by 
multiple discourses, there are various possibilities for self-construction. The 
identities of women who are abused by an intimate partner are not simply determined 
by the criminal justice system. The criminal justice system does, however, “operate 
from a position of discursive advantage” and ultimately shapes the realm of 
possibilities for self-construction (Fox, 2001, p. 191). Thus, the control that women 
have over how they are perceived and the ways in which their cases are handled by 
agents of the criminal justice system is limited.1
This brings me to the first finding that I wish to discuss: women’s agency and 
resistance. The women I interviewed demonstrated agency in two major ways: 
through processes of self-construction and through embodied resistance to the 
institutional power of the criminal justice system. While discourses create a limited 
field of possibilities for victims of intimate partner violence in their self-construction 
and interactions with criminal justice system professionals, the identities of the 
women I interviewed were not a given. They drew from competing discourses in 
order to both alter and resist identities that were bestowed upon them, and to 
construct and consolidate identities of their choosing. All of this was done in efforts 
to achieve their goals and maintain some level of control over their experiences in the 
criminal justice system. Thus, my research demonstrates that women resisted 
hegemonic discourses by challenging them and creating counterdiscourses (Davis and
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Fisher, 1993). As Fraser (1997) argues, while “the notion of hegemony points to the 
intersection of power, inequality, and discourse,” groups in power do not maintain 
exclusive control over meaning; instead, “conflict and contestation are part of the 
story” (p. 154).
Some have argued that focusing on discourse and counter-discourse will never 
translate into effective feminist politics because discursive resistance to power does 
nothing to actually transform power relations (Hartsock, 1990). Yet, as Fraser (1989) 
argues, “struggles over cultural meanings and social identities are struggles for.. .the 
power to construct authoritative definitions of social situations and legitimate 
interpretations of social needs” (p. 6). Further, Davis and Fisher (1993) argue that 
exploring the “tensions between structured forms of constraint and women’s agency” 
is important (pp. 12-13). This has been a central purpose of my dissertation. The 
women I interviewed wanted to be able to construct their own identities and form 
their own interpretations of their experiences and circumstances. Additionally, they 
had clear and definitive ideas about what they needed and desired. They did what 
they could to put these processes into motion, not only by attempting to craft their 
own selves, but by taking action. Many of them did what they could to be heard and 
use the criminal justice system to their advantage. When this failed, they often 
refused to go along with what agents of the criminal justice system expected of them. 
Hence, despite the constraining nature of the criminal justice system, the women were 
not completely helpless and powerless. Their narratives demonstrate their refusal to 
be confined—and defined—by the victim/agency dichotomy that so frequently shapes 
cultural perceptions of battered women (Mahoney, 1994).
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My second conclusion and the one that I wish to pay most attention to
prompts important questions for social change. An important component of this
dissertation has been to examine the effects of the way in which the problem of
woman battering is currently framed. And, as I have demonstrated, the framing of
this issue as primarily a criminal one has not always had positive ramifications for
battered women. Consider Ferraro’s (1996) words:
[Domestic violence] discourse is a feminist victory, on one side, as it has urged 
social recognition of women’s oppression and developed material resources and 
institutions specifically addressed to the problem. It is simultaneously a feminist 
nightmare, as it has absorbed grassroots struggles into the machinery of social 
engineering and mass mediation, reinscribing patterns of race, class, and gender 
domination, (p. 77)
As I discussed in the first several chapters, the criminalization of domestic violence 
has effectively severed the analysis of woman battering from its political roots. As 
Schneider (2000) states, under the legal discourse of “crime control,” “intimate 
violence becomes just one other ‘crime’ problem that is unmoored from its social, 
historical, and cultural context” (p. 230).
The criminalization of domestic violence led to the notion that the criminal 
justice system is the venue through which it is “best” addressed. According to Pitch 
(1995), to demand the criminalisation of an act implies then to problematise it in a 
particular way. She continues: “And because the criminalising response is in its 
very nature a rigid response, allowing no gradations, continuities of evaluation, 
flexible and elaborate understandings, it transfers these characteristics to the problem, 
constraining it within these terms ’ (p. 76). She argues that the very nature of the 
criminal justice system necessitates the simplification of a social problem into very 
black and white terms; the demarcation between the “victim” and the “offender” is
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clearly defined and both of these categories are constructed rigidly. For Pitch, this 
has significant consequences. First, there is no recognition of “difference”: “from the 
legal standpoint, ideally, there are neither men nor women, neither rich nor poor, 
neither black nor white” (p. 77). People are either “offenders” or “victims.” The 
second consequence is that criminalization results in the framing of problems as 
issues of individual responsibility. Pitch states, “to criminalise a problem means 
imputing it to clearly identifiable individuals, with the consequence that it is only 
these who will come to be rendered accountable for the problem” (p. 77). Finally, 
Pitch argues that criminalization, while legitimating a collective identity of people 
who the state becomes “obliged to protect,” effectively removes self-determination 
(p. 77). As she puts it: “Specific actors disappear within the much wider category of 
victims” (p. 78). Indeed, my research has highlighted all of these processes at work 
during the prosecution of domestic violence cases. The gendered context in which 
woman battering most often occurs is ignored, as are the structural, social, and 
cultural factors that produce and perpetuate the problem and limit women’s abilities 
to effectively end the violence in their lives. Further, as I have already discussed, 
each individual woman’s identity becomes subsumed by larger discursive processes 
that dictate how she is viewed.
This leads to the question of whether or not the criminal justice system is the 
best place to address and remedy woman battering. Schneider (2000) argues the 
importance of linking the “general” with the “specific” in feminist lawmaking on 
battering; for her, responses to domestic violence need to be able to take individual 
women’s experiences into account, while simultaneously recognizing how battering is
255
connected to broader social patterns of gender subordination. However, as my work 
demonstrates, this has proven difficult given the current structure of the criminal 
justice system and the implementation of uniform policies. While mandatory arrest 
and prosecution policies fail to take women’s situated “specific” experiences into 
account, the criminal justice system as an institution fails to address the “general” 
gendered context in which battering most often occurs.
I argue that if criminal justice system interventions continue to be viewed as 
the most appropriate solution to woman battering, we must question the value of 
mandatory policies that dictate the uniform treatment of all women’s cases. 
Addressing the historical lack of action by police officers and criminal justice 
professionals, along with their maltreatment of women in their responses to woman 
battering, is essential if the criminal justice system remains the central means of 
redressing domestic violence. But my research indicates that the determination of 
when uniform policies should be in place and when women’s individual life 
circumstances should be considered is an area of unresolved struggle. A further issue 
centers on who decides these matters. The state? Feminists? Battered women 
themselves? At odds here is who makes decisions about when and how the criminal 
justice system is involved with domestic violence, and hence, the lives of battered 
women.
The criminalization of domestic violence and the implementation of 
mandatory policies originated from the attempts of battered women’s advocates (and 
others) to alter hegemonic interpretations of women battering. While this was 
certainly beneficial in some ways, we must also consider the costs of such a change.
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The battered women’s movement challenged notions that battering was a “private”
matter, instead demanding that it be viewed as a public concern. Many legal scholars
continue to argue that “concepts of privacy permit, encourage, and reinforce violence
against women” (Schneider, 2000). However, the framing of domestic violence as
solely a public issue upholds the public/private dichotomy. Not only do women not
have any control over what aspects of their lives are private and what are public, but
bracketed is any consideration of the possibility that there is a “grey” area where
women, at their own choosing, are in the middle of the public and private realms or
moving back and forth between them. Schneider (2000) writes:
“Privacy” is selectively invoked as a rationale for immunity in order to protect 
male domination. For example, when the police do not respond to a battered 
woman’s call for assistance, or when a civil court refuses to evict her assailant, the 
woman is relegated to self-help, while the man who beats her receives the law’s 
tacit encouragement and support, (p. 88)
However, what are we to make of claims by battered women that what happens in
their relationships is also an issue of “privacy” in order for them to avoid forced
intervention by the criminal justice system? Or, what of women who purposefully
avoid public means of addressing the violence in their lives because of their lack of
control over these means? More than a few of the women that I interviewed vowed to
avoid utilizing the criminal justice system to combat any future violence they may
experience from their abusers, saying they would handle it “themselves.” These were
women who did not have satisfactory experiences with the criminal justice system
and did not like losing control over how their cases were handled. Most women
wanted assistance in dealing with the violence in their lives, but often they did not
like the type of help they received or the accompanying stipulations.
257
Current cultural discourses frame domestic violence as an issue of crime 
control. As such, battered women are expected to remedy the violence in their lives 
through use of—and full cooperation with—the criminal justice system. I, along with 
many others, have demonstrated that many women either do not want to fully 
cooperate with the criminal justice system or, for a variety of reasons, find doing so 
disadvantageous. Researchers such as Ford (1991) and Wittner (1998) have shown 
how women may go back and forth between the public and private realms when 
attempting to stop the violence from their partners. Ford demonstrated how a woman 
would sometimes file charges against her abusers but later drop them in order to 
exercise power in the relationship and to demonstrate “that she is the one in charge 
and that only she can alter events which are destined to bring a man to court and 
possibility to jail” (p. 331). Battered women may also file for restraining orders but 
continue to live with their partners, using the restraining order as a similar power 
resource. These women temporarily enter into the public realm and then retreat back 
into the private, using the threat of re-entry into the public as leverage to control their 
partner’s violence. However, criminal justice professionals often view these acts as 
“manipulative.” Because domestic violence is currently viewed as an issue of public 
concern, if women do not remedy the problem completely through public means—in 
the manner dictated by the state—they are accused of manipulating the system for 
private ends and may be denied future assistance. Thus, the issue is forced back into 
the private realm. Unacknowledged are ways in which poor people, women, and/or 
people of color have been shown to creatively use the criminal justice system as a 
strategy of dispute management” (Merry, 1995a) or as a “power resource” (Ford,
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1991, Wittncr, 1998) to further their own interests. Again, I argue that current 
discourses framing woman battering as a completely public issue neglect the political 
question of who should decide if, when, and how things should be public or private.
Okin (1991) reflects feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy when 
she states that “the liberal ideal of the non-intervention of the state into the domestic 
realm, rather than maintaining neutrality, in fact reinforces existing inequalities 
within that realm” (p. 83). My own research, in fact, demonstrates how when police 
refuse to respond to battered women’s calls for help, women are at risk of further 
abuse. However, my work also demonstrates some of the potential problems that 
arise when women are forced to address violence in their lives through complete 
public means, particularly when these means are the criminal justice system—an 
institution that also reinforces existing social inequalities and hierarchies. The current 
structure of the criminal justice system—including mandatory arrest policies— 
clarifies and makes static who makes decision about battered women’s lives and 
when; this has proved disempowering to women.
I am by no means arguing that protection orders and the arrest and prosecution 
of batterers are not useful or in the best interests of some battered women—clearly in 
many cases they have been life-saving. However, they are not desired by all women, 
nor do they always “protect the woman, change her partner’s intimate behavior, or 
create life support and alternatives to enable her to be safe” (Scnheider, 2000, p. 92). 
Theorists such as Brown (1995) question whether or not the state can effectively 
address imbalances of power and resulting “injuries.” She argues that an effort to 
“outlaw” social injury is, in many ways, troublesome:
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lxes the identities of the injured and the injuring as social positions, and codifies 
as well the meanings of their actions against all possibilities of interdeterminacy 
ambiguity, and struggle for resignification or repositioning. This effort also casts 
the law in particular and the state more generally as neutral arbiters of injury rather 
than as themselves invested with the power to injure, (p. 27)
However, Brown herself allows that the power of the state is by no means monolithic. 
And, as Rosga (1999) argues, it is the complexities of state power that allow social 
actors to use the state against itself.” Focusing specifically on state accountability 
and hate crime, Rosga demonstrates how individuals both within and outside of law 
enforcement are aware of the state’s “power to injure” (p. 170). She found that both 
activists and law enforcement officers, in their efforts to define “hate crime” and 
create police policy, “contribute to the ongoing construction of the function and roles 
of law enforcement officers” and thus participate in the negotiation of state- 
accountability (p. 169). As I have demonstrated, similar processes exist surrounding 
domestic violence. Rosga concludes that instead of simply accepting or rejecting 
state-focused” strategies, “we would do well to ask what conditions make it difficult 
to conceptualize non-state-centered strategies”:
What conditions make criminal justice strategies so compelling to activists? Are
such strategies sometimes successful in disrupting the state’s apparent neutrality
albeit in limited and contradictory ways? Do they create spaces of possibility for
mobilizing state power in more just and responsible ways? What are the limits to 
those spaces? (p. 170)
These are important questions, and should be considered by battered woman’s 
advocates in their continued negotiations with the state.
My third and final conclusion involves the issue of battered women’s 
“responsibility.” As I have illustrated, some of the women that I interviewed believed 
that they were, on some level, responsible for the violence in their relationship; some
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women also believed that it was their responsibility to do whatever necessary to end 
the violence. Talking about women’s responsibility is potentially dangerous, for 
reasons that I have elaborated throughout this dissertation. However, I suspect that 
women’s claims of responsibility represent—at least partially—a need for them to 
feel that they have some degree of control over their lives. As my work 
demonstrates, many battered women rejected depictions of themselves as powerless, 
weak, and helpless. Yet, simultaneously, many of them reported believing that they 
had no control over the criminal justice process or outcome. Because battering is 
primarily viewed as a criminal issue, there are few (if any) other options for women 
who are dissatisfied with the criminal justice system. If women are unhappy with the 
way the criminal justice system responds to the violence in their lives—yet they 
concurrently recognize that there are few other social alternatives to help them—their 
claims of responsibility make sense. Such claims provide them with a means of 
having some degree of power and control over the violence they experience, and 
more broadly, their own lives. As Mahoney (1994) argues, dominant cultural 
representations and expectations about the behavior—and, I would add, words—of 
battered women often conceal women’s struggles and acts of defiance. We must 
consider the possibility that women’s claims of responsibility in their abusive 
relationships may not indicate that they have simply absorbed discourses that blame 
the victim, but may instead reflect awareness by the women that they only have 
themselves to rely on in a society that lacks adequate institutional support for battered 
women.
261
Future discussions about social remedies to domestic violence need to account 
for the diversity of women’s experiences and needs. Linda Mills (1996) writes:
.true empowerment for battered women is achieved not though obedience to the 
expectations of legal or social work advocates or models but through 
acknowledgement of the woman’s need to reconsider and re-evaluate the meaning 
of the trauma in a flexible time frame and a supportive environment, (p. 266)
An effective response to domestic violence needs to acknowledge the historical,
cultural and social context in which it occurs. Cultural constructions of battered
women and victims need to be severed from associations with particular versions of
femininity and should be expanded to account for the experiences of all women,
regardless of their social location. Further, there needs to be greater recognition of
the various steps women take to attempt to stop the abuse they experience and the
constraints they face when doing so. Finally, while women should not be held
individually accountable for ending the violence in their lives, each woman’s unique
circumstances and experiences need to be taken into consideration when social
assistance is offered. To craft a response that takes all of these factors into account is
certainly a challenging task; however doing so is necessary to alleviate domestic
violence while simultaneously empowering women.
NOTES
1 While examining the “identity work” of criminal justice professionals was beyond the scope of this 
project, assumedly these processes are similarly impacted by domestic violence discourses. In other 
words, just as battered women are limited in their self-constructions and self-presentations by available 
discourses, police officers, prosecutors, and judges most likely are limited, as well.
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APPENDIX A
Prosecutor Interview Schedule
1. How are domestic violence cases handled by your office? Can you describe how a 
domestic violence case is handled from beginning to end?
2. What is your overall impression of domestic violence cases?
3. What is your overall impression of victims?
4. What is your overall impression of offenders?
5. Are domestic violence cases treated differently than other criminal cases? If yes, how 
so?
5a. Is your role as a prosecutor different for domestic violence cases than for other types 
of crimes? If yes, how so?
5b. Do you receive any type of specialized training for handling domestic violence cases?
6. What kinds of factors influence the prosecution and conviction of domestic violence 
cases? For Victim? For Offender? For Case Characteristics? For Other?
6a. Are there internal policies that are unique to DV cases which affect case 
screening/charging/decision making?
7. First, what are the most common methods used by the court to separate victims and 
offenders?
7a. How does the court handle dual-arrest/cross-complaint situations?
7b. How does the court determine who is the “true” victim in cross complaint cases or 
whether it is a mutually combative relationship?
8. What is the victim’s role in the prosecution of their cases?
8a. Ideally, how much time should be spent with a victim in preparation for prosecution?
8b. How often and at what state do you ask for victim’s input into their cases?
8c. What are some common methods you might use to make domestic violence victims feel 
supported?
8d. Generally, how satisfied are victims with case outcomes?
9. What is the role of the victim’s advocate in domestic violence cases?
9a. How do women utilize this service? How is it determined who will have contact with a 
victim advocate?
9b. How do you think victims advocates have influenced the prosecution of domestic 
violence cases?
10. Are case dismissals a problem for your office?
10a. Do you have a policy in place that is designed to address case dismissals?
11. How often do domestic violence victims request that their cases be dropped?
11a. What are the primary reasons women give for requesting that charges be dropped?
1 lb. How do you think victim involvement can be encouraged in these cases?
12. Do you feel are in a position to be able to stop the abuse?
12a. What restricts/limits you from being able to stop the abuse?
13. Do you think the CJ response to domestic violence is too lenient? Too harsh? Just right?
14. Do you feel the CJ response to domestic violence is efficient?
14a. What could be done to improve the efficiency of the CJS response to DV?
15. Do you think the CJS is “user-friendly” to victims of domestic violence?
15a. What can be changed to make it more user-friendly?
16. What is your overall impression of the CJ response to DV? What could be changed to 
make the CJS response a better one?
17. Describe the most recent DV case you had.
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APPENDIX B 
Recruitment Flyer
Would you like the opportunity to share your 
police and court experiences with someone?
I am conducting a research project through the University of Rockford examining 
what women who have experienced domestic violence think about the police and the 
courts. I want to know what happened and what you wanted the police and courts to 
do. Did the police and courts help you? Did you feel you had any control in the 
process? Were your opinions taken seriously?
*You must have been the victim in a misdemeanor domestic violence case sometime 
within the past year.
*You will be paid $30.00 for your time.
*1 will meet you at a time and place that works for you.
*1 will keep what you tell me private. Anything you tell me will not change any 
services you receive from the police or the courts.
Interested? Have questions?
♦Call Amy at the RU Prosecution Project at (XXX) XXX-XXXX
OR
*Fill out a permission slip giving the Safehouse staff permission to give me your 
contact information and I will try to reach you. Make sure to indicate when is a safe 
time to call you and whether or not is OK to leave a message.
Your opinions and experiences matter -  please take the time to share
them with me.
The Rockford County/Lanville Prosecutor’s/DA’s Offices assume no responsibility 
for this study. The University of Rockford Criminal Justice System Project assumes 
full responsibility for this study.
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APPENDIX C
Victim Interview Schedule
1. Tell me about the history of your relationship with___________ .
2. Could you review the experiences you have had dealing with the CJS in regards to 
domestic violence? Describe what led to your involvement with the CJS.
3. Tell me about your experiences with the criminal justice system. In general, were 
they positive or negative?
4. Did you choose for the police and courts to become involved in your situation? If 
so, what made you call them? Do you remember what you were feeling/thinking 
at the time? What goal(s) were you hoping to reach with their involvement?
5. How did you feel when they arrived?
6. What did the police do?
7. Did the police present you with any choices? If so, were you satisfied with these 
choices?
8. How much control do you feel you had when dealing with the police? In other 
words, do you think they took into account what you wanted to have happen?
9. Tell me how you felt about the amount of control you feel you had when dealing 
with the police. Were you satisfied with this control?
10. Did you wish other options were available to you besides what you were given by 
the police?
11. Did you go to court? If yes, how did you feel about going there? How did you 
feel while you were there? What influenced your decision to go/not go?
12. Did you ever talk to the prosecutor? Tell me about this experience.
13. Did you ever talk to the VA? How did you feel about your conversations?
14. How much control do you feel you had when dealing with the court system? In 
other words, do you think they took into account what you wanted to have 
happen?
15. Tell me how you felt about the amount of control you feel you had when dealing 
with the courts (DA and/or judge). Were you satisfied with this control?
16. Did the prosecutor and/or judge present you with any choices? If so, were you 
satisfied with these choices?
17. Did you wish other options were available to you besides the options you were 
given in court?
18. Did the police and/or court involvement help you achieve your desired goal(s)?
19. Did you do anything along the way to help you achieve your desired goals? Why 
or why not? If so, tell me about it. How did it feel to be able to do something to 
help achieve your goals? If not, were you upset about this?
20. Do you believe the system took your opinions seriously?
21. Tell me about the outcome of the case. How did you feel about this outcome?
22. How did the process impact your view of the criminal justice system?
23. How do you think the police view victims of domestic violence? How does this 
make you feel?
24. How do you think the courts and DAs view victims of domestic violence? How 
does this make you feel?
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25. Do you think you did anything to challenge those opinions?
26. What does the term “victim” mean to you? How do you relate to this term?
27. What does the term “battered woman” mean to you? How do you relate to this 
term?
28. How did the process impact your relationship with the person arrested for 
physically harming you? How did the process impact any violence you have 
experienced by that person?
29. Would you want the police involved if you were to ever again experience 
violence from the person arrested for physically harming you? Why or why not?
30. Would you want the court involved if you were to ever again experience violence 
from the person arrested for physically harming you? Why or why not?
31. (If she says she wouldn’t want criminal justice system involved): What would you 
do if you were to experience violence again?
32. Do you think there are other resources besides the criminal justice system to assist 
you if you did experience violence again? If so, are they helpful, in your opinion?
33. What, if any, changes would you like to see in how the criminal justice system 
handles violence against women?
34. Did you do anything to empower yourself while dealing both with the violence 
you have experienced and the criminal justice system? In other words, what have 
you done to take care of yourself or make yourself feel stronger or better?
35. Anything else you’d like to say?
36. What did you think of the interview?
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APPENDIX D
List of Interviewees
#1: Pam, 45, white
#2: Valerie, 43, African-American
#3: Tricia, 38, white
#4: Laura, 29, white
#5: Ann, 36, white
#6: Robin, 28, white
#7: Karen, 46, white
#8: Gina, 40, white
#9: Beth, 48, white
#10: Rose, 45, African-American
#11: Jean, 43, white
#12: Kathy, 35, white
#13: Barbara, 36, white
#14: Jewel, 37, African-American
#15: Julia, 21, Hispanic
#16: Paula, 37, white
#17: Tiffany, 28, African-American
#18: Susan, 30, white
#19: Veronica, 25, African-American
#20: Heather, 38, white
#21: Daisy, 47, African-American
#22: Ellen, 56, white
#23: Nicki, 24, African-American
#24: Betsy, 41, white
#25: Gloria, 32, African-American/Hispanic
#26: Carla, 58, African-American/Native American
#27: Florence, 50, white
#28: Marta, 20, Hispanic
#29: Krista, 28, African-American
#30: Tammy, 22, Native American
#31: Rita, 52, African-American
#32: Kim, 46, white
#33: Liz, 41, white
#34: Angela, multiracial
#35: Jan, 43, white
#36: Shondra, 55, African-Amercian
#37: Darla, 36, African-American
#38: Tracy, 37, white
#39: Mary, 40, white
#40: Lauren, 21, white
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